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With this celebration publication, Modern State Development, Capacity, and Institutions, 
we honour Pierre du Toit, an esteemed colleague and mentor to so many Political 
Science students, on his retirement as a professor in Political Science at Stellenbosch 
University. This impressive collection of research articles, mainly with the state as 
focus, written by some of his former higher degree students and colleagues, is an 
indication of the high regard they have for him.
Pierre and I had been colleagues in the Department of Political Science since 1986 and 
from the beginning I was impressed by his scholarship, methodological rigour, original 
ideas, inspired teaching and general academic productivity. It is a near impossible 
task to survey his contribution to Political Science in any detail in this brief preface. 
However, this short summary of the influence that he has on Political Science, in 
South Africa and internationally, will clearly show how prolific he was as a researcher, 
supervisor of post-graduate students and lecturer to undergraduate students. 
Trained at Stellenbosch University Pierre’s first permanent appointment was at the 
University of the Western Cape in 1976 after three years in part-time lecturing posts at 
Stellenbosch. Three years later, in 1979 he was appointed as lecturer at Stellenbosch 
where he moved through the ranks to reach the level of professor in 2001. During this 
time he received several research grants from the Human Sciences Research Council 
(HSRC) and also served four years in the middle 1990s as editor of Politikon, flagship 
journal of Political Science in South Africa. Besides two co-authored books in 1987 
and 1990, he also published his first sole author book, Power Plays – Bargaining Tactics 
for Transforming South Africa in 1991 that dealt with the difficult choices that had to 
be made during the negotiation process for a democratic South Africa. During this 
time he also participated with top researchers at the International Conflict Research 
Institute at Ulster University in a five nation comparative study on peace and conflict 
where he made excellent research contributions and broaden his network within the 
field of peace and conflict studies. 
In the early nineties he received the prestigious Peace Fellow Award by the Jennings 
Randolph Program for International Peace which allowed him to spend a year at the 
United States Institute of Peace in Washington, DC. This was followed by another 
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research sabbatical in 2002 in the USA when he was awarded a Fulbright New 
Scholars Award to work on ethnic and cultural conflict within and across national 
borders. Closer to home the quality and impact of his research output was also 
recognised by the high rating as an “internationally recognised” researcher awarded 
by the National Research Foundation in 2003. 
In his research Pierre concentrated mainly on state-building, peace processes, 
ethnic conflict, and democratic consolidation and identity politics. Very few political 
scientists in South Africa managed to draw international attention to their research. 
However, Pierre managed to do just that with at least two of his three sole authored 
monographs. His research at the United States Institute of Peace in 1992/1993 
resulted in the publication of State Building and Democracy in Southern African in 
1995, where he built on solid theories and a deep understanding of the importance 
of empirical research. It focuses on the role of the state in political transitions. In the 
American Political Science Review (90:4, 1996) the leading Political Science journal in 
the USA, James R. Scarritt opined that the “…combination of sophisticated macro-
theory and solid micro-foundations means that this book will make a significant 
contribution to thinking about democratic sustainability in Africa, even for those who 
do not agree with every point made in it.” 
In his next book, South Africa’s Brittle Peace – The Problem of Post Settlement Violence, 
published in 2001 by the highly regarded publishers, Palgrave-Macmillan, he 
shifted the emphasis to an important element of political transitions, namely the 
peace processes. This book showcased the ease with which he managed to apply 
and analyse the theoretical contributions of world famous social scientists like 
Charles Tilly, Michael Mann and Martin van Creveld in the South African context. 
Undoubtedly, a book that pointed to a new approach and unique direction in this 
field. It is an outstanding contribution with very original conceptualisations of new 
phenomena in the field of peace and conflict.
He also brought his knowledge and vast experience as a researcher in the field of 
democratic transitions to the Transformation Research Initiative which was establish 
in 2001 and renamed in 2015 to the Transformation Research Unit (TRU) attached to 
the Centre for International and Comparative Politics at Stellenbosch University. With 
the World Values Survey as basis the team of international experts’ contribution on 
democratic transitions focused on a number of the “most different cases” (Poland, 
South Korea, South African, Chile and Turkey) with Sweden and Germany, being 
established democracies, as “control cases”. He delivered close to ten chapters in 
three book publications of TRU. The first of which, Democracy under Construction – 
Preface
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Patterns from Four Continents, was described by the renowned political scientist, Philip 
Schmitter, as “…a major, even seminal volume. No one interested in democratization, 
including a sceptic like myself, can afford not to come to terms with both its method 
and its findings”. 
Three co-authored books, all in the broad field of transitions and democracy, by 
Pierre since 2011 are an indication of his academic productivity. Moreover, it is also 
an indication of his accommodating nature without abandoning his high academic 
standard – a co-authored work needs a give-and-take approach. What impresses 
most, is also his originality and discipline when it comes to academic writing. One does 
not only see it in his books but also in the close to forty academic articles published 
in top journals as well as his numerous chapter contributions to edited books. As a 
lecturer his contribution and appreciation by undergraduate students were always 
reflected in the high ratings given to Pierre by the students. On a postgraduate level, 
especially on M- and PhD-level Pierre delivered many top students, a number of 
whom joined academia. 
There are but a few South African political scientists that achieved the same level of 
local and international recognition for their contribution to the field of comparative 
political analysis as Pierre du Toit. 
Despite his substantial contribution to Political Science in South Africa, Pierre 
managed to have a balanced family life with interesting outdoor hobbies, such 
as mountaineering in his younger days and more lately mountain biking and 
longboarding. All this mixed in with long, mostly camping trips exploring Southern 
Africa on holiday with his wife Laura and two sons Chris and Leon. 
Hennie Kotzé
Professor Emeritus 








There exists a vast amount of literature on theories of the state, which mainly 
differs on what the nature of state power is and should be. In addition, there are also 
different perceptions on what the role of the state is and/or should be. The purpose 
of this chapter is not to provide a complete literature review of the abovementioned 
topics, but rather to focus on a number of conceptual clarifications of the state, 
based on state-society relations.1 The majority of the research on this topic utilises 
Migdal’s (1988, 1994 and 2001) state-in-society approach in a comparative or case 
study design and there exists an opportunity for theoretical contributions, based on 
the more recent development of the position of the state locally, and globally. 
That said there is a central proposition that grounds the majority of state-centred 
literature namely that: “…national states constitute the building blocks of legitimate 
world order…” (Rotberg, 2003:1). Accordingly, there is a focus on the search for 
the perfect formula and method in order to construct the state, which will indeed 
provide a system that will be the building blocks of a legitimate world order. These 
studies usually include an analysis of state failure and processes involving state 
reconstruction. However, there exists literature that is based on the proposition that 
the nation state is not the most important actor of authority in order to create a 
legitimate world order. Studies constructed on this proposition include an analysis 
of other actors of authority, both domestic and international. Accordingly, there 
is a broad theme that covers all literature: the question of the durability of the 
traditional Westphalian notion of the state. This literature survey is constructed on 
the proposition that the nation-state is the building block of a legitimate world order 
and the most essential institution in the political sphere, with specific reference to 
the local political sphere, and not the global. 
1 The chapter will not focus on state-society relations in situations of conflict, or on relationship re-
construction in post-war states.
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The chapter will focus on state-society relations, concentrating on (amongst other 
works) the work of Joel S. Migdal (1988). Migdal (1988) looks at states from the 
perspective of states in society and more specifically, strong societies and weak 
states, thus state-society relations, with specific reference to state capabilities. 
In order to measure the social capabilities of the state, Migdal (1988) uses three 
concepts, namely compliance, participation and legitimacy. A brief overview will 
also be provided on state weakness, failure and collapse. Professor Pierre du Toit 
has through his academic career focussed on the different writings of Migdal, for 
example in his book State-building and democracy in Southern Africa: A comparative 
study of Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe (1995). His analysis and interpretation 
of J.S. Migdal’s contribution to state theory, was the main inspiration for this text. 
This chapter will continuously refer to the relationship between the state and non-
state actors (located within society). Within the state system, there can be the 
presence of non-state actors as social forces that may or may not work in favour 
of the state in sustaining the balance of power. Thus, there may or may not be a 
mutually beneficial relationship that works in favour of either the state or certain 
actors within the society. The contrasting view will also be discussed: rival social 
organisations (as an indicator of strong societies), with specific reference to local 
rival social organisations (as opposed to regional and international). 
Understanding the State: A Conceptual Framework 
There have been a number of seminal academic works based on the position, 
authority and continuance of the state in the global world order (for example Van 
Creveld, 1999; Strange, 1996 and Evans, Reuschemeyer and Skocpol, 1985 and 
Dryzek and Dunleavy, 2009). Van Creveld (1999) notes that although the state has 
been the most important of all modern institutions, a number of the functions of 
the state have been taken over by other actors, both local and domestic, and as a 
result, he observed a decline in the power, functions and capabilities of the state. 
Factors that led to the decline of the state include: the retreat of the welfare state, 
the waning of major wars, globalisation and the advancement of technology and 
also the withdrawal of faith that citizens have in the state. For example, Susan 
Strange (1996) refers to the decline of the state as the retreat of the state. Strange 
(1996) postulates that the state has lost political authority over the society and the 
economy, and discusses a series of non-state authorities in the international political 
economy, which have taken over some of the functions of the state. Thus, as there 
has been a decline in state authority, there exists: “… a diffusion of authority to other 
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institutions and associations, and to local and regional bodies…” (Strange, 1996:4). 
One proposition that is provided as support for this argument is that a state’s 
authority has been weakened by technological and financial change and the rise of 
a single global market economy. As a result of the retreat of the nation-state, what 
exists is a: “…yawning hole of non-authority…” (Strange, 1996:14). A power void or 
gap will accordingly exist, which will have the potential to be filled by an authority 
other than the state. This results in that the state as an organisation faces constant 
and increasing competition from other non-state organisations, who may challenge 
the authority of the state. 
Nevertheless, as noted by Dryzek and Dunleavy (2009:6): “…the existence of 
contested, failing and failed states should not disguise the pervasiveness of the 
state form…”. Accordingly, there is also the view that the retreat of the state is 
not as intense as described above. As with any organisation, external and internal 
elements will continuously have an impact on the structure and operations of the 
state. What is observed is that, the nation-state is no longer the only relevant actor 
(both domestically and in international relations) and that the monopoly that the 
state had over specific capabilities, tasks and roles has changed. However, the 
question remains: What is the effect of other actors on the role of the state and 
how will this change the authority and position of the state? For example, Friman 
and Andreas (1999:4) note that the: “…global division of labour and expanding 
power of global production and finance have increased the accountability of states 
to global markets and non-state entities…”. Thus, according to Friman and Andreas 
(1999) the authority of the state is still confirmed in the global economy. Equally 
important is that the impact of globalisation on the state will differ in each case and 
it is important to take into consideration each state’s position in the global economy, 
but also the historical context of each state (Friman and Andreas, 1999). Indeed, 
the Global Financial Crisis that started in 2007/2008, which was triggered by the 
housing bubble in the United States, and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, has 
brought about a renewed interest in the position of the state in the global economy. 
As a result of the global recession, caused by these economic failures, national 
governments were forced to provide rescue packages to financial institutions, in an 
attempt to stabilise various sectors, most notably the banking sector. Thus, as states 
interceded, it brought about the reality of the interventionist state. Another, more 
recent example can be found in the migrant crisis in Europe. Mostly as a result of 
the war in Syria, Europe has been flooded with migrants. This has sparked a turn 
towards nationalist policies and government rhetoric in the region is increasingly 
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becoming conservative (for example Croatia) and state policy affirmative towards 
protecting its borders. At the time of writing there were ongoing talks of the 
complete removal of the Schengen travel agreement and the ultimate collapse of 
the European Union; this signals that states are flexing their muscles and claiming 
back individual importance as opposed to regional. As will be highlighted below, 
defending the sovereign territory is a central function of the state. 
With specific reference to international relations, it is important to note that the 
majority of literature on state authority in international relations has been focused 
on the challenges to the state coming from above; thus, the top down approach 
of challenges to the nation-state (for example the impact of globalisation or 
regionalism). There has however been an acknowledgement of the bottom-up 
challenges to the state, with specific reference to the criminal element or organised 
criminal groups: Strange (1996:110–120) writes on the symbiosis between the 
state and organised criminal groups, with the pre-1980s Italian state as the prime 
example. However, she claims that the symbiotic coexistence between the state 
and organised criminal groups, as a non-state actor, are not sustainable and will 
cease to exist in two cases: first, when there is a collapse in the hierarchy of power 
in the state and second: “…when the rival authority’s power is perceived to threaten 
the state because it has acquired new foreign allies or new sources of wealth and 
influence…” (Strange, 1996:120). 
Other studies of the relationship between organised criminal groups and the state 
in international relations (Mittelman and Johnston, 1999; Shelly, 1995 and 1999) 
focus on the transnational element of organised crime. Thus, the organised criminal 
group is viewed as a global actor in competition with the state for authority. Shelly 
(1999) hypothesises that the authority of the state is diminishing, but that this has 
not resulted in the disappearance of authoritarianism: “…transnational organised 
crime represents a new form of non-state-based authoritarianism…” (Shelly, 
1999:25). In addition, Williams (1997) comments that the increase in the activities 
of transnational criminal groups, as facilitated by globalisation and the decline of 
the authority of the state, leads to these non-state actors to be one of the most 
important security challenges facing the 21st century. 
There are several theoretical propositions regarding the state, for example: Pluralism, 
Elite Theory, Marxism and Market Liberalism (only to mention the classical ones). In 
addition, there are just as many conceptual interpretations for the construct of the 
state. However, a number of these conceptual interpretations find their foundation 
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in the seminal work of Max Weber. Weber (1978:56) provides a conceptualisation 
of the basic understanding of the modern state. He writes that: 
“…The primary formal characteristics of the modern state are as 
follows: It possesses an administrative order subject to change by 
legislation, to which the organised activities of the administrative staff, 
which are also controlled by legislation, are oriented. This system of 
order claims binding authority not only over the members of the state, 
the citizens, most of whom have obtained membership by birth, but 
also to a very large extent over all action taking place in the area of its 
jurisdiction. It is thus a compulsory organisation with a territorial basis. 
Furthermore, today, the use of force is regarded as legitimate only so 
far as it is either permitted by the state or prescribed by it…The claim 
of the modern state to monopolise the use of force is as essential to it 
as its character of compulsory jurisdiction of continuous operation…”
A number of key elements can be extracted from this definition: binding authority, 
administrative order, citizenship, territorial basis, legitimate use of force and a 
monopoly on the use of force. On the concept of state authority, it can be defined 
as: “… a psychological relationship, between the governed and their governors, 
which engenders a belief that state personnel and institutions, should be obeyed…” 
(Thomson, 2004:201). From this definition two essential subjects arise: first, the 
importance of state-society relations and second, the legitimacy of the state. It 
is postulated in this chapter that state-society relations should be regarded as an 
essential component of maintaining the organisation of the state. Accordingly, an 
imbalance or a breakdown in state-society relations will have a negative impact on a 
sovereign state. For the purposes of this chapter, the importance of the society in the 
construct of the state is acknowledged.
On the topic of legitimacy, Thomson (2004:201) postulates that state authority 
is generated from two sources, namely legitimacy and coercion. He argues that 
governments use a combination of legitimacy and coercion to maintain their 
authority over a specific society. Furthermore: “…when the state’s legitimacy 
declines, however, and rulers no longer command sufficient resources of coercion, 
authority is threatened…” (Thomson, 2004:201). If the citizens of a state regard the 
system as legitimate, the state will have the ability to mobilise society. As noted by 
Migdal (1988:21–22) several elements are central to the survival of the state, the 
most important of which, is the ability to mobilise society. The mobilisation of the 
society: “…involves channelling people into specialised organisational frameworks 
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that enable state leaders to build stronger armies, collect more taxes…and complete 
any other number of complicated tasks…” (Migdal, 1988:22). Thus, the capacity 
of the state to mobilise society is a functional part of the conceptualisation of 
the state. Migdal (1998, 1994, 2001) focusses strongly on the state-in-society 
perspective and hypothesise that “… States are part of societies. States may help 
mold, but they are also continually molded by, the societies within which they are 
embedded…” (Migdal, 1994:2). As will be noted later, this is a much more adaptable 
conceptualisation of the state. 
In agreement with a more generic definition, Van Creveld (1999:1) postulates that 
the state is an abstract entity and furthermore, that it is an overarching invisible 
subject, which includes both the head of state and the common citizen of the 
state. In addition, Van Creveld (1999:1) suggests that there are three distinctive 
characteristics by which the state is defined: “…it authorises (other corporations) 
but is itself authorised…solely by others of its kind; secondly, that certain functions…
are reserved for it alone; and thirdly, that it exercises those functions over a certain 
territory inside which its jurisdiction is both exclusive and all-embracing…”. The third 
element that is mentioned by Van Creveld (1999) is control over a specific territory: 
failure to exercise control over the entire area of a state, may lead to state weakness 
and state failure. Indeed, this is recognised by Herbst (2000) when he addresses 
state development in Africa.2 Herbst (2000) explains how the process of state-
building in Africa differs from state-building in Europe. He explains that a lack of 
permanent, well-defined boundaries in pre-colonial and colonial Africa is essential 
in terms of explaining a lack of state development. In addition, Herbst (2000) 
postulates that when explaining state weakness in Africa an important element is 
low population density as this complicates authority and control. In Africa, states 
were not centralised as in Europe as all leaders had to deal with the problem of 
low population densities, which in turn made it difficult for leaders to control the 
periphery from the capital. It was essential to control the main urban areas, and rural 
areas that were important in terms of the economy (for example region around the 
Nile river), but political control was limited to such regions and did not expand over 
the entire territory of states. Other elements, such as a lack of state institutions and 
the role of colonialism are also discussed by Herbst (2000). However, the inability of 
rulers to apply and maintain control over their territory is central to the clarification 
of why states in Africa fail. States can only survive if there is continuous control over 
their entire territory. In the introduction this central hypothesis is confirmed when 
2  For reflections on state-society relations in Africa, see Rothchild and Chazan (1998). 
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he states that “…states are only viable if they are able to control the territory defined 
by their borders…” (Herbst, 2000:3). 
Another significant definition of the state is provided by Stepan (1978:xii), when 
he claims that: “…The state must be considered more than the “government”. It is 
the continuous administrative, legal and coercive systems that attempt not only 
to structure relationships between civil society and public authority in a polity but 
also to structure many crucial relationships within civil society as well…”. From 
this definition, as noted by Skocpol (1985:7), other organisations and agents are 
essential for the continuation of the state as they also take part in and facilitate 
social and political relationships. 
These attributes of states are echoed by a number of authors. For example, Zartman 
(1995:5) stipulates three functions of a state. First, that the state is a sovereign 
authority (the arena of politics and the source of identity), second that the state is 
an institution (one single organisational entity, as also noted by Weber (1978), and 
an intangible symbol of identity and thirdly, that the state is the security guarantor 
for the populated territory, referring back to the legitimate use of violence noted by 
Weber (1978). In addition, what Zartman (1995) argues is that there is a significant 
blurring of these characteristics of the state and that it is difficult to perform the 
functional characteristics in isolation. Accordingly, each of these functions needs to 
be executed in order for the state to persist. Similarly, if one function is not executed 
it will result in a possible failing of the other. 
Williams (2002:164) similarly outlines four main interpretations of the state: a) the 
state is a sovereign territorial entity, which controls the area under its jurisdiction, 
thus controlling who and what enters; b) the state is a system of rules, and thus the 
state has both authority over its citizens and obligations towards them; c) the state 
is a set of institutions and people who act on its behalf; and d) the state is a set of 
functions, which range from the state as guarantor of order and security, to the role 
as the manager of economic activity and provider of economic and social welfare. 
As previously mentioned, in order for the characteristics of a state to be functionally 
executable, at the core of the state exist administrative, legal, extractive and coercive 
organisations. More practically speaking, the state will facilitate revenue generation, 
safety, security and justice, basic service delivery and economic governance. 
If these core functions of the state can be performed, the legitimacy of the state 
will increase. It is important to note that these organisational structures will differ 
from state to state, mainly based on the legislations of that state and governmental 
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structures (Skocpol, 1985:7). Also, as noted by Dunn (2001:55): “…the nation–state 
as an institution reflected the needs and demands of a specific time and place…”.3 
If a state is analysed based on the neo-pluralist theory,4 Rotberg (2003:2) provides 
a normative conceptualisation of the state. He explains that the main function of 
the modern state is to provide political goods to the citizens; thus: “…state answers 
the concerns and demands of citizenries…”. What is important, however, is that 
there exists a specific hierarchy of political goods, of which the supply of security 
(specifically human security) is the most important one. As said, the provision of 
these political goods is regarded as the main function of the state. It includes the 
prevention of cross-border invasions and infiltrations; thus, the prevention of the 
loss of territory. Furthermore, domestic threats that may attack national order 
and social structure need to be eliminated. Also, crime and other related dangers 
to domestic security need to be prevented and last, citizens need to be enabled to 
resolve disputes with each other and the state, without fear of intimidation (Rotberg, 
2003:3). A summary of the normative hierarchy of political goods, which the state 
needs to provide, as its main function, is listed in table 1 below. 
Table 1 Hierarchy of Political Goods 
Political Goods Description 
Security Prevent loss of territory 
Political freedom Citizens can participate freely, openly and fully in politics and political processes
Medical and Health care Include medical and health care at varying levels and costs
The Knowledge Good Schools and educational facilities of various kinds and levels 
Physical Infrastructure Including roads, railways and harbours
Communications Infrastructure Including telephone networks and broadcasting stations 
Money and Banking system Including a national currency and system presided over by a central bank 
Fiscal and Institutional Context Citizens can pursue personal entrepreneurial goals/potentially prosper 
Civil Society The promotion of civil society 
Environmental Commons Methods of regulating the sharing of the environmental commons 
(Source: Adapted from Rotberg, 2003:3, 4)
3 Dunn (2001) discusses the African state in international relations theory and postulates that the 
generally accepted definitions of the state do not fit the reality in Africa. 
4 According to the neo-pluralist view of the state there is an emphasis on individual rights and 
the freedom of political association in order to participate in political processes. This, as well as, 
emphasis on the importance of competitive elections and a constitutional framework are preserved. 
Public policy is formulated from interactions between several groups and actors. However, the 
inequality and imbalance of these groups are recognised, for example an imbalance between 
business and the rest of society (Dryzek and Dunleavy, 2009:132). 
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To conclude this section, the state is regarded as: an abstract entity of administrative 
order with binding authority and a territorial basis and jurisdiction that is recognised 
by other similar organisations. There should be a separation between ruler and 
organisation and the organisational structure of each entity can differ, based on a 
number of elements including: History, legislative and governmental structure and 
location. In order to attain benefits for society, the state needs to fulfil a number 
of functions, which are intertwined and cannot be executed in isolation. As part 
of these functions, the state needs to provide political goods to citizens, of which 
the provision of security is the most important. Accordingly, the state claims the 
legitimate use of force and a monopoly on the use of force. The lack of provision 
of political goods can facilitate the breakdown of state-society relations. Thus, the 
ability of the state to mobilise society will weaken, and consequently, there may also 
be a decline in the legitimacy of the state. 
Rotberg (2003) notion of political goods strongly reflects Weber’s conceptualisation 
of the state. In addition, it has to be noted that Migdal (1988) concurs with Weber’s 
conceptualisation of the state, but he attempts to reconceptualise this definition 
in later works. In his 2001 book State in Society: Studying how states and societies 
transform and constitute one another he explains his re-conceptualisation: 
“…The assumption that only the state does, or should, create rules 
and that only it, or should, maintain the violent means to bend people 
to obey those rules minimizes and trivializes the rich negotiation, 
interaction, and resistance that occur in every human society 
among multiple systems of rules. It posits a human society where 
only incredibly coherent and complex organization exercises an 
extraordinary hegemony of thought and action over all other social 
formations intersecting that territory. It provides no way to theorize 
about arenas of competing sets of rules, other than to cast these in 
the negative, as failure or weak states or even as non-states (Migdal, 
2001:15). 
Migdal (2001:15–16) re-conceptualises the state as: “…The state is a field of power 
marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) the image of a coherent, 
controlling organization in a territory, and (2) the actual practices of its multiple 
parts…”. 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to debate Migdal’s (2001) re-conceptualisation 
of the state, but a few important notes can be provided. Although Migdal (2001) 
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provides a re-conceptualisation the foundation is still located in the Weberian 
understanding of the state. The re-conceptualisation is rather more fluid and 
acknowledges the role and impact of multiple streams of interaction, either positive 
or negative for the functioning of the state. The state remains part of society, located 
in society, and each with the ability to shape each other.5 This understanding may 
allow for a better grasp of the process of state decay, as will be explained below. 
A Conceptual Clarification: State Decay
A great deal of research has been devoted to analysing why states fail. This body of 
literature usually includes the reasons for state failure based on case study analysis. 
These cases typically include states such as Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia. 
However, there has been a move towards incorporating the themes of breakdown, 
restoration and prevention into case study analysis.6
It is important to note that the concepts of state weakness, -failure, -fragmentation, 
-breakdown and -collapse are often used interchangeably to explain the deterioration 
and ultimate downfall of the state. This chapter distinguishes between state 
weakness (indicating initial fragmentation of the state, but also limitations on the 
capacity of the state), state failure (the visible non-functioning of state apparatus) 
and state collapse (a complete breakdown of most, if not all state systems). Thus, 
state weakness can result in state failure, which in turn can result in state collapse, 
and the process is referred to as state decay, as is presented in figure 1. It is important 
to note that states can progress or regress between the different categories of state 
decay, indicating that state reconstruction is also a possibility. For example Lebanon, 
Nigeria and Tajikistan have moved from collapsed to weak states, Afghanistan and 
Sierra Leone from collapsed to failed, and Zimbabwe from a once strong state to a 
failed one (Rotberg, 2003:10). 
5 The latest text on the state-in-society approach developed by Migdal is the 2013 book The Everyday 
Life of the State: a State Society Approach.
6 A number of case studies related to state collapse and reconstruction can be found in Zartman (ed) 
(1995). This collection includes a historical analysis of state collapse and reconstruction in Chad 
(Foltz, 1995), Uganda (Khadiagala, 1995) and Ghana (Rothchild, 1995). The book further addresses 
the topics of states in danger and agents of state reconstruction.










Figure 1 The Process of State Decay and State Reconstruction (Source: Produced by 
the author).
State Weakness 
On the topic of state weakness, the most important element used to define a state 
as weak, is internal institutional weakness, as observed in a decline in the capacity 
of the state. Mentan (2004) argues that a state weakens when the state cannot 
provide citizens with a minimum level of security, when the state is vulnerable 
to external economic and political forces and when the state is not regarded as 
legitimate by groups of the population. 
With regards to weak state capacity and the identifiable elements of a weak state, 
Williams (2002) furthermore lists weak border controls, lack of business regulations 
and an ineffective criminal justice system. Williams (2002) agrees with Mentan 
(2004), that weak states will have a low level of state legitimacy. Migdal (1988) 
also focuses on state capabilities when identifying weak states, in that such states 
will have low capabilities to extract resources, regulate relations between the state 
and citizens and amongst citizens themselves, and penetrate society and mobilize 
citizens. This relates to what Mann (1986:113) refers to as infrastructural power: 
“…the capacity of the state actually to penetrate civil society, and to implement 
logistically political decisions throughout the realm…”. Accordingly, Williams 
(2002) refers to the weaknesses in the state as capacity gaps, which will lead to 
functional holes in the system of the state. These functional holes may then be 
utilised by non-state actors for their own benefit (Williams 2002:170). Similarly, 
Mentan (2004:20) claims that state weakness in Africa creates the ideal situation 
for violent non-state actors to capture the state. The author further describes several 
manifestations of weak states, including high rates of unemployment (specifically 
amongst historically disadvantaged groups), extremely high levels of corruption and 
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a general absence of the rule of law. The result will be an abundance of unskilled and 
unemployed youths engaging in criminal activities, lack of law and order and a lack 
of legitimate government. Weak states can be summarised as states suffering from 
gaps in the capacity of the state, but also a lack of state legitimacy. Furthermore, 
a weak state will not be in control of its entire territory, with specific reference to 
areas where marginalised groups reside or peripheral areas. Indeed, Reno (1998:2) 
conceptualises a weak state as a state where: “…conventional bureaucratic state 
capabilities exists alongside (generally very strong) informal political networks…”. 
Informal local non-state actors and informal political networks may subsequently 
challenge the authority of the state. 
State Failure 
The next step in state decay is state failure, but (as mentioned) it is important to 
acknowledge that state weakness does not automatically lead to state failure. 
Accordingly: “…crossing from weakness into failure takes will as well as neglect…” 
(Rotberg, 2003:14). State failure is thus mostly man made and does not happen 
by accident. As catalysts of state failure, two elements can be highlighted: Internal 
violence and (non)-delivery (of) political goods. Rotberg (2003:1) states that: “…
Nation-states fail because they are convulsed by internal violence and can no longer 
deliver positive political goods to their inhabitants…”. Indeed, failed states will only 
provide limited, if any, political goods. As explained previously, security is regarded 
as the most important political good and if there is a lack of security, the result would 
be internal violence and conditions conducive towards state failure. Indicators of 
internal violence and an inability to deliver political goods are the following: enduring 
political violence, victimisation of citizens by the state, loss of control over peripheral 
territory, growth of criminal violence, flawed state institutions, deteriorating 
infrastructure, failing provisions of basic services, economic opportunity for an elite, 
in the context of a generally declining gross domestic product, and widespread 
corruption (Rotberg, 2004). 
First, Rotberg (2004:6) lists lack of control as an important indicator of a failing 
state. He says that: “…failed states cannot control their peripheral regions, especially 
those regions controlled by out-groups. They lose authority over large sections of 
territory…”. Furthermore, this can be measured by the actual control of government 
officials over a geographical area. A second important indicator of state failure to be 
highlighted is the increase of criminal violence. In this case, lawlessness as a result 
of the lack of authority by the state will become more apparent. Criminal gangs will 
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increase and extend their control over territories. Strongmen will become central 
to communities, as they will provide protection and security (Rotberg, 2004:6). As 
explained earlier, as part of the conceptualisation of the state, one of the main roles 
of the state is to provide political goods; as the state breaks down, it will not be 
able to provide basic political goods. In the case of failed states, this function can be 
taken over by non-state actors. If a non-state actor has a significant armed following, 
prevention of failure will probably not be possible (Rotberg, 2004). In addition, three 
other signs of imminent state failure can be highlighted: rapid reduction in incomes 
and a decline in the standard of living, an increase in the levels of violence and 
the subversion of democratic norms (Rotberg, 2004). If these characteristics are 
present, the ultimate result will be state collapse.
Reno (1998) takes a look at state weakness and state failure from the perspective 
of warlord politics. He argues that warlords stay in power as a result of their ability 
to manipulate resources and garner support from external sources. However, in 
order to maintain power and the accumulation of wealth, rulers ensure that the 
bureaucracy and the military stay weak. Thus, institutional state weakness needs 
to be kept in place therefore state failure is a deliberate strategy by the ruler. Such 
states will have no legitimacy as they will fail to provide political goods to citizens. 
State Collapse 
A simplistic definition of state collapse is that the state can no longer perform its 
basic functions, including that of maintaining the role of the decision-making centre 
of government, being a symbol of identity and territorial entity, being the authoritative 
political institution and a system of socio-economic organisation (Zartman, 1995:5; 
Thomson, 2004:211). Therefore, state collapse does not necessarily occur in the 
case of regime breakdown, such as a coup or rebellion, but when the: “…legitimate 
power of the state…” falls apart, together with the laws of the state and the political 
order (Zartman, 1995:1).7
Zartman (1995:1) and Rotberg (2003:9) further explain that when a state collapses, 
a vacuum is created, with specific reference to authority. The vacuum of authority 
may be filled by non-state or sub-state actors (also referred to by Zartman (1995) 
as local power grabbers): “…order and power (but not always legitimacy) fall down 
7 An example of a collapsed state is Somalia. Thomson (2004:211) writes that “… Although Somali 
clans were united enough to bring down Siad Barré’s corrupt regime in 1991, these disparate groups 
collectively failed to reconstitute a national government in its place. Somalia … has not had an 
officially recognised central authority for the last 15 years…”.
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to local groups or are up for grabs…” (Zartman, 1995:1). Thus, a local non-state 
authority could consume the power lost by the central government and fill the 
vacuum of authority. The non-state actor could control a territory within the original 
boundaries of the state. One example is Somaliland, a region located in the Horn of 
Africa. It is a self-declared sovereign state and not internationally recognised.8 It is 
important to note that in the case of Somaliland (located in the state of Somalia) the 
lack of a formal, internationally recognised state did not result in anarchy and chaos. 
The institutional system is based on local authority (coming from the society) which 
maintains order. 
Thus, two important concluding remarks can be derived from the preceding 
conceptualisation of state weakness, state failure and state collapse: state collapse 
is the final stage in the process of state decay, preceded by state weakness and state 
failure. In the case of state collapse, a vacuum as a result of a lack of institutional 
capabilities of the state is created. This vacuum is often filled by a local non-state 
actor and although the authority exemplified by this actor would be in rivalry with 
the state (or what is left after state collapse), the authority of the non-state actor can 
have the ability to normalise and stabilise the situation, as in the case of Somaliland. 
This section has illustrated the interconnectedness of the state and the society and 
how the state is embedded in society. 
State-Society Relations
The focus of the discussion of state-society relations will centre on the 1988 work 
of Joel S. Migdal: Strong societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State 
Capabilities in the Third World. Migdal’s (1988) main research question was stated as: 
why specific states find it hard to foster strong state-society relations, by achieving 
high levels of social control, while other states find it easier to do? Thus, why does 
a specific state have the ability to successfully conduct policy implementation, as 
an indicator of high state capacity? Accordingly, Migdal (1988) creates a set of 
theories to examine state capabilities, which is based on state-society relations. 
What is central to the analysis is that states cannot be separated from society; and 
in order for a state to emerge and progress to a strong state, social control by the 
state, over society, is needed. 
Migdal (1988:24) further focuses his analysis on: “…sources of resistance to the 
state’s efforts at achieving predominance…”. As part of this analysis, two themes are 
8 For more information on statehood in Somaliland the following texts can be consulted: Buur and 
Kayed (2007), Menkhaus (2006 and 2007).
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focused on: How the: “…rules of the game…” have been established and maintained 
in society and second, that there should be a focus on all organisations in a society 
that have exercised social control; thus, both formal and informal organisations. 
According to the classical pluralist theory of the state, the analysis of state-society 
relations needs to include all significant political actors and on different levels. 
With regard to the levels of analysis, Migdal (1988) focuses on three levels of the 
state, namely the central executive leadership, central state agencies and officials 
at regional and local level. What he postulates, as will be explained later, is that in 
weak states local strongmen will work against the central state agencies, as created 
by executive leadership. The leadership will be challenged. Fragmented social 
control may result with state leaders prioritising their own survival and engage in the 
reshuffling of state agents and even “…dirty tricks…”, such as corruption and buying 
of support (Migdal, 1988:257). This may however further weaken the state, through 
the deterioration of the capabilities of state agencies and a subsequent decline 
in legitimacy. As will be noted later, legitimacy is essential to foster strong state-
society relations.
State Capabilities and State Social Control 
For the purposes of this chapter, state-society relations can be defined as: 
“…interactions between state institutions and societal groups 
to negotiate how public authority is exercised and how it can be 
influenced by people…They are focused on issues such as defining the 
mutual rights and obligations of state and society, negotiating how 
public resources should be allocated and establishing different modes 
of representation and accountability…” (Department for International 
Development, 2010:15). 
The focus of this definition is on ensuring accountability of the state and to make the 
state responsive to society. An essential element of state continuation is the strong 
connection between the state and the society. Here, two relationships need to be 
identified: first, the direct impact of states on society and second, that societies also 
affect states. With specific reference to the last mentioned relationship and as noted 
by Migdal (1988), structures of societies can affect the capabilities of the state. 
State capabilities will be conceptualised in the following section. In order for a state 
to survive, a number of factors need to be present: “…including the organisational 
capabilities of its leaders, population size, potential material and human resources 
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available, and larger international configurations…” (Migdal, 1988:21). In the case 
of states where all these elements are present, the state will technically survive. 
However, in addition to state survival, states aim to achieve a high level of specific 
capabilities, including the capability to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, 
extract resources, and use resources appropriately.9 Strong states are those with 
high capabilities to complete these tasks, which in turn will make it possible for them 
to achieve goals set out by leaders. On the other hand, weakened states will find it 
difficult to achieve changes sought by leaders (Migdal, 1988:4-5). State capabilities 
will increase if the state has social control or if the state can successfully mobilised 
society. Social control is defined as: “… the successful subordination of people’s own 
inclinations of social behaviour or behaviour sought by other social organisations 
in favour of behaviour prescribed by state rules…” (Migdal, 1988:22). Accordingly, 
a state will have social control if people behave socially as the state prescribes, 
rather than in terms of what they desire for themselves or in terms of what other 
societal actors prescribe. In order for a state to achieve high levels of social control, 
the strategies of survival, as prescribed by the state, have to be part of citizens’ daily 
life. All social organisations, formal or informal, can each present symbols, rewards 
and sanctions to citizens. Social control will be achieved by the organisation that can 
provide key elements of survival strategies: “…strategies of survival, sewn from the 
symbols, rewards, and sanctions, are roadmaps used to guide one through the maze 
of daily life, ensuring one’s existence…” (Migdal, 1988:27). Thus, the state needs 
to ensure that its symbols, rewards and sanctions are the survival strategies of the 
society. These prescriptions of the state are expressed in the laws of the state. 
As mentioned, in order to avoid state breakdown, a high level of state social control 
is needed. This level can be measured by three indicators: the compliance by the 
populace, the level of participation by the citizens in state sanctioned institutions and 
the legitimacy of the state (Migdal, 1988:32). The focus is accordingly on the criteria 
of compliance with state rules, participation in state structures and the legitimacy of 
the state. 
For a state to achieve compliance, the citizens should yield to the rules of the state. 
Initially, compliance can be found by the use of force and thus, it is essential for 
a state to exercise successful control over its security forces. This is only possible 
if the strategies of the security forces and the other organisations of the state 
correspond. Furthermore, control over the extraction and allocation of resources will 
9 As mentioned, see also Mann (1984) on what he referred to as infrastructural power and the ability 
of the state to regulate society.
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also determine the level of compliance. If the state is successful in the reallocation of 
resources, citizens will more willingly accept the prescriptions of the state (Migdal, 
1988:32).
With regards to participation, the key factor is that the state should be able to 
mobilise citizens to repeated voluntary participation in the different institutional 
sectors of the state. Participation goes beyond only voting in elections; it should 
extend to engaging and contributing to state institutions. As participation increases, 
the state will gain strength. The practical example used by Migdal (1988:32) to 
illustrate participation is that a worker would rather make use of a state-licensed 
medical clinic, than of an illegal healer.
Legitimacy, most importantly, refers to the right to rule by a state. Successful 
legitimation of a state will see citizens voluntarily accept and approve the authority 
of the state. The legitimacy of a state is the most powerful indicator of the strength 
of a state – in the case of compliance and participation; citizens may conform to 
the prescriptions of the state in return for incentives or compensation (Migdal, 
1988:33). Legitimacy can be conceptualised as: “…a psychological relationship 
between the governed and their governors, which engenders a belief that the state’s 
leaders and institutions have a right to exercise political authority over a society…” 
(Thomson, 2004:108). Accordingly, legitimacy is only achieved if there is un-
coerced acceptance of all the systems of the state by the citizens. In addition, Weber 
(1964:324–392) identifies three pure types of legitimate authority: Traditional 
authority (shaped by a society’s culture, history and traditions), charismatic 
authority (a belief in the authority of an individual, as a result of exemplary character 
or sanctity) and legal authority (a belief in the legality of rules and a support of the 
authority to issue commands). In the case of legal authority, Thomson (2004:108) 
notes that a legal-rational government is based on a social contract, where citizens 
follow the rules of the state, as state institutions in turn will look after their interests; 
thus, in accordance with the pluralist view of the state, citizens will trust the state 
and view it as worthy. As has been explained, a lack of legitimacy is also regarded as 
one of the main reasons for state failure (Rotberg, 2003). If a state has high levels 
of legitimacy, there will be a significant amount of trust between the state and the 
society. The state’s ability to manage citizens’ demands is also dependent on the 
level of legitimacy of the state. 
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Strong/Weak States and Strong/Weak Societies 
Migdal (1988:35) distinguishes between different societies by measuring the 
distribution and the overall amount of social control exercised by the state. The 
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Figure 2 Social Control of States and Societies (Source: Adapted from Migdal, 1988). 
In this matrix, the associations between strong/weak states and strong/weak 
societies are clarified. Four relationships are highlighted: strong states and strong 
societies, strong states and weak societies, strong societies and weak states 
and weak states and weak societies. In the first case, strong societies and strong 
states exist simultaneously. Migdal (1988) does not provide a description of such 
a situation. What is explained, however, is a situation where a pyramidal structure 
of social control is created. This results from social organisations with compatible 
and congruent rules and structures, with those of the state. In such a situation, the 
strong state will succeed in merging the survival strategies present within society, 
with those of the state. The resulting structure resembles a pyramid with the state at 
its apex. The key factor of a pyramidal structure of social control is that the survival 
strategies or rules of the state and that of the different societies will be reconcilable 
with each other (Migdal, 1988:34-35). Thus, the rules and structures different 
organisations such as the church and interest – and community groups, the family 
and cultural organisations will be compatible and mutually reinforcing, also with 
those of the state, fostering strong societies within the regulations of a strong state. 
Du Toit (1995:24-25) further explains Migdal’s (1988) theory on pyramidal 
structures of social control by stating that in a strong society with a pyramidal 
structure, a strong state will gain control by commanding the top section of the 
pyramid. The strong state will succeed in merging the strategies of the state and that 
of the society. This would be the ideal situation, which will lead to the continuation 
and further consolidation of the state and centralisation of state power. What is 
clear from figure 2 is that Migdal (1988:35) regards the presence of a pyramidal 
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society the result of a strong state and a weak society. However, it is argued that 
a pyramidal society can be present where there is both a strong state and a strong 
society (See figure 3 below). As explained, if there is a society where there is a 
fused pattern of social control, the state will exercise control over the society by 
occupying the apex of the pyramid. Examples of pyramidal societies (as a result of 
the presence of a strong state and a strong society) include states with a strong and 
active civil society, but also high levels of legitimacy and state social control, such as 
the current situation in Norway and Germany. However, as mentioned, a situation 
can arise in which a society will have uneven levels of social control because of 
social organisations with diverse rules and structures, which are not compatible with 
those of the state. Thus, “…numerous systems of justices operate simultaneously…” 
(Migdal, 1988:39). 
In the matrix presented by Migdal (1988:35) such a situation is referred to a diffused 
society, but it is later also described as a weblike society. Thus, there will be the 
presence of a weakened state and a strong society (See figure 3 below). In the case 
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Figure 3 Typology of State-Society Relations (Source: Adapted from Migdal, 1988). 
Weblike societies can be conceptualised as follows: “…In weblike societies, although 
social control is fragmented and heterogeneous, this does not mean that people are 
not being governed; they most certainly are. The allocation of the values, however, 
is not centralised…” (Migdal, 1988:39). In addition, as further explained by Du Toit 
(1995:25): “…in weblike societies no single strand of social control holds the social 
fabric together, but rather a network of such strands…”. Thus, several systems of 
rule and law operate at the same time. In the case of weblike societies, where the 
social control is fragmented between numerous rival organisations, states will find it 
very difficult to achieve policy implementation.
Accordingly, weblike societies operate around strongmen who usually attempt to 
facilitate the disintegration of state social control by dominating aspects of the state. 
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For strongmen to be able to dominate aspects of the state, the process of bargaining 
has to take place between state officials, implementers and the strongmen. This is 
described by Migdal (1988:249) as the “…triangle of accommodation…” (See figure 
4). Inside the triangle of accommodation, the: “…state officials will formulate policy at 
national level; implementers who are officials entrusted to oversee policy execution 
at the local level and strongmen…” (Du Toit, 1995:26). Migdal (1988) makes specific 
reference to the regional and the local level and asserts that on these levels the 
state, through its implementers, may become involved in bargaining relationships 
with strongmen and with other implementers and other state and political officials. 
The result may be that mutually profitable agreements will be arranged between the 
actors and that each of the strongmen will succeed in creating its own set of rules 
for social control.10 To explain further, in the triangle of accommodation, various 
strongmen will function alongside each other, together with state implementers and 
state officials. Migdal (1988) further notes that where the triangle of accommodation 
is in place and where there is fragmented social control, the process is very difficult 
to turn around. The state will find it very challenging to claim back social control 







Figure 4 Triangle of Accommodation (Source: Adapted from Migdal, 1988). 
Such a configuration of power, as the one in the triangle of accommodation, can 
be maintained for a limited period, as it may lead to increased weakening of the 
state and place strongmen in a more powerful position. Thus, the continuation of 
the triangle of accommodation can act as an accelerator for state weakening; as 
explained above, state leaders will implement political strategies in an attempt to 
10 Williams (2002: 172-173) uses Russia as an example where a different construction, the ‘iron 
triangle’, is made up of an extremely complex relationship between politicians and government 
officials, businessmen, and criminals hamper democratic transition.
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keep power, but in effect decrease state legitimacy and from the local level triangles 
of accommodation enforce the rule of strongmen and fragmented social control. 
The third relationship in the typology of state-society relations is a situation where 
there is a strong state, but a weak society. This may occur in a totalitarian regime, or 
regimes that exhibit features of totalitarianism, where aspects of civil society, or all 
aspects of individual life and civil society, are strictly controlled by the state, usually 
in the form of coercive measures. 
The last relationship will occur in the case of both a weak state and a weak society. 
Such societies can be described as normless and anarchic, with a breakdown in 
social order. Migdal (1988:35) refers to China during World War II with the Japanese 
occupation and Mexico during the revolution between 1910 and 1920, as examples 
where both a weak state and a weak society existed. A more recent example is 
Haiti after the January 2010 earthquake. During the period immediately after the 
earthquake the United States were forced to take control of airports as looting was 
widespread and vigilante groups attempted to control neighbourhoods. 
To summarise, with the increase of levels of compliance, participation and 
legitimation, a state will find it easier to achieve its goals (Migdal, 1988:32-33). A 
strong state will have high levels of social control, one set of survival strategies, high 
levels of capabilities and compliance, participation and legitimacy. In a weakened 
state societal organisations succeed in establishing their own survival strategies, 
alongside or in contention with those of the state; hence a multiplicity of survival 
strategies. This may lead to a weblike society. A good example of this is the Cape 
Flats, located outside of the city centre of Cape Town, South Africa. The Cape Flats 
are plagued with gangs and organised criminal activities. These groups provide their 
own set of survival and operational activities, most often as a result of a void of state 
co-ordinated strategies. The voids as a result of weakened state structures are filled 
by a series of non-state actors (Lambrechts, 2012). 
Conclusion
This chapter used a pluralist theoretical view of the state and set out to establish a 
conceptual framework of the state. This conceptual framework was primarily based 
on the position of the nation state, in that it is the building block of the legitimate 
world order. Furthermore, the state was conceptualised as an abstract entity of 
administrative order with binding authority, a territorial basis and jurisdiction 
that is recognised by other similar organisations, and a separation between ruler 
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and organisation. In order for the state to prosper, it should perform a number of 
functions, ranked in a hierarchical order, of which the provision of security is the 
most important. Accordingly, the state claims a monopoly on the use of legitimate 
force. The importance of state-society relations is emphasised as that the lack of 
provision of political goods may facilitate the breakdown of state-society relations. 
The state can lose the ability to mobilise society and ultimately lose legitimacy, 
which is the most important indicator of the social control by the state. 
Next, the process of state decay was explained, fixed in a state-in-society 
perspective: first, the presence of elements of a weak state (gaps in the capacity 
of the state), second state failure (lack of territorial control, increase in criminal 
violence and the inability to provide political goods) and last state collapse (where 
the state can no longer perform any of its basic functions). This will leave a vacuum 
of authority, which may be filled by non-state actors.
The following section of the chapter focused on state-society relations, the central 
theme of this study. These relations were discussed by focusing on the work of 
Migdal (1988) and his indicators of social control: participation, compliance and 
legitimacy. If the state has low levels of social control there will be a decline in the 
capacity of the state, again opening the gap for rival social organisations to establish 
contending survival strategies that are in conflict with those of the state, for example 
local gangs or organised criminal groups. 
As mentioned in the introduction, there is a need for more recent work on state-
society relations, which will take into consideration both local and domestic 
developments. The migrant crisis in Europe has been mentioned, and important 
events such as these will not only change the way the state is conceptualised, 
but also the connection between the state and the society. What is society’s 
expectation of the state and what is the mandate that society gives the state that 
can be executed within which perimeters? Theoretical propositions that have been 
discussed in this literature survey, such as Zaartman (1995), Rotberg (2003; 2004) 
and Migdal (1988), need to be re-visited at the backdrop of a changing landscape.11 
Migdal’s state-in-society perspective also deserves robust application on the study 
of emerging strong societies, for example Brazil and China. 
11 See for example Lambrechts 2012, where Migdal’s 1988 Triangle of Accommodation was adapted to 
explain local state-society relationships on the Cape Flats, in Cape Town, South Africa. 
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2
THE GREAT DEMOCRATIC DISILLUSIONMENT?  




South Africa is now in its third decade of democratic rule. Contemporary political 
analysis highlight that citizens are caught in a grand democratic disillusionment in 
the context of political decay. This is evident in political volatility through service 
delivery protest that escalate in both frequency and destructiveness, narrative of 
state capture, political corruption, and anorexic delivery of basic services. A dominant 
narrative is that the democratic dividend of a better life had not materialised for many 
who remain caught in the cycle of poverty and inequality. 
The ruling African National Congress (ANC) is blamed for ineffective delivery, slack 
transformation, and self-benefit through corruption, which has not delivered the 
dream of 1994. This democratic disillusionment finds expression in often destructive 
and violent service delivery protests and an increase in voter disengagement from 
formal electoral processes (Schultz-Herzenberg, 2014). The Afrobarometer Survey 
2015 found that South Africans are discontent with democracy and “…a majority of 
citizens would be willing to give up elections in favour of a non-elected government 
that would provide basic services” (Afrobarometer, 2016). This indicates that intrinsic 
support for democracy in South Africa is weak. It also shows that South Africans seem 
to generate instrumental support for democracy as opposed to intrinsic democratic 
support. Democratic legitimation based on instrumental support for democracy can 
be problematic as it is 
…granted and may be withdrawn according the mood of the times. If 
citizens evaluate regimes mainly in terms of their capacity to deliver 
consumable benefits or to rectify material inequalities, they may also 
succumb the siren song of populist leaders who argue that economic 
development requires sacrifice of political leaders (Kotze and 
Steenekamp, 2009:72).
In this context, a narrative of renegotiating South Africa’s political society also 
emerged in 2012 under the banner of Economic CODESA driven by perpetual high 
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levels of poverty and inequality that mostly affect black South Africans. This narrative 
stresses growing discontent with a slow pace of transformation could potentially 
lead to a political and democratic crisis (Allix, 2012). The main thrust of this narrative 
stresses that “…we achieved political freedom without economic freedom…we never 
completed the job and we still have economic apartheid dividing the haves and the 
have-nots” (Sunter, 2015). It thus points to proverbial buyers remorse on the deal 
that inaugurated South Africa’s democracy in 1994. 
Du Toit (2003:104–105) observed, South Africa’s early political decay should 
be read in relation to overall ideas and goals that parties came to the negotiation 
table with in the early 1990s. The inherent problem with negotiated settlements 
to secure democracy, for Du Toit, is incommensurables. Here he highlights those 
incommensurables
…accrue over time, as one party gains something tangible that yields 
quick benefits, while the other party gains an item that is harder to 
measure, takes longer time to produce observable benefits, and may 
not even be equally beneficial to all stakeholders on that side of the 
bargain (Du Toit, 2003:109). 
In the South African case, it is evident that creating a political democracy was 
achieved as the “quick” outcome of the negotiations. A mere four years after the 
negotiations, a founding election inaugurated the post-apartheid state with a 
democratically elected ANC at its helm. This victory, however, came in the context 
of a contested narrative on reimaging the state for the political project of creating 
post-apartheid South African society. Twenty-two years after the miracle of 1994, 
as Robinson, Steinberg, and Simon (2016:1) highlight, “there is an increasing sense 
that the settlement reached in 1994 was not so much the foundation of a new order 
as a holding operation, keeping in abeyance a host of unresolved issues in regard to 
economic distribution and race relations”. 
This chapter presents an analysis of the emergent narrative of a buyers’ remorse of the 
bargain of 1994 through Huntington’s (1996) lens of transition and democratisation 
problems. First, I present an analysis of South Africa’s transition problems, which 
may have culminated in signs of political decay evident after 22 years of democracy. 
South Africa may well be caught in the problems of transitions that may inhibit 
democratic consolidation and legitimation of an emerging democracy. Democratic 
consolidation and legitimation, Huntington argues (1996:209–210), may be impeded 
by three factors, which are transition problems, contextual problems, and systemic 
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problems. This chapter focuses on two questions. First, what did the dream of 1994 
mean for ordinary citizens? This is an important question considering the finding that 
South Africans have an instrumentalist construction of democracy. What did it mean 
that live would be better under the democratic rule? What were the expectations 
created during South Africa’s transition period? This ties in with the second question 
this chapter focuses on: a democratic delegitimation rooted in a sense that life had 
not gotten better under democratic rule. 
The pitfalls of negotiations: Transition problems
We know that South Africa’s transition was an elite driven process. This enabled 
elites involved in the negotiations to set the tone of what was to come in future. As 
Southall (2012) highlights, “societal goals are established by elites and accomplished 
under their direction. This does not mean that societies do not change, only that most 
change comes about as a result of changes in the composition of elites”. Here history 
is equated to elite struggle for societal control. In the South African, elite political 
control shifted from the Afrikaner Nationalist Party elite to ANC political elites. In 
this context, we find the perception that the former National Party had sacrificed 
political power for white South Africans in order to maintain economic power. This 
is evident in expressions that white South Africans must share the wealth and return 
what was stolen as the economy is still dominated and controlled by white South 
Africans (Essa, 2013). Thus, white South Africans may have lost political power, but 
they still maintain their white privilege. 
Transitions involve intense political conflict among the political contenders competing 
to implement policies founded on different and mutually exclusive versions of 
government, state and economy. Here parties will negotiate and attempt to gain the 
most concessions on what the post-authoritarian state, society and economy will look 
like. It is not illogical to assume that both authoritarian and democratic actors in the 
negotiations will attempt to secure the most benefit for their respective constituents. 
Thus, we should not be surprised that the idea that Mandela’s negotiated peace 
provided an empty shell of economic transformation as new political elites entered 
into a pact with big business and Afrikaner nationalists (Bond, 2016). 
Transition problems are linked to the negotiations that bring about democratic rule 
and deal with agreeing on the institutions and processes that make democratic 
process work. In other words, is relates the institutions that make a new social 
contract between state and society work. It includes agreeing on the constitution 
and constitutional principles, as well as the basic institutional character of the 
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new democratic state. This also, however, needs to extend to what the new post-
authoritarian state will look like and what principles will guide the new social contract. 
Du Toit (2003:108–109), for example observe that the constitution was not founded 
on consensus. He asks:
was it a matter of win-win problem solving, or a war waged by other 
means? Was it to create procedural democracy guaranteed by a written 
contract, or was it to start a programme of sweeping redistribution 
subject to perpetual reinterpretation and revision? 
By 2012 there had been 16 constitutional revisions (De Vos, 2012). What we see now, 
however, is an argument that the constitution was only a “…compromise document 
foisted on the people of South Africa by evil right-wingers, that the document has 
become a stumbling block to effective governing of the country and hence has 
become a hindrance to the economic transformation of the country” (De Vos, 2012). 
The constitution, a document that creates the political structure of South Africa’s 
democracy, is now seen as a primary obstacle in achieving the great post-apartheid 
transformation. This is because, as Du Toit (2003:106) there were different views 
on the meaning of the negotiations. Consequently, “negotiators glossed over them 
[key issues] at the time in order to keep the negotiations moving forward, which was 
considered decisively important, and the long-term implications flowing from these 
unresolved differences have never been adequately weighed”. 
The ANC (1992) presented the negotiations as a “first option … a victory for the 
democratic movement and a defeat for the forces of apartheid”. In their Negotiations: 
A strategic perspective document, the ANC presents liberation as a phased process, 
with securing political power through negotiations as the first step. Here the ANC 
was of the view that “delays in the process of peaceful transformation are not in 
the interest of the masses, who seek liberation now, and do not enhance our 
possibilities to effect the transformation to genuine democracy as effectively and 
speedily as we should” (ANC, 1992). To facilitate a speedy resolution to create a post-
apartheid South African society on the principles of equal rights, non-racialism, non-
sexism, democracy and mutual respect (ANC, 1993), the ANC adopted a phased 
liberation process. 
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Figure 1 The ANC’s Phased Liberation Approach to creating post-apartheid 
South Africa
This view of phased liberation to recreate post-apartheid society demonstrates Du 
Toit’s argument on good faith. He argues that in a non-Western and high-context 
cultural context negotiations do not necessarily constitute a binding agreement that 
must be upheld. Rather, as opposed to negotiations and agreement providing “…a 
fixed point of reference…”, it rather signals “…a temporary benchmark, capturing the 
status of the relationship at that particular point in time…” (Du Toit, 2003: 106). 
Therefore, Du Toit, further observes, as new power structures and elite status emerge, 
negotiated settlements may become obsolete, requires a new deal. This much was 
evident in the views expressed by the ANC, as the only movement that can facilitate 
the creation of a truly democratic South Africa:
At all states, we should consider carefully the balance of forces, how 
to change the balance, and therefore place ourselves in a position in 
which we can determine the correct path to follow to futher the process 
of democratic change…The balance of forces, our specific objects and 
our long-term goard would at each stage dictate the need to: enter 
into specific, and perhaps changing, alliances; and, make certain 
compromises in order to protect and advance this process (ANC, 1992). 
At its 53rd policy conference held in 2012, the ANC thus presented its A second 
transition? Building a national democratic society and the balance of forces in 2012 
discussion document. Here we see a continuation of the phased liberation project 
evident in a sentiment that “…the first transition with its focus on democratisation 
over the last eighteen years…” has been concluded, the focal point is now “…a vision 
for a second transition that must focus on the social and economic transformation 
of South Africa…” (ANC, 2012). To this effect, the ANC thus sought to implement 
radical and transformative policies, which for them, finds expression in the National 
Development Plan. By 2015, however, the ANC noted a “…slow progress in…key 
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transformative programmes” in the sphere of the state due to “…constitutional 
and resources constraints” (ANC, 2015a). These constraints, the ANC maintains, 
undermines their ability to deliver a better for all (Ndou, 2014). 
Part of South Africa’s transition problems, it would seem, is the belief of the ANC 
that it is South Africa’s custodian of democracy. As the liberator, the ANC self-
image is one of a vanguard – a liberation movement that still continues to struggle 
for the liberation of South Africa. Thus, while the rules for the democratic game 
(institutionalisation of procedural democracy) was the outcome of the negotiations 
as well as an elite transfer of power, the ANC saw this as merely a first agreement or 
step towards achieving socio-economic transformation. 
A little more than two decades after the Founding Elections of 1994, we now see a 
narrative constructing the constitution as an uncomfortable hindrance to achieving 
socio-economic liberation for South Africa’s marginalised poor. It also sets the tone 
for the narrative that democracy failed, as opposed to the ANC as a ruling party 
not delivering on its electoral mandate. The basis of this disillusionment could be 
found in the nature of the social contract the ANC advanced through the National 
Democratic Revolution. The basis of this social contract was not necessarily rooted 
in an intrinsic commitment to a new constitutional order, but rather, a contract 
based on vanguardism where the ANC as a custodian of the state will deliver on the 
promise of liberation, and, if need be, revisit the terms of the settlement to enable a 
true liberation.
Contextual problems of South Africa’s transition
The second set of transition problems for Huntington (1996:209–210) is contextual 
problems that focus on the type and nature of the society, the economy, the culture, 
and the history of the transitioning state. These problems include high levels of mass 
poverty, cultural and ethnic divisions, and overextended economies. 
At the time of the negotiations, South Africa was a highly unequal and racist society. 
The apartheid state was built on a discriminatory and racist ideology that completely 
disempowered black South Africans politically, economically, and socially. The 
apartheid state acted as a vanguard for white interests that effectively created a 
society of white privilege and advancement at the cost of empowering black South 
Africans. The very basis of the liberation struggle was fought on securing political 
liberties, human dignity, and socio-economic advancement of ALL South Africans. 
Thus, towards the end of the negotiations, the ANC (1993) presented their vision for 
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South Africa in their Ready to Govern document. The post-apartheid political project 
was to advance:
1. The achievement of the right of all South Africans, as a whole, to political 
and economic self-determination in a united South Africa;
2. To overcome the legacy of inequality and injustice created by colonialism 
and apartheid, in a swift, progressive and principled way;
3. To develop a sustainable economy and state infrastructure that will 
progressively improve the quality of life all South Africans; and,
4. To encourage the flourishing of the feeling that South Africa belongs 
to all who live in it, to promote a common loyalty to and pride in the 
country and to create a universal sense of freedom and security within 
its border (ANC, 1993). 
The rationale for dealing with these contextual problems to achieve a democratic 
order in post-apartheid South Africa was premised on these four goals.
These are not mutually exclusive goals. On the contrary, the future of 
our country depends on the harmonious and simultaneous realisation of 
all four. The advancement of the majority of people will, in the medium-
and-long-term, release hitherto untapped and suppressed talents and 
energies that will both boost and diversify the economy. Developing the 
economy will, in turn provide the basis for overcoming divisions of the 
past without creating new ones. Finally, the achievement of a genuine 
sense of national identity depends on all of us working together to 
overcome inequalities created by apartheid (ANC, 1993). 
Economic empowerment and transformation was thus seen as the vehicle through 
which complete liberation and transformation of post-apartheid South Africa would 
be achieved. The underlying sense, it seems, was by virtue of generating economic 
equality through economic development with strong state capacity and political 
efficacy, South Africans would find a renewed sense of nationhood in the context 
of reducing racialised inequality and poverty as a new multi-racial class structured 
was engineered. It is also here where the intimate link between political (procedural) 
democracy and substantive democratisation (socio-economic transformation) lies:
…[the ANC] response must be aimed both at establishing a new 
and democratic political dispensation that replaces the racist and 
undemocratic apartheid constitution and addresses the legacies of 
apartheid in the broader socio-economic sphere…[thus] the ANC’s 
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broad policy response…to highlight the strong relationship between the 
creation of political democracy and social and economic transformation 
(ANC, 1993). 
The National Democratic Revolution became the political expression of the post-
apartheid social contract. This revolution would work to advance a political project 
of creating a 
…united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic society. This in essence 
means the liberation of Africans in particular and black people in general 
from political and economic bondage. It means uplifting the quality of 
life of all South Africans, especially the poor, the majority of whom are 
African and female (ANC, 2000).
What is important, however, is that that an ANC-controlled state will advance this 
project. The ANC regards itself as the leader of transformation (ANC, 2000) that 
“… needs to exercise leadership in all pillars of transformation: building a democratic 
developmental state, transforming the economy, ideological work, international 
work as well as mass organisations and mobilisation” (ANC, 2015b). Substantive 
democratisation in this view is dependent on the ANC remaining in power. It creates 
a correlation between post-apartheid transformation and ANC governance, which in 
turn, may fuel the instrumentalist construction of South Africans view of democracy. 
In other words, because the ANC has not effectively delivered on the promise of 
National Democratic Revolution and societal expectations of a better life for all, 
South Africa’s negotiated settlement needs revisiting to secure a better economic 
deal. Economic freedom remains elusive for those most oppressed during the brutal 
years of apartheid. 
The debate on securing economic freedom emerged strongly in the South African 
post-apartheid political landscape in 2011 with the release of the African National 
Congress Youth League’s (ANCYL) Declaration of the 24th National Congress in 
2011 signed under the banner of Economic Freedom Fighters (ANCYL, 2011). Using 
historical frames of racial oppression and economic exclusion of the black majority 
in general, but Africans in particular,1 through the continuation of colonialism of a 
1 In terms of racial classification in South Africa the term black is used to refer to all non-whites. 
This includes the Indian/Asian and Coloured populations. The term African is used to refer to the 
indigenous black population. 
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special type,2 this declaration issued a commitment to a new struggle “…in the war for 
economic freedom in our lifetime” (ANCYL. 2011). This struggle for economic freedom 
is premised on the Freedom Charter’s clarion call to “…transfer the economy from the 
minority to the people as a whole” (ANCYL, 2011). There was a moral obligation, the 
ANCYL argued, for the African National Congress, South Africa’s oldest liberation 
movement and current ruling party, to pursue a political and economic agenda to 
realise the Charterist vision of South Africa as a country that belonged to all and 
the people shared in its wealth (ANC, 1955). By 2014 the ANC Youth League was 
divided. Following a political clash with its mother body, the ANC, members of the 
ANCYL left to form the Economic Freedom Fighters of which Julius Malema is the 
public face. 
The ANC Youth Leagues’ Clarion call for Economic Freedom Fighters3 point to the 
failure of the ANC to deliver on the liberation promise of economic spoils envisaged 
in the Freedom Charter. Here the interpretation of South Africa’s failed democratic 
experiment focused on the high levels of socio-economic inequality that continues 
to characterise South African society. This clarion call sought to mobilise society 
behind the seven pillars to achieve economic freedom in our lifetime. This included 
mass nationalisation of strategic sectors through a direct transfer of wealth, 
direct state intervention through a developmental state, expropriation without 
compensation to facilitate transformation and an amendment to the property clause 
to allow the state to expropriate property in the name of the public interest, inclusive 
and decentralised economic development based on the redistributive strategy of the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme, land restitution and agrarian reform, 
extension of South Africa’s enterprises on the African continent, and the provision 
of education, skills and expertise to the people (ANCYL, 2011). Thus, the social 
contract requires an interventionist state that acts as a custodian and gatekeeper 
2 The South African Communist Party advanced that South Africa suffers a colonial peculiarity known 
as colonialism of a special type. Here they highlight that ‘within South Africa, bourgeois domination 
and capitalist relations of production, which emerged within the context of colonialism, have been 
developed and maintained since 1910 through a specific variant of bourgeois rule – colonialism of 
a special type. It is a variant of capitalist rule in which the essential features of colonial domination 
in the imperialist epoch are maintained and even intensified. But there is one specific peculiarity: in 
South Africa the colonial ruling class with its white support base on the one hand, and the oppressed 
colonial majority on the other, are located within a single country’. See SACP, The path to power, 
(1989), <http://www.sacp.org.za/main.php?ID=2638#3.1> (26 November 2015). 
3 Members of the ANC Youth League under the leadership of Julius Malema were expelled from the 
ANC in 2013 following an internal factional battle. They subsequently formed the Economic Freedom 
Fighters, a political party campaigning on the slogans of Economic Freedom in our Lifetime and drive 
a narrative of nationalization to establish a socialist state that will facilitate the full emancipation of 
the oppressed black majority. 
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to economic resources and works to empower the poor. Implicit in this narrative is 
abandoning the procedural democratic structure negotiated in the early 1990s to 
allow an interventionist state in regulating societal and economic life. 
Conventional wisdom in democratisation studies maintains that democratic 
regime performance is an essential element in constructing legitimation and 
democratic consensus (Ethier, 1990; Diamond, 1996; Diamond, 1999; Schneider 
and Schmitter, 2004; Chu, Bratton, Lagos, Shastri and Tessler, 2008). Underpinning 
the democratic consensus is a constitutional state where all the significant political 
actors are committed and adhere to the rules of the democratic game, and, no 
significant financial, human and social resources are spend on attempting to create 
authoritarian regimes (Schedler 2001:76–77). Diamond (1996:33–34) highlights 
that this consensus can only be built on the basis of effective state capacity to deliver 
on the hopes and aspirations of citizens. For him, the new democratic state must 
facilitate liberalising the economic structure secure social and political order, and 
maintain the democratic rights and liberty of citizens, while complying with the rule 
of law. This implies through delivering on a better life and improving the material 
conditions of citizens, the state will facilitate intrinsic democratic support as people 
evaluate the democratic regime in a positive light. Ethier (1990:15–16) presents a 
similar argument. Societies that suffer greatly economically and socially for extended 
periods of time are more susceptible to domestic instability and the overthrow of 
democratically elected regimes. 
Vergopoulus (1990:139–140) pits political consolidation against social fragility. In 
poor social contexts were we find absolute poverty and high levels of inequality, 
citizens (especially the economically marginalised) create many expectations of a 
better life. Here a beliefs that under democratic rule material conditions will improve 
which will lead to a better life and social upliftment may dominate public perceptions. 
This great expectation, however, will eventually lead to great disappointment, 
as many new democracies cannot undo history that gave rise to particular social 
and economic problems. This, as Pereirra (1990:199) represents a major threat to 
securing a democratic consensus and consolidation. It also, however, speaks to elites 
managing perceptions and what is realistically possible during the transition phase. 
For Fukuyama (2013:6), “the inability to ‘make democracy deliver’ in terms of shared 
growth and broadly available public goods has in turn weakened the legitimacy of 
democratic governments”. There is a correlation relationship between political 
efficacy, economic development and growth, and political leadership. Strong 
political leadership to advance a post-conflict social contract is essential to facilitate 
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substantive democratisation. And, for Fukuyama (2013:6) government performance 
and the quality of state bureaucracies are central to substantive democratisation 
and consolidation. 
Fukuyama (2013:5–6) further notes that while many new democracies succeed in 
holding relatively free and fair elections, political efficacy remains a key obstacle to 
democratic consolidation due to continued patterns of patron-clientism, corruption 
and ineffective service delivery. These are exacerbated in one-party dominant 
systems as due to its electoral majority, dominant parties may govern without the 
opposition. Consider the passing of controversial legislation like the Protection 
of State Information Bill in in 2013 (News24.com, 2013) or the ANC’s action in 
undermining constitutional structures, most notable in the battle of Nkandla and the 
Public Protector (Munusamy, 2016). 
The problem of incommensurables becomes evident as South Africa progresses in 
its third post-apartheid decade. The ANC had won political rule through elections, 
but an improvement in the socio-economic conditions of the poor remains elusive. 
This is often attributed to the implementation of neo-liberal economic policies that 
exacerbated inequality as opposed to create conditions for transformation envisaged 
in the post-apartheid social contract. For example, the ANCYL argues that
…post-1994 democratic [South Africa] State has not achieved anything 
substantial due to the fact that the economic policy direction taken 
in the dawn years was not about fundamental transformation, but 
empowerment/enrichment meant to empower what could inherently 
be few black aspirant capitalists, without real transfer of wealth to the 
people as a whole (ANCYL, 2011). 
The slow and unequal pace of transformation works to establish a grand 
disillusionment with ANC rule. Given that the ANC constructs itself as the custodian 
of democratic rule, it may play to the view that democracy has not delivered. In 
an attempt to maintain power, we find the ANC falling into a trap that had brought 
other dominant party liberation governments out of power, which relates to systemic 
problems of transitions Huntington (1996) identified. 
The systemic problems of transitions
The third set of problems Huntington deals with is systemic problems (Huntington, 
1996:209–210). These problems related to the democratic process, procedures, 
and institutions. Essentially Huntington argues that the nature of the authoritarian 
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regime impacts on performance legitimacy of the new democratic order, as they may 
be elite driven. These systemic problems include stalemate, the inability to reach 
decisions, and domination of political responsibility to vested interest of political and 
economic elites. 
In a post-apartheid context, systemic problems may be related to a continuation of 
one-party dominant tradition in South Africa’s political system. Following dominant 
Nationalist party rule between 1948 and 1993, the ANC emerged a clear victor in the 
founding elections with more than 60 % of the vote. The ANC has maintained an 
electorally dominant position, never achieving less than 60 % of the vote at a national 
election since then. A different story emerges at the level of local government, 
where election results indicate that support for the ruling party is slowly slipping. 
Municipalities are characterised by defects in governance and a lack of accountability, 
underperformance in budgetary spending, maladministration, patronage and 
anorexic service delivery. In 2014 only 9 % of South Africa’s municipalities received a 
clean audit (Evans, 2014). A lack of accountability, wasteful expenditure and dubious 
procurement processes within local government that enrich government officials 
or those closely connected to political elites (Grant, 2014) are key factors that 
undermine political efficacy and clean governance. With the exception of eThekweni 
and Mangaung, electoral support for the ANC during local government elections has 



















Figure 2 ANC’s electoral Local Government Election Performance4 
Data obtained from www.elections.org.za
Increasingly one sees the political party plagued by party-dominant “dilemmas”. 
These include narrowing the scope of political competition, blurring the lines 
4 I include the data for the 2014 General Election as a demonstration of the last election before 
the 2016 Local Government Elections scheduled for 3 August 2016. Cape Town is a DA governed 
municipality and was excluded from this analysis. 
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between state and party, (perhaps unintentionally) encouraging corruption through 
a system of patronage, and policy stagnation as a consequence of a lack of policy 
innovation (Dunleavy, 2010). Narratives of state capture, the infamous Nkandla 
scandal, and cadre deployment policy that blurs the line between party and state 
are characteristic of South Africa’s slow political decay early in its third decade of 
democracy. We have also seen a narrative of regime change and destabilisation 
of democracy where Western powers are seeking to remove the ANC from power 
emerged (Africa News Agency, 2016), which illustrates a very weak commitment to 
electoral processes that may eventually remove the ANC from power. The narrative 
of destabilisation of a democratic government by opposition forces is also evident in 
the emergent ANC policy narrative. For example,
The Fifth Parliament has been characterised by unity of the opposition 
with the intention of destabilising Parliament. This has been demon-
strated through the attempted motions of no confidence targeting ANC 
leadership in parliament; the unruly and disobedient behaviour, walk 
outs; and flagrant disregard of electoral doctrines that underpin the role 
and character of the democratic Parliament (ANC, 2015a). 
As dominant liberator parties generally emerge following major period of “…nation-
building, revolution, independence, or reconstruction after war” (Greene, 2007:10), 
the ANC now reimagines the South African state with an “…activist parliament...” 
emphasising the developmental role of the state that requires “…vigilant and 
assertive…” action to “…guard against the erosion of dignity and the high levels of 
confidence…” society has in Parliament (ANC, 2015a). Thus, we find that the ANC 
may be seeking to recreate the liberation euphoria through this reimagining of the 
state as an additional site of struggle to advance the National Democratic Revolution. 
This social contract built on the National Democratic Revolution, after all, requires a 
strong state able to drive economic growth and uplift people out of poverty. Thus, the 
state and its associated institutions are seen as the epicenter for ensuring liberation. 
This view also dominates the EFF’s construction of ensuring liberation for South 
Africa’s economically disenfranchised. 
Early democratisation periods are generally characterised by narratives and political 
agendas of reconciliation and post-conflict reconstruction. This works to create a 
sense of legitimacy built on ideas of societal transformation and a better life for all 
(Greene, 2007: 10). It may cement perceptions that a dominant party is the custodian 
of some future political project to recreate a democratic, just, and equal society. 
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The danger, of course, is that by virtue of linking legitimacy to a party instead of a 
system, once the party cannot deliver on its promises, it may lead to disillusionment 
with democracy as a system. In addition to this, a dominant party, as the self-
constructed custodian of democracy, may seek to undermine the political and 
constitutional order in an attempt to maintain power. 
We should pay attention to the emerging rhetoric of the ANC as they analyse the 
balance of forces and the institutional constraints on delivering on the dream of 1994 
in preparation for their elective conference of 2017. Here the ANC constructs the 
nature of constitutional democracy as an obstacle to achieving the much promised 
democratic dividend for the masses. For the ANC, inherent weaknesses in the state 
works to maintain apartheid political economy, undermining the broader political 
mandate of societal transformation (ANC, 2015b). Here the “processes of societal 
transformation saw the rise of many Blacks into middle and upper strata…this had 
not translated into systemic changes in ownership and control of wealth, including 
land; with the locus of economic power largely unchanged” (ANC, 2015b). 
Mbeki (2016) contests this notion, arguing, instead that the South African economy 
is not necessarily controlled by white South Africans, but rather by political and 
economic elites aligned to the ANC. This myth, Mbeki (2016) argues, is politically 
convenient for an ANC facing potential losses due to voter dissatisfaction with the 
party performance. 
For Mbeki, it is a problem of accountability due to inherent weaknesses in the electoral 
system. Du Toit (2003) also advanced this argument. The nature of the electoral 
system is too elitists as elites in party leadership decide on representatives to be 
deployed to the various institutions. Rather, a reconfiguring of the electoral system 
to allow direct election should be pursued whereby leaders are directly accountable 
to the people. This is an old debate in our scholarship. As early as 2002 concerns 
that the closed list proportional representation system undermines democratic 
accountability emerged (Kakemba, 2002). Similar arguments emerged in 2012 
after two ANC Members of Parliament were disciplined for their decision to abstain 
from voting in Parliament on the controversial Protection of State Information Bill 
(Sibalukhulu, 2012). This habitual debate, Solik (2014:40) argues, arises because 
South Africans want greater democratic accountability. Thus
In the wake of party political scandals and a lack of political alternatives, 
electoral reform has been cited as a much needed intervention; the PR 
system for national and provincial elections does not enable us to hold 
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individuals to account. We are fed up with many politicians, especially 
in the ruling party, who simply toe the party line. Politicians at the end 
of the day are accountable to party bosses and we have no way to 
influence party lists. This impotence is often encapsulated most vividly 
through the protests by those least able to participate in public life and 
most burdened by the state of inequality (Solik, 2014:40). 
The tension between accountability and governance is also exacerbated in a one-
party dominant context. Due to overwhelming electoral majorities, controversial 
motions, positions, and bills may pass with relative ease in Parliament, with the 
most recent example the failure of the motion to impeach President Jacob Zuma in 
April 2016 after the Constitutional Court found that he had violated his presidential 
oath through using public funds to renovate his personal residence.5 A lack of 
accountability also facilitates corruption, and in South Africa, a sense that corruption 
has gotten worse under the Zuma administration exits (Corruption Watch, 2014). 
This even though South Africa has thirteen public agencies mandated to deal with 
corruption (Corruption Watch, 2014). Increasingly one finds a sense that democratic 
accountability weakened under the Zuma administration,6 and a sense that “…ANC 
forgot about the people…” (Buntse, 2016). Of course, the correlations between 
perceived and actual corruption are complex (Africa Check, 2015), but democratic 
legitimacy is built on perceptions held by citizens. If citizens believe that their 
governments are corrupt and not acting in their interest, it may lay the foundation 
of a delegitimation of the government and societal unrest through civil disobedience 
and violent protest. 
A failed promise of a better life for all?
Has the ANC delivered on the promise of 1994? The answer, it seems, depends on 
whom you talk to. For some a better life for all is seen as an expression of the ANC 
creating a better life for South Africa’s poor and that life is generally better now under 
ANC rule than twenty years ago. This is evident in the number of people who now have 
access to basic services and the growth in a multi-racial middle class (Biko, 2013: 1). 
For others there is general acknowledgement that life is better under democracy, but 
that the socio-economic plight of the poor has still not been addressed. For producers 
5 See http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35966916. 




of this discourse, life under ANC rule has only benefited a few while leaving a large 
majority of the oppressed black majority behind (Biko, 2013:1). 
The data presented here is drawn from 25 interviews7 conducted in Motherwell, Port 
Elizabeth. A poor township area established in 1982 in Port Elizabeth, Motherwell is 
home to approximately 450 000 people (Affordable Land and Housing Data Centre, 
no date). Key challenges in the area are low skills level, high levels of HIV/AIDS, 
high crime, and high rates of unemployment. While there is evidence of progress in 
the area with RDP housing, unemployment remains a key issue for the community. 
The area is often plagued by violent and destructive protest action and evictions 
of foreigners. In essence, the area represents both the progress made in terms of 
housing delivery under the ANC government, but also stagnation due to high levels 
of crime, poverty, and unemployment.
South Africa’s transition period was built on the dream of 1994: a democratic country 
where all will be equal and life will be better for all, not just those who benefitted 
from the apartheid regime. The dream of ’94 was also seen as a first step towards 
restoring human dignity. Here participants noted that:
I was very happy. I felt extremely happy because this was the first 
time that black people gained freedom…And it made me feel free as a 
person as well. Even just strolling around I felt free; I didn’t have to be 
so conscious around white people. There was no longer any fear…I felt 
good, really good.
What I was thinking. I was thinking that now we are free. That you can 
talk with everybody, you can walk with everybody. You know, that you 
can be friends with everyone that you want to be friends with. I thought 
that now that the party [ANC] would take over, they’d know what we 
had gone through then. 
The dream of ’94 was also built on the idea of a better life, a life where all races would 
be equal, and more importantly, have equal access to opportunities, most notably 
education.
Talking of expectations, because I grew up in that old era, in that old 
regime [apartheid]. So my intention was, should Nelson Mandela be 
free, we would be living in a free country…our expectations were that 
7 The interviews were conducted in isiXhosa and English and translated by a Xhosa-speaking 
research assistant. 
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we would gain free education and that there’d be lots of jobs, that 
everyone would be employed, things like that. And that everyone would 
have his or her own house, things like that… and those were the things 
that we expected; which I expected.
Yes, yes…I thought wow! I too would now live comfortably like white 
people did…you know that we would all now live in a big house, live 
comfortably and be happy, you know the same as white people did. 
That’s really what I was now thinking, for real. And that everything was 
now going to be fine. But that is not how things turned out.
These views resonate with the expectations created during South Africa’s transition. 
A equal South Africa where the state will treat all impartially, with equal opportunity 
and equal access to political and material goods. Indeed, one participant reflected: 
I think this is a very tricky situation, it depends where you come from…
not in terms of place but in terms of your birth…you know, age… In 
my case I say that during, what we call the revolutionary tribal days…
how we defined freedom is not different to how freedom is supposed 
to…or is actually defined. And I understand that at that time we didn’t 
want gold, we just wanted to get the regime out of the way and it was 
not only expectations which we are talking about, but it is what was 
promoted amongst the minds of the people. Because if you remember 
all our struggle songs we were just saying one thing; that there shall be 
houses, security and jobs for all, you know. So if you risked your life…
we risked our lives, people went to jail, people got shot and got killed 
and they knew that this is what we are fighting for. Because this was 
what we were singing every day, this is what the media was telling us 
when we gathered in the stadiums, that this was the plan. So finally 
when 1990 came, when Madiba was unbanned, and Madiba was out 
from jail, we thought that yes, we are now heading the right direction…
we didn’t really look at the dynamics as to how are you actually going 
to get the land, it was just like an emotional thing that once you are 
free you are getting that.. I’m just going to go to Summerstrand8 and 
I’m going to pick that house. It was not put that way, but mentally …If 
someone stands in a crowd and makes a big noise and says ‘every street 
must have a car and we go yeah’ and you know you wonder how are you 
8  Affluent area in Port Elizabeth
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going to get that car, because you know we just wanted people to vote 
for the party, at that stage but come 1994 reality struck. 
There are different interpretations of the meaning of freedom that 1994 was meant 
to bring. It depends on age, and for young participants, the notion of freedom is an 
illusion, something that remains elusive in South Africa’s democracy. As one young 
participants noted:
I think, in my own opinion for those who lived before 1994, their aim 
of freedom was to free Mandela, then after it was to have their own 
black government. But for me, who was born in 1987, the word freedom 
for me is still an idea, which South Africa has not yet implemented. It 
is just an idea. The reason why I say that is because for me the word 
freedom is too big of a word for South Africa. Because yet you find 
that we have private schools, private hospitals, then in such instances, 
where is freedom there? They always say that freedom…they always 
say that education is the key to success. Therefore without education, 
there is no freedom. If education was free, then I would say that yes 
we do have freedom. The only place where you get free education is 
in prison. When you get in prison, you’ll get education for free. After 
you’ve received that education you won’t get anywhere because you’ll 
have a criminal record, meaning that that education is useless, so 
where’s freedom in that?
There is a sense that younger participants see freedom as having some form of 
tangible impact on their quality of life and future prospects. Class distinction also 
comes into effect as those with higher incomes are able to access private hospitals 
and schools, which often offer better services than government facilities. One senses 
that if government facilities were comparable to private facilitates, it would generate a 
sense of equality that could facilitate a view that South Africa is indeed a free society. 
…for example those guys that are the MPs that are working for 
government, most of their kids are not attending those local government 
schools, they are sending their children to private schools, and they are 
more educated than those children in the township schools. So that 
clearly shows that we will never be the same up until we build the right 
foundation…
This is not surprising given that unemployment is high and the chance of finding a 
good job to lift oneself out of poverty is limited. The interviews revealed a sense that 
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if you want to succeed in post-apartheid South Africa, then one needs resources to 
access private schools and health care. This, of course, places the poor in township 
communities at a continued disadvantage, as they do not have the financial means 
to afford fees at private schools, for example. If they do, it also comes at as a huge 
sacrifice for the family. It also reproduces apartheid patterns of exclusion due to the 
racialised nature of poverty and inequality, which in turn structures a narrative on 
starting afresh with a right foundation to recreate post-apartheid society. 
The theme of building a right foundation emerged a number of times during the course 
of the interviews. Due to the continued sense of oppression, a view that one must 
destroy the “old” in order to rebuild the “new” South Africa emerged. However, there 
is debate on how to rebuild the “new” South Africa. For example, one participant 
stated that 
Let me first start here, I’m not speaking against what you were saying 
but that can be dangerous, if we were to actually implement it and start 
fresh as you say. If we were to start afresh that might lead us heading to 
the Zimbabwean situation. 
Those who lived during the transition and the elections remember the uncertainty 
that had characterised those times. For example, one participant stressed that the 
ANC should be recognised for managing the transition and taking power in a manner 
that did not lead to South Africa’s political demise and civil war.
Personally I would give ANC a round of applause in terms of planning. 
Not that they have done well, but because they came in power with no 
experience, they took a country which is so much diverse. South Africa 
is a country filled with so much diversity that has a rich, painful history 
and they came into power. For me the fact that for the past 24 years we 
did not collapse as a country, that we can give them credit for. Because 
our government is still there. We have never woken up to a situation 
where one morning we are afraid that there might be bombs set off…
Thus, while there is recognition for the ANC’s role in facilitating establishing a 
democratic South Africa, there is also a distinction between the ANC as a liberation 
movement and as a governing party. As a governing party, participants felt that the 
party lacked political efficiency in addressing their immediate concerns, which are 




But I think that the government in terms of the efficiency in running, 
its one thing of being able to do something [free South Africa] and it’s 
another thing when one speaks of efficiency. If we look at the past and 
present, our main concern has to be now. 
This links to a view of “starting afresh” and “building the right foundation”, as the 
expectations of 1994 have not necessarily been delivered by the ANC as a governing 
party. The slow pace of socio-economic impact that translates drives this sentiment 
into a measureable impact on the quality of life of the participants, especially among 
younger participants. Here one participant highlighted that 
I think the point is that people fear change, that’s why they always stick 
with this ruling party [ANC] because of the fear of what happened 
before, I think if you may go through all the party’s mandates, they make 
promises come election time, that were going to do a b c and d, so if you 
follow your x or if you understand what that party promises you, then 
you put your x there and you make sure that these are my expectations 
and this is what I’m hoping to get in return from my x. Because if you 
go through all the different parties mandates, you always get promise 
of free education, you always get talk of lots of jobs, houses, service 
delivery and all of that, but at the end of the day you don’t get any of 
those in return.
One also notices a sense of disempowerment among young participants. This seems 
to be premised on the view that their voice is limited due to the lack of opportunities 
they have to recreate a better life for their families. After two decades of democracy, 
there may be a sense that oppression continues as the vote does not necessarily 
translate into a tangible opportunity to pursue their life choices. For example, one 
participant highlighted that she dreams of becoming a doctor, but due to the high 
cost and lack of medical schools in Port Elizabeth, she will have to give up on that 
dream (Motherwell Interviewee 5). Here she blames government, who should 
have provided free education as was promised in 1994. While their parents’ value 
political freedom having lived with the dehumanising legislation of the apartheid 
regime, for younger participants the notion of freedom and the dream of 1994 is 
more instrumentalist. The optimism of 1994, it seems, had disappeared as the first 
post-apartheid generation came of age politically. The hand of apartheid reached in 
and touched the future, as one participant noted. Here the feeling is that 
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I think we may have those that we call the Born Frees, but they too are 
affected by the…apartheid regime because I’m a father who is not that 
well educated. If I had been well educated I would be in a position now 
to provide for myself and my family. But now my children are suffering 
because of that…because of the suffering that I endured, and it’s now 
a chain of suffering. So the past still affects the present generation to 
such an extent that even in terms of education, people are still yearning 
for quality education. 
The lived reality of the youth is one of continued expression where freedom is still 
something that must be attained in the future. 
I think when you compare my mother and I…my mother is more satisfied 
with the freedom we have now, whereas I don’t see it as a freedom. She 
was forced to carry a dompass, there were whites only places, no black 
places. She didn’t have a house at that time, whereas now she’s living 
in a RDP house. She’s willing to vote which is said that your vote is your 
voice, maybe she has a voice whereas I don’t have it and that is why I’m 
saying that she’s more satisfied than I am. I can say that now yes we can 
vote, and that our vote is our voice, and you vote for your own political 
party, and that political party will backstab you. That same political 
party will oppress you, and it’s that same political party that we’ll put 
our hopes on. So I don’t see freedom yet, maybe freedom is still coming. 
This sense of continued oppression was salient on issues surrounding education and 
service delivery. For example, one mother stated that
My little boy is 9 years old and they will keep on going with these 
strikes and burning schools and there’s poor quality of education that 
our children get. At the end of the day our children complete grade 12 
but they don’t have the right qualifications. They just pass the students 
to the next grade, if there were inspectors like in the olden days then I 
think that the teachers would work harder and the person whose above 
the teacher would hire more teachers as the inspectors would see that 
the classrooms are overcrowded and that the teachers can’t manage so 
many children…
There is a sense of disillusionment with electoral democracy, but not on the basis 
of the act of voting, but rather the expectations political parties create when 
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campaigning for vote. This disillusionment is premised on the view that after 22 
years of democracy, all the ruling ANC offers are empty promises. 
…the ruling party [ANC] has been promising South Africans the same 
thing for twenty years now. The first democratic leader of South Africa 
said free education for all and that has not yet happened. We as South 
Africans experienced load shedding for almost three years now, and 
the ruling party said that they would take care of that. All the other 
parties are promising to do what the ruling party is not doing, they are 
not bringing anything new of their own, and they are just saying that 
they will do that which the ruling party fails to do. So for me, voting is 
useless because of that reason. 
I’m not voting. Because they don’t give us what they promised, they 
don’t deliver. We vote for them and they don’t deliver look at the 
schools now!
How many times have we voted in order to make sure that our voices 
are heard? But still there’s no change…even when they build us houses, 
they don’t care who builds those houses or whether those houses fall 
on top of our children and on top of us because they don’t even employ 
qualified builders for those houses. So that’s why I say that they try 
but they don’t try hard enough, or the people running the ward, they’re 
not working together. So that’s why I won’t vote. Because I have voted 
several times before but my voice haven’t been heard. 
Other participants, however, noted the importance of voting, especially with 
regard to building opposition to an electorally dominant ANC. Here participants 
highlighted that 
Going back to basics if you think of voting and you have the mindset 
that this government is going to give me this and that. I understand that 
for those that are saying that they will not vote, they are angry at the 
government that is ruling now… This government that is now is failing 
but your voice will only be heard if you vote against that government….
You know there is this saying that says that it is better to live as a lion 
for a day, then as a sheep for the rest of your life, which means that you 
have to wake up and do something. If this government is not treating 
your well then you must vote against this government, which is what 
Mr. Nelson Mandela once said. He said that if the ANC government 
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does to you what the apartheid government did to you, then you must 
do to the ANC government what you did to the apartheid government! 
This is the correct stance to take. And I’m going to vote. 
For me it’s good to vote. Because what I’ve noticed as the ruling power 
loses its area or ward, then they start making improvements and that 
makes them realize that they must pull up their socks. That means that 
you must do what you must do as an individual. It’s not good to vote for 
the same thing that happens to all the time. You must create some sort 
of balance, give others a chance so that the other can pull up their socks 
and do the right thing.
There is a political awareness of the importance of creating opposition for the 
dominant ANC, especially in order to ensure the democratic dividend of what was 
promised during the electoral campaign. This view, however, was more pronounced 
among younger interviewees as opposed to older participants. Older participants 
highlighted a fear of the opposition, noting that “…if a party had any inkling of 
apartheid…” they will not take a chance and vote for it. This also facilitates building 
legitimacy on the premise of fear of the opposition (Steyn Kotze and Prevost, 2015: 
158). To this effect, phased liberation, a continued political agenda of transformation, 
race, and fear of the opposition interplay to create a historical obligation to continue 
voting for the ANC (Steyn Kotze and Prevost, 2015: 158). 
The construction of political legitimacy of continued ANC rule is also based on the 
provision of social welfare goods, including food and stationary at schools, even if 
the services delivered are of weak quality. Seemingly the view is that some services 
are better than having no services at all. For example, some participants highlighted:
Yes I am going to vote…let’s look at this in two ways because although 
we may grumble and say that they are not doing anything, we would 
find that if you were to visit the black schools you’d see that it’s not 
that the government is not doing anything, in those schools you’ll find 
that the stationery is free, that they get meals because the government 
understands that at times that those students did not get any meal at 
home even from the previous night, so at least at school they would 
get served breakfast and lunch. So we should consider those things, 
because even if I say that I will not vote, I should consider the difference 
that I would have made in the country. What I know is even if one votes 
or does not vote, in this country there is nothing that will be done that 
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will reach us perfection. There will always be complaints and that is 
something we can’t run away from. It’s a fact. So I will vote, because the 
government does try even amongst all the complaints. 
Whether the ANC has indeed created a better life for all remains a contested 
narrative, especially in the construction of political legitimacy of democracy and 
ideas of freedom. What is evident, however, is that there are generational differences 
in the perceptions of whether the Dream of ’94 has indeed been achieved. Younger 
participants view the idea of democracy and freedom as empty given that a sense 
that democracy has not necessarily delivered on the promise of equal opportunities. 
There is also a sense among young participants that this failure needs to be corrected 
with a fresh start to recreate the economic structure of post-apartheid South Africa. 
This, of course, opens the space for more radical political parties advocating 
nationalisation as the path to economic prosperity of the poor to generate support. 
It could also drive perceptions that an authoritarian government will be acceptable if 
there is quality service delivery. Thus, as Du Toit (2003:112) highlight, this speaks to a 
sense that the rules must reflect changing power relationships, and not shape them. 
Older participants, perhaps due to the lived experience of oppression during 
apartheid, however, guard against this view. While they concur that on a socio-
economic level the Dream of ’94 remains elusive, they do value their political rights 
and freedom. For them, these rights are an expression of human dignity and equality 
denied to them by the apartheid regime. It would seem that older participants have 
more of an intrinsic support for democracy than younger participants. 
Du Toit (2003:111–113) provides an insightful analysis on giving voice to deprivation. 
In deconstructing the notion of liberation, Du Toit identifies two relationships: 
(1) the link between liberation and poverty, and (2) the link between poverty and 
dignity. These themes, Du Toit argues, not only serves to explain a continued sense 
of deprivation, but also forms part of high-context cultural frameworks where “…
human relationships (of domination, subordination, and emancipation) are at the 
core of issues, a historical sense of injustice is pervasive, and matters of status are 
central” (Du Toit, 2003:112). The themes of liberation and poverty play out in the 
views of younger participants, especially with their view that freedom remains an 
empty ideal in post-apartheid South Africa. Oppression is felt in the sense that life 
has not necessarily gotten better, and, as Du Toit (2003:112) highlights, as pressure 
for the ANC to make good on their promises increases, we may see an increase in 
rhetoric demanding a “…rewrite of constitutional rules as a way of escaping from the 
pressure of unkept promises”. 
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We find expressions of this in the perceptions that people hold on whether the ANC 
had indeed delivered a better life for all. The problem, of course, is that one entity 
or political party cannot solve the problems of incommensurables (Du Toit, 2003: 
113). Rather it speaks to reimagining a new social contract the democratic dividend 
is not dependent on a political party (whether it is the ANC or EFF), but rather 
the ability of people to hold their leaders accountable for failing to deliver on their 
electoral promises. 
Conclusion
We find two contending schematas for unpacking the problem of incommensurables 
flowing from South Africa’s elusive dream of 1994: one of liberation and one of 
continued oppression. The construction of post-apartheid South Africa as either free 
or oppressive, seemingly, also depends on age as well as the instrumentalist view 
that quality of life has indeed improved. Here political freedom is valued on the basis 
that there are equal rights for all and that each person can vote, but it seems that this 
is more prevalent among those who had lived through the uncertain times of South 
Africa’s transition and experienced the brutality and dehumanising oppression of the 
apartheid state. 
One cannot ignore the view that apartheid oppression continues in the form of 
inequality, lack of socio-economic benefit, and job scarcity. There is a sense of 
disillusionment built on the failed promise of free education. There is broad consensus 
among the participants that the way out of poverty is education. But, this is a luxury 
that they cannot afford. It is here that the ANC has failed to transform life for those 
who had suffered most under the brutal apartheid regime. 
The lack of delivery creates a foundation from which to construct the transition 
through the lens of a remorseful buyer who should start afresh in advancing the 
political project of freedom. This, of course, opens the political space for more radical 
parties to capitalise on this disillusionment with a superficial freedom that means 
little in transforming the lived experience of oppression. 
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TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA AND POLAND:  
THE GENETIC APPROACH
Ursula van Beek 
Introduction
In 2002 Thomas Carothers published his since much talked about article about 
the end of the transition paradigm. The paradigm, which he contested, evolved in 
the early 1990s when close to a hundred countries across all cultural regions of the 
world began to move away from authoritarian rule towards a more liberal form of 
governance. The phenomenon followed in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet 
Bloc, and later the Soviet Union itself. It was generally assumed at that time that 
democracy won the war of attrition between the two competing political systems, 
which had bisected the globe since the end of the Second World War in 1945. 
Most observers also assumed transitions in the individual countries to be a global 
trend that constituted a part of – and gave greater impetus to – the Third Wave of 
Democracy (Huntington, 1991).
Five assumptions underpinned the paradigm. First, all the countries in transition were 
moving away from authoritarian rule towards democracy; second, democratisation 
unfolded in a sequence of well defined phases; third, elections were of key importance; 
fourth, structural factors did not play a major role; fifth, transitions making up the 
Third Wave were built on functioning states.
Many important analyses of transitions emerged. Among them the pioneering 
work by O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead (1991) who explained the process of 
democratisation of South American and Southern European regimes; Linz and Stepan 
(1996) who focused on the problems of democratic transition and consolidation in 
Southern Europe, South America and post-Communist Europe; Dogan and Higley 
(1998) who compared the role of elites in the transition process; Gilliomee and 
Simkins (1999) and van Beek (1995) who analysed various transitions, with the latter 
making an initial attempt to compare the transition in South Africa and Poland; Meyer 
and Ryszka (1991) who conducted a comparative study of political participation and 
democracy in Poland and East Germany; and Szelenyi, Wnuk-Lipinski, and Treiman 
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(1995) who studied the emergence of economic, cultural and political elites in 
Poland, Russia and Hungary.
Carothers challenged the continuing validity of the transition paradigm by pointing 
out that of the hundred, or so, countries considered as transitional in the 1990s, 
probably fewer than twenty retained the positive dynamic of the early days and were 
on their way to become well-functioning democracies in the following decade. The 
vast majority of the cases did not seem to be deepening whatever initial democratic 
progress they may have made. Carothers categorised the latter countries as those 
that have moved, or were about to move, into the “grey zone”, pointing out that two 
common defects dominate this dynamic. The one is “feckless pluralism”, a syndrome 
in which significant amounts of democratic trimmings remain, but where alternation 
of power seems to do no more than to shift the country’s problems back and forth; 
where democracy remains shallow and troubled; and where the ruling groups are 
considered to be corrupt, self-interested and inept. The other defect is the “dominant 
power politics” syndrome.1 Countries falling into the latter category also retain some 
important vestiges of democracy, including space for political contestation by the 
opposition, but in those cases one political grouping dominates the system to such 
an extent that the possibility of an alternation of power in the foreseeable future 
is unlikely.
South Africa and Poland, the two countries to be analysed here, have been both 
considered as transitional in the literature. They both moved away from authoritarian 
regime at the height of the Third Wave, and each has made impressive strides 
towards democratisation in the initial period of their respective transitions. Yet 
Carothers classified Poland as belonging to the successful minority of countries that 
are well on their way to a consolidated democracy; while placing South Africa as a 
country edging ever closer to the “grey zone”.2 The question is why the divergence? 
The framework
Searching for answers the empirical part of the inquiry that follows will test a model 
proposed in a much earlier yet just as influential article entitled “Transitions to 
democracy: Toward a dynamic model” (1970). Its author, Dakart Rustow, is considered 
to have introduced the term “transition” in reference to a change in political regime. In 
contrast to most political scientists at that time, Rustow was less curious about how 
1 For insightful analyses of South Africa in this context see: De Jager and du Toit (2012). 
2 Pierre Du Toit elaborated on the dynamics behind democratic degeneration in a long-term historical 
perspective (2010).
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an existing democracy might best be preserved or strengthened, than in the problem 
of how it comes into being in the first place. Focusing on the “genetic question”, as 
he called it, Rustow turned to the study of the conditions existing at the birth of a 
democracy. In his opinion such an approach offered valuable insights into why some 
democracies improve and persist while others weaken over time, or even perish. 
Writing before the onset of the Third Wave, Rustow also considered an inquiry of 
this kind to be of more interest, and possibly of more usefulness, to students of 
democracy in the parts of the world that were yet to democratise. Now that this has 
happened, his hypotheses are worth revisiting for their potential explanatory value.
Rustow emphasised agency, process and bargaining over functional approaches. 
Without denying the significance of the latter, he argued that even the most 
prominent attempts to offer a worldwide comparative perspective on democracy 
such as those by Martin Seymour Lipset (1959, 1960), bore only on function. Taking 
the form of correlations measured at a given point in time these data did not reveal, 
for example, if affluent and literate citizens make for better democrats; whether 
democracies provide superior schools; or create conditions more propitious to 
economic growth; or whether an “industrial” economy causes democracy, as well 
as affluence and literacy. In a similar vein Rustow questioned the contemporary 
opinion-based findings of Almond and Verba (1963), pointing out that it was not 
clear whether willingness to participate in public life or a consensus on fundamentals 
that form “civic culture” were the effect of democracy, its cause, or neither. 
Taking pains to distinguish clearly between cause and correlate, Rustow did not 
commit his model to the simple view of causality where every effect has only one 
cause, and every cause but one effect. Instead, he allowed for a two-directional 
flow of causality between politics, on the one hand, and the economic and social 
conditions, on the other, cautioning the social scientist to be specific about the 
mechanisms by which social or economic conditions penetrate the political 
democratic foreground. Nor does the model impose uniformity. Instead it stresses 
there are many roads to democracy, and it assumes that transition is not a steady 
process progressing over time because both continuity and discontinuity are 
possible. The model imposes three restrictions. It calls for a specific time-frame; it 
requires an internal logic of transition, with no major impetus from abroad; and, it 
recommends a close examination of two or three cases that could by application be 
tested later on a broader sample of cases. 




Background condition: The initial condition is national unity, understood not as pledges 
of allegiance to soil and blood, but defined by the absence of any mental reservations 
or doubt by the vast majority of the democrats-to-be that they belong to the same 
political community. The background condition is best fulfilled when national unity is 
unquestionably taken for granted. 
Preparatory phase: This phase builds up against the background condition in a 
prolonged and inconclusive political struggle between well entrenched social forces 
rallying around issues of great meaning to each side. The struggle leads typically to 
polarization rather than pluralism. The dynamic process of democratization is usually 
set off by the emergence of new elite that is able to mobilise a previously leaderless 
social group into concerted action. 
Decision phase: The decision phase is activated when leaders of the contending social 
forces accept the existence of diversity and recognize that a fundamental power 
shift is underway. This may lead them to make a conscious decision to institute 
a political change. A decision in favor of democracy will typically entail a lengthy 
process of negotiations, which is fraught with risks for the future and is conducted 
by a small circle of leaders who play a disproportionately large role at that stage. 
Among them are the protagonists of the preparatory struggle. The phase terminates 
when a compromise has been reached, even if there is no general agreement on 
fundamentals and differences in preference on procedures have not been resolved. 
Habituation phase: The final phase entails reconciling professional politicians and 
the citizenry at large with the imperfect agreement worked out by the leaders. The 
very establishment of a democracy by means of the principle of conciliation and 
accommodation can be helpful to the process as it provides proof that negotiations 
can work as a conflict resolution mechanism. This in turn might encourage the 
contending political forces and their leaders to continue seeking resolution to 
conflicts through this democratic procedure. But, according to Rustow, success or 
failure is related to the nature of the conflicting issues at hand. Historical examples 
show how effective democracy has been in resolving political questions where the 
major divisions are social and economic. The same cannot be said of countries 
divided by religion, ethnicity or race. In those cases tenacious and recurring bitterness 
causes divisions, which democracies struggle to settle. Rustow sees this difficulty 
in resolving community issues as an indication of the importance of national unity 
as the background condition of the democratization process, concluding that “the 
hardest struggles in a democracy are those against the birth defects of the political 
community” (1970: 360).
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South Africa and Poland in transition 
The background condition
Since national unity as the background condition plays such a singularly important 
role in the model, the term has to be clearly defined. This is especially so that 
“national unity” might easily be confused with the term “state”, where the latter 
is understood – and is routinely listed – as one of the preconditions of achieving a 
democratic transition. Larry Diamond (Discussion, 2014), for example, censured 
Rustow for going too far by labeling as national unity something that should have 
rather been called a “reasonably coherent state”. But the two terms are not always 
interchangeable. There can be national unity without there being a state, and there 
are examples of existing states, which lack national unity. The deliberate distinction 
Rustow made in this regard is exceptionally well illustrated by the history of the two 
cases examined here: South Africa and Poland.
In South Africa the Dutch and the British settlers have been vaguely united over 
the centuries by the notion of their shared European roots and by the alleged 
achievements of their common mission of ‘civilising’ the indigenous inhabitants. At 
the same time they viewed each other with suspicion, and many would argue that 
some of these negative sentiments linger to this day. While the English speakers 
considered South Africa a colonial outpost and traced their own roots back to Europe, 
the identity narrative of the Afrikaners developed a fierce allegiance to Africa, but 
one that excluded the indigenous people of the land (Mda, 2002). This divergence 
in historical allegiance, coupled with a different sense of belonging and, above all, 
competition for resources, led to a collision course that culminated in the Anglo-Boer 
war. Besides combat casualties, some 26 000 Boer women and children perished 
in British concentration camps and in their homesteads during the war, leaving the 
Afrikaners with a determination never to be victimised again. The subsequent fervent 
brand of their exclusive nationalism may have paved the way to the crafting of the 
policy of apartheid (Krog, 1998).
Colonialism initiated the degrading social differentiation, apartheid made it legal. 
The apartheid narratives portraying the non-white ethnic and racial groups in the 
country as inferior or threatening prevented the forging of any sense of common 
national unity. The narratives and the associated discriminatory policies were, in fact, 
designed for precisely the opposite purposes: they were to keep the various groups 
apart. The institutionalization of segregation excluded by law the majority of the 
population from citizenship in the state. 
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The history of Poland could not have been more contrasting as the country ceased to 
exist as an independent state and yet the sense of national unity survived the absence 
of statehood. In three successive territorial seizures (1772, 1773 and 1795) Russia, 
Prussia and Austria carved up and divided the land among them, until they erased 
Poland entirely from the map of Europe for 123 years (Cegielski and Kadziela, 1990). 
Alarmed by the loss of territory following the first partition, Polish intellectuals strove 
to assure that the thought of Poland and its language, along with the ideas of Polish 
Enlightenment, were carried forth. The most notable achievement of these patriotic 
thinkers was to reform the educational system in the wake of the papal dissolution of 
the Society of Jesus, which removed Jesuits from the Polish school system. In 1773 
they set up the National Education Commission, which is considered to have been the 
first ministry of education in Europe (Davies, 2005). The Commission restructured 
education from primary to college level, established Polish as the language of 
instruction, and introduced university courses on citizenship, public responsibilities 
and the arts of state (Wroczynski, 1983). 
The final partition of Poland was a response to the first and most extensive in the 
series of three national uprisings against the occupying powers. The 1794 rebellion 
led by Tadeusz Kosciuszko, one of the heroes of the American revolutionary war, 
gave the initial impetus to the following November Insurrection of 1830 and the 
January Uprising3 of 1864. Although all three uprising ended in failure, they helped to 
keep the spirit of national unity alive until the Treaty of Versailles recreated the Polish 
state in 1918. 
Preparatory phase
In contrast to the differences in the “background condition”, South Africa and Poland 
shared many similarities during the “preparatory” phase, which both countries 
entered in 1948. In that year the apartheid regime took the reins of power in South 
Africa, while in Poland the last vestiges of freedom were eliminated following the 
fraudulent election, which gave the Soviet-supported communist regime total control 
over the country and its people. The lines of conflict became clearly demarcated in 
both countries. 
The African National Congress (ANC) played a leading role in the struggle against 
white racial domination in South Africa. The forms of the struggle ranged from 
non-violent mass actions, to armed resistance and acts of terrorism against the 
3 Karl Marx in his speech marking the fourth anniversary of the January Uprising referred to the spirit 
of the Polish nation as that of the “immortal knight of Europe (Marx, 1867). 
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apartheid state. The struggle was informed by Christianity, Liberalism, Marxism, 
Pan-Africanism and Black Nationalism. The initial input into this curious fusion of 
concepts came from the Christian tenets disseminated by missionaries who were 
the earliest opponents of segregation and segregationist legislation. Their social 
gospel fostered through the educational system promoted social reform that was 
meant to lead to an equitable and just society. In political terms the Christian ideal 
found expression in the Freedom Charter, adopted in 1955. The document, which 
the apartheid regime banned, envisaged South Africa as belonging to all who live 
in it and who should enjoy equal rights and opportunities, including the right to a 
democratic vote without distinction of colour, race, sex or creed. The Freedom 
Charter was formulated primarily by people whose biblical knowledge acquired in 
the mission educational system helped them articulate the blueprint for a free and 
democratic South Africa (Xundu, 1988).
But Christianity arrived in tandem with European colonization and in time an anti-
Christian bias emerged among the younger generation. This development gave rise to 
African Nationalism and prepared a fertile ground for Marxism. In the ensuing course 
of the struggle, liberationist political thinking about future citizenship coalesced into 
two broad trends: “Charterist” non-racial integration, and Black Nationalism. The 
liberal multiracialism of the former captured in the Freedom Charter was set against 
the Marxist vision for a non-racial post-liberation South African society based on 
class distinctions. The polarity in African political thinking led in 1959 to a break-away 
Black Nationalist movement, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), which splintered 
from the ANC. 
For South Africa the defining moment in the “preparatory phase” was the 1976 Soweto 
Uprising. The brutal suppression of the uprising jolted into action the formerly low key 
United Democratic Front (UDF). In the aftermath of the uprising the UDF managed 
to give shape to mass political culture by directing it towards engagement in popular 
activism. The movement provided a powerful rallying platform at the national level 
for the hundreds of anti-apartheid civil society organisations that had sprang up at 
local levels throughout the country in response to Soweto. These were church and 
civic bodies, as well as various workers, youth, student and women structures. The 
UDF was a strictly non-racial and non-violent movement. It brought together people 
from across racial, ethnic and class boundaries. The movement was modelled on the 
strategy of civil disobedience promoted in the 1950s by the ANC, with which the 
UDF shared the Christian heritage (Van Beek, 2010). 
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Poland entered the communist era significantly weakened. World War Two claimed 
almost one fifth of the population, with more than 90 percent of Polish Jews and three 
million ethnic Poles having been exterminated. Landed gentry, the intellectuals and 
the middle classes were the main social groups targeted by the Nazis. The Soviets 
aimed to eliminate the same strata of population during their occupation of eastern 
Poland (September 1939 to June 1941), with the 1940 Katyn massacre of several 
thousands of Polish reserve officers as the most telling example (Wawrzonek, 2008). 
The combined impact of the Nazi, Soviet and Polish communists’ policies decimated 
Polish elites, making the communist takeover of the country that much easier. 
German wartime occupation policy also decimated the Catholic clergy. Significantly 
weakened, the Church nevertheless entered the communist period as an enduring 
symbol of what it meant to be Polish. The traditional model of the Catholic-Pole 
was to become the defense mechanism in the face of Stalinist repression in Poland 
(1948-1956). The embodiment of the anti-communist defiance was Cardinal Stefan 
Wyszynski who repeatedly dared the regime. He called for freedom of assembly by 
invoking the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and he encouraged inner 
freedom, which allowed “the citizen not to be afraid to defend his rights when they are 
violated” (Michnik 1993: 116). After some years of evident secularisation,4 the model 
of the Catholic-Pole returned with a vengeance in the post-Vatican II period, initiating 
the division between ‘us’, the Poles, and ‘them’, the communists (Grabowska, 2001). 
By then the ‘us’ meant a coalition of workers and intellectuals that, most significantly, 
included not only Catholic intellectuals but also dissident left intellectuals. Despite 
their longstanding anticlerical tradition the latter engaged in a dialogue with the 
Church. This unlikely alliance created the embryo of the future trade union Solidarity 
(Michnik, 1998; Garton Ash, 1983). 
While Soweto was the defining moment of the “preparatory phase” in South Africa, 
for Poland the catalyst was the election of a Polish pope in 1978. More precisely, it 
was the pilgrimage of the newly elected Pope John Paul II to his homeland a year 
later that rekindled in the Polish society the dormant sense of national and ethical 
unity, shattering thereby the societal atomisation engineered and imposed on the 
society by the communist regime. In August 1980, this re-discovered oneness gave 
rise to Solidarity, a ten million-strong social movement. As in the case of the ANC, 
Solidarity was also outlawed when the regime declared martial law in December 
1981. And as the ANC, Solidarity survived underground, while its spirit was kept alive 
4 Polish sociologists noted increased levels of secularisation between 1956 and 1968, especially 
among intellectuals, high school pupils and university students (Szawiel 1989).
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by the Church. With the ascent of the Gorbachev era in the Soviet Union and the 
resultant emergence of a reformist faction within the Polish Communist Party, the 
robust counter-elite created by Solidarity seized the moment. 
The ultimate collapse of the authoritarian regimes in South Africa and Poland was 
the outcome of very different and internally highly complicated social processes that 
did, however, share one general characteristic: a yearning for freedom. The eventual 
success of achieving transition in both cases can be attributed to another common 
factor: a universal discrediting of the respective types of autocracy. Whereas 
apartheid was from the start rejected by the majority of South Africans and was 
condemned throughout the world for its racist foundations, communism held the 
power to move the hearts and minds of millions and for a time communist ideology 
was successfully substituting for regime legitimacy. This changed in 1956 after the 
ruthless suppression by the Soviet Army of the Hungarian uprising the purpose of 
which was to depart from the imposed rigid totalitarian communist dogma. In Poland 
and elsewhere in the Soviet Bloc, the revisionist reaction to the suppression of the 
uprising was an attempt to reform communism from within. The experiment of trying 
to build ‘socialism with a human face’ ended with the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia 
by the forces of the Warsaw Pact. The experiment failed, but the romantic veneer 
came off leaving communism exposed for the repressive system that it was. 
Decision phase5 
Formal government negotiations with the opposition movements began in the two 
countries just over two years apart. The February 1989 Round Table talks brought 
together delegates from the ruling Polish United Communist Party and the Solidarity 
trade union. In South Africa the Convention for Democratic South Africa (CODESA 1) 
met in December 1991 with the two major participants representing respectively the 
ruling National Party and the ANC. At the outset, both the Polish and the South African 
governments seemed to have been in a stronger position than was the opposition. 
The Polish government, fully aware of the abysmal state of the Polish economy, 
realized that to undertake meaningful economic reforms it needed societal support 
and that such support would only be forthcoming if a compromise were reached with 
the opposition. The expectations of the opposition at that point were rather modest, 
5 Pierre du Toit offers an insightful analytical framework within which to assess the bargaining 
relationships that precede negotiations and extend beyond the decision phase. Although focused 
more specifically on South Africa, the framework helps both making a distinction between potential 
power, tactical action and bargained outcomes, and studying the effects of specific tactics on 
outcomes and subsequent power relations (du Toit, 1989 and 1991). 
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merely to be returned to public life by enjoying the status of a legal organisation. 
The South African government already unbanned the ANC and committed itself to 
political liberalisation, but it hoped to prolong the process while retaining maximum 
influence over its implementation. The expectations of the ANC were much more 
radical than those of Solidarity. The ANC wanted a swift introduction of majority rule 
by means of an interim government and called for the election of a body to draft a 
constitution (Nel, 1995; Paczkowski, 1995). 
The balance of power between the negotiating parties shifted along the way, with 
control over the process slipping away from the respective governments. In South 
Africa this happened more gradually, between the second half of 1992 and the end 
of 1993, when it became clear that the agenda of the government was increasingly 
losing traction vis-à-vis the wishes of the opposition. Nevertheless, the National Party 
emerged from the first democratic election in April 1994 in a much better shape than 
the Polish Communist Party whose fortunes changed virtually from one day to the 
next. The election of 4 June 1989 took on the unexpected form of a plebiscite that 
stripped the regime of the last vestiges of legitimacy. In an overwhelming victory for 
the opposition the government candidates lost the vote even in the so-called “closed 
circuits” that is, among the military and the police, which sent a strong signal to the 
authorities that the “force option” was no longer an option (Wnuk-Lipinski, 2014:9). 
Although the illusion of control lasted a little longer the end of communism in Poland 
was inevitable.
The habituation phase
According to the discussed model the “background condition” of national unity 
is the key predictive determinant on whether or not a new democracy will fail to 
consolidate or will persist. The acid test comes during the phase of habituation. In the 
two cases reviewed here, as in most other cases, institutional engineering has been 
completed by then and democracy is seemingly regarded by the majority of citizens 
as ‘the only game in town’. One could be forgiven for assuming that the most difficult 
stages of the process of democratic transition have been left behind. But this is, in 
fact not so. Instead, the well-defined division between the aspiring democrats and 
the oppressive regime fractures, bringing to an end the strong unity of purpose that 
had kept the opposing sides together during the preparatory and decision phases. 
The new fault lines are many and differ from case to case. The question is whether 
national unity is indeed the indispensable condition that makes habituation possible, 
as Rustow presumed. 
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In Poland, the new divisions appeared only after the country was admitted into the 
European Union in 2004. Once the Copenhagen criteria of democratic governance, 
the rule of law, protection of minorities and a functioning market economy were 
declared to have been met and accession was assured, the political landscape in the 
country changed quite rapidly with the appearance of Eurosceptics and populists in 
party politics. The populist theme of redistribution of the benefits of the economic 
transition resonated with many voters in the 2005 parliamentary and presidential 
elections (Kucharczyk and Fomina, 2007). Nationalism, often intertwined with 
political Catholicism, has also arrived on the scene, making the role of the Catholic 
Church far less clear-cut than is used to be. Previously, and enjoying strong support 
from the late Pope John Paul II, this once most trusted of institutions in Poland had 
managed to take the wind out of the Eurosceptic campaign that opposed Poland’s 
entry into the EU on the grounds that Europe was morally decadent, atheist and 
represented a threat to national sovereignty. This resolute pro-Europe stance by 
the Church helped assure a resounding ‘yes’ vote in the accession referendum. But 
the Church no longer stands united as some currents within it carry much more 
sympathetic views of nationalism and Catholic fundamentalism (Kucharczyk and 
Zbieranek, 2010). 
The strong background condition notwithstanding, Poland has been experiencing 
deep cleavages along party lines. In a democratic polity differences in party 
preferences are, of course, normal, but in Poland these differences appear to be so 
deeply entrenched and so highly charged emotionally that they restrict room for 
compromise across party lines and impede thinking in terms of the common good 
for the society as a whole (Wnuk-Lipinski, 2014). The divide shapes and defines 
the Polish political scene, which continues to be dominated by two main parties, 
the liberal-conservative Civic Platform and conservative-populist Law and Justice. 
Nevertheless, the Poles and the Czechs were the most convinced among their 
Central Europeans counterparts that democracy building in their country has been 
a success. This opinion was expressed by two thirds of Polish respondents surveyed 
by the Institute of Public Affairs and its partners (Butorova, 2009). Such individual 
perceptions continue to be borne out by a variety of data, which point towards a 
healthy state of democracy in Poland.
In South Africa the first indication of the impending political and social reconfiguration 
was signaled at an ANC conference in 1997, dimming the vision for a country that 
belonged to all who lived in it as the “Rainbow nation” promoted by the leading lights 
of the struggle. To the fore came the concept of “African hegemony in the context of 
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a multi-cultural and non-racial society”. The “national objective” to build a non-racial 
democratic society of equals was supplanted by the idea of a ‘National Democratic 
Revolution’ (NDR), which would improve the quality of life of the poor, who were ‘by 
definition mostly black’ (African National Congress Strategy, 1997). 
The largely rhetorical notion found much fuller expression and is slowly being 
implemented following the 2007 ANC conference where the left faction within the 
party – allied closely with the trade unions and the Communist Party – gained the 
upper hand. The conference resolutions reaffirmed the ANC as the “key strategic 
centre of power” called to exercise leadership over the state and society in pursuit of 
the objectives of the NDR. Uncannily reminiscent of the Marxist-Leninist language 
once used in the Soviet Union and throughout the Soviet Bloc, the resolutions of the 
conference expressed anxiety over a “counter-revolution” and stressed the need to 
remain vigilant in the face of forces seeking “to subvert and disrupt the agenda of 
revolutionary change” (Polokwane conference, 2007).
The most significant resolution taken at the 2007 conference was the reconfirmation 
of the “national groups” concept for societal transformation. This model is envisaged 
as “concentric circles” with black workers at the centre and the wider black 
communities as the “motive forces”. The dynamic of the concentric circles tapers 
towards the outer edges where the “balance of the majority” – made up of all races 
– steadily forges a social compact of common interest, and where all the circles 
are eventually expected to intertwine as the NDR reaches maturity (Polokowne 
conference, 2007). Supporters of this transitional model identify with the ANC’s 
outlook and norms, which among others promote a developmental state, collective 
rights, values of community caring, and communal solidarity. The other side, regarded 
as counter-revolutionary, is said to follow the ideological outlook of the media and 
support values that include neo-liberalism, weak and passive state, overemphasis 
on individual rights, and market fundamentalism. The rhetoric represents a clear 
departure from the principles of reconciliation and cultural tolerance enshrined in 
the post-apartheid constitution, creating instead a new and most troubling cleavage. 
The rhetoric also indicates a departure from democratic values. 
Closing reflections
At a first glance the main premise of the tested model has been confirmed. Poland, 
whose citizens had no mental reservations or doubts about belonging to the same 
political community, is consolidating the gains of its democratic transition; South 
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Africa, where the majority was excluded from citizenship and was denied the feeling 
of belonging together as a nation, is experiencing serious transitional hurdles. 
Of course, one cannot generalize from just two cases and expect to reach universally 
applicable conclusions. However, drawing on historical examples and looking at the 
now much larger and much more varied set of democratization cases than Rustow 
was able to assess, it appears that the presence of “national unity” continues to be 
a valid explanatory variable as to why some democracies strengthen over time and 
others weaken or perish. What ought to be reexamined, though, is the definition of 
the term “national unity” itself. 
Rustow considered such unity to be the single most important background condition 
for the entrenchment of a democracy and he assumed that its absence at the 
threshold of transition was a serious “birth defect”. But does such birth defect 
represent an incurable genetic impediment, which will condemn a new democracy to 
an early demise? Not if we remember that both the modern concept of national unity 
and modern democracy emerged during the same historical process. The French and 
American revolutions are the two paradigmatic examples of events during which the 
idea of togetherness as a nation was forged and was equated with citizenship in 
a democratic state. In these two cases national identity, or national unity, became 
rooted in the deep conviction of people that they belonged to a community of 
citizens who constituted the democratically organised state and whose memory of 
the revolutionary events that brought them together defines who they are, and is 
being celebrated. 
The model proposed by Rustow will remain valid if a distinction is made between the 
concept of national unity formed by objective historical pre-configurations, and the 
type of national unity that arises from a subjective decision and is the outcome of a 
normative discourse. Transition to democracy, in other words, should be a process 
allowing citizens to retain their sense of belonging to a social group that might be 
distinctly different from other groups, but where all the groups are bound together 
within the larger national community. When this happens, norms such as equality, 
liberty and human and civil rights, start playing a constitutive role in developing a 
new sense of national unity that was not imposed by history, or by ‘nature’, but has 
been decided by the people themselves (Ruesen, 2005).
Once so habituated democratic values become the goalposts on the road to 
resolving problems. As Rustow noted, democracy is not about maximum consensus, 
but about finding the tenuous middle ground where social and economic conflicts 
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can be expressed and resolved. But conflict resolution will succeed only if a general 
acceptance of democratic rules becomes the common language of transition. 
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GOOD FAITH OR GOODWILL? THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION AS 
CONTESTED TERRAIN 
Salome Teuteberg 
This contribution formed part of a doctoral study under the supervision of Prof. Pierre du Toit, Department of 
Political Science, Stellenbosch University
Introduction
Since South Africa’s dramatic but unexpectedly peaceful transition to democracy in 
the early 1990s, it has been used as an example of peace-making and constitution-
making. Authors such as Harris and Reilly (1998) and Darby & MacGinty (2003 & 
2008) have hailed the nature of the process. However, Teuteberg (2015:1) found 
that by 2014 ‘evidence was accumulating of an emerging dissensus, or lack of 
convergence of interpretation of agreement, on the South African Constitution’. 
Teuteberg cites an example in the Sunday Times of 3 May 1998. Kgalema Motlanthe, 
then secretary general of the ANC, claimed that the ANC would ‘review the power 
held by independent watchdogs if it won a two-thirds majority’ in the 1999 election 
(Paton & Schmidt, 1998). In this article, Motlanthe is quoted as saying that by 
winning the majority, the ANC could govern ‘unfettered by constraints.’ According to 
Teuteberg, this statement ‘casts doubt on the actual, authentic intentions of the ANC 
as to the status of the new negotiated constitutional regime’. 
Not many authors have explored the idea that varying perceptions of the South 
African outcome may exist among its original negotiators. Horowitz (1991) and 
Sisk (1995) investigate this idea, but both studies were undertaken before the final 
constitution of 1996. Pierre du Toit (2001:104) noted this disparity in his book 
South Africa’s Brittle Peace: The Problem of Post-Settlement Violence, and specifically 
mentions the lack of data available regarding participants’ views on the outcome 
of the South African negotiations. Using the limited data, Du Toit finds a number of 
divergent views present among those involved in the process, noting that the ANC 
and PAC focused on the outcome as part of a liberation process, as a mere ‘landmark’ 




In this chapter, the concept of a Benchmark Agreement, first noted by Cohen (1997), 
elaborated by Du Toit (2001) and later Teuteberg (2015) will be explored and applied 
to selected negotiators. I hope to establish a clear path from Du Toit’s earlier work 
to a more fundamental exploration of this concept. By investigating this concept in 
the context of the South African negotiations, I will seek evidence that the thinking 
associated with the Benchmark Agreement was present during the negotiations 
leading to the South African Constitution (1993 and 1996).
What happens when parties hold opposing contextual perspectives? 
Du Toit (2001:103) clearly states the importance of establishing a ‘clear and 
explicit understanding’ between negotiators regarding the approach to be taken on 
negotiations. He goes on to mention four problems (2001:103–104) associated with 
the absence of an explicit understanding among negotiators regarding their approach 
to negotiations: 
First, it may lead to a disagreement on the importance of procedures, the 
establishment of procedures and the following of procedures. Second, in low-context 
cultures, tactics beyond the negotiating table are ‘discreet’ from official negotiations, 
while in high-context cultures, these types of tactics form part of and complement 
official negotiations. 
Third, in low context cultures, the outcome is considered contractually binding. 
However, in high-context cultures, the outcome is ‘just another platform for further 
contestation and for remoulding’ the power relations between the parties. Fourth, 
low-context cultures consider negotiators as equal when coming to the negotiating 
table. Negotiators from high-context cultures ‘insist on recognition of their own high 
moral superiority’ (Du Toit, 2001:104). 
Confronted with high-context negotiators, low-context negotiators can accuse their 
opponents of bad faith, while when high-context negotiators are confronted with 
opponents from a low- context culture, they may claim those negotiators to be morally 
insensitive. Differing definitions of how agreements are made and interpreted in the 
long run may cause disruptions in conflict settlements.
The Benchmark Agreement
Cohen (1997) sets out to establish a theory to varying perceptions of contracts 
in the form of low- and high-context negotiators. When negotiation takes place 
across cultures, these shared ‘semantic assumptions’ are often absent and present 
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persistent problems in understanding. Parties’ perceptions and interpretations are 
formed by cultural experiences and cannot be defined with a simple dictionary 
definition of concepts (Cohen, 1997:27). High-context cultures tend toward allusive 
communication as opposed to direct communication. High-context cultures are 
concerned with the implicit content of a message, the nonverbal clues and ‘hinted-
at nuances of meaning’ (Cohen, 1997:31). High-context cultures are very concerned 
with maintaining face, and therefore, the loss of face is seen as a penalty to be 
avoided. Cohen (1997:32) identifies this type of cultures as being ‘shame oriented 
rather the guilt oriented’. 
In high-context cultures, the negotiation process is not seen as a ‘specific event with 
a discrete character and finite, clearly demarcated boundaries’ (Du Toit, 2001:102). 
According to Cohen, a process of negotiation is more likely viewed as ‘one event in a 
longer process including other events and interactions’ (Cohen, 1997:34, in Teuteberg, 
2015). According to Du Toit (2001: 102), ‘[a]t worst, such an event is merely an 
episode in the ongoing relationship, at best a benchmark.’ Teuteberg (2011:9) writes 
that in this type of negotiation culture, ‘negotiated agreements do not represent rigid 
contracts but are rather seen as flexible arrangements that are entirely subject to 
renegotiation. In such agreements, the relationship is upheld by goodwill rather than 
good faith’. Goodwill derives from ‘joint recognition of the justness of the cause of 
one party over the other, and from their joint, but not identical, contributions to right 
some large historical wrongs’ (Du Toit, 2001:102). 
Agreements can become outdated as relationships change. The negotiated outcome 
becomes merely an episode, a benchmark, in a larger process, which reflects the nature 
of the relationship at the time of negotiation. In this context, negotiation becomes 
a continuous process. A Benchmark Agreement ‘allows for revisiting and changing 
agreements as relationships change, making negotiation a continuous, ongoing 
process’ (Teuteberg, 2015:59). A single agreement, which may come in the form of a 
contract, is ‘certainly not a conclusion’, but merely a document of transitory status in 
which ‘nothing is ever definitively closed’ (Cohen, 1997:200). Relationships are open-
ended, and as such, so are agreements within those relationships. The agreement 
is subject to the relationship and the predominant aspect of the relationship is the 
power relationship. This does not mean that high-context parties enter into contracts 
in the low-context idea of ‘bad faith’, or with ‘malicious intent’.
Cohen (1997:201) contends that in high-context cultures, unforeseeable difficulties 
arising in future are renegotiated in a ‘spirit of goodwill.’ Teuteberg (2015:59) provides 
a summary of thinking in this context: 
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High-context negotiators insist that the context reveals historical 
wrongs committed by one party over the other. ‘Goodwill’ then, as 
derived from the above, requires the perpetrator to appease the victim 
in the negotiating process, and places pressure on the perpetrator 
to accept terms of settlement that go some way to amending these 
historical wrongs. Therefore, a culture of ongoing negotiation is 
cultivated and required.
According to Du Toit (2001:102): ‘From this perspective, the goodwill necessary for 
sustaining the process of negotiating for peace has to derive from joint recognition 
of the justness of the cause of one party over the other, and from their joint, but 
not identical, contributions to right some large historical wrongs.’ Du Toit proceeds 
to ask the question whether South Africa represents a process based on good faith 
or on goodwill. He concludes that this is a ‘crucial, but under researched aspect of 
the process.’ (2001:104). He goes on to say that the ANC seemed to openly view 
negotiations as a ‘fifth pillar of the struggle’ – from which could be inferred that their 
view of the negotiation process would fail to deliver the irreversible outcome the NP 
wished to achieve. Joe Slovo, a seminal figure of the ANC struggle, argued that good 
faith was immaterial to the process and that negotiations were but a strategy toward 
the ANC achieving complete victory. On the other hand, Nelson Mandela appears to 
have wanted to negotiate in good faith.
Teuteberg (2015:213) finds that the ‘Benchmark Agreement is not as easily 
operationalised as in its nature it is fluid and changeable. This type of agreement 
tends to be found in cultures that regard contextual factors, located within the 
particular history of conflict as salient. This kind of agreement tends to focus on 
past injustices, and tend to identify victims and perpetrators, with the concomitant 
implication that all negotiators are not equal in moral standing.’ Historical context 
plays a formative role in how high-context negotiators react toward each other, and 
as such has the ability to shape, or at least act as a factor in, negotiations and their 
outcome. Within high context cultures, a lot of focus is placed on who holds the 
moral high ground in negotiations. Historical context may favour one party over the 
other in terms of morality, or one party may view itself as having the moral high 
ground because of past injustices. Third parties may also assign participating parties 
moral high ground when entering into negotiations. 
Parties who enter into negotiations believing they hold the moral high ground may 
see themselves as being entitled to the bargain falling in their favour. Those who 
believe themselves to hold the moral high ground tend to expect more concessions 
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from their opponents. This perceived ‘unequal standing’ usually stems from past 
injustices where one party is considered by the other party to have acted immorally, 
unfairly or wrongly toward the other.
Present within the benchmark perception of the outcome is the idea that the 
outcome, or bargain, is subject to a larger, and definitely superior, objective. The 
settlement, or outcome, reflects only the commitment and relationship at the time 
of the negotiations, and is not intended to be governing ‘law’ with any sense of 
permanence. The settlement is a means to a larger end. 
Instead of signifying the end of a relationship between the opposing parties, the 
negotiations and the outcome thereof signifies the beginning of an ongoing and 
changing relationship. The settlement is instrumental in reflecting the power 
relationship at the time of the negotiations, and may further shape the relationship, 
but will become obsolete as the relationship changes. 
The view of the settlement as temporary as opposed to permanent is the basis of the 
benchmark view. Du Toit (2001:102) terms it as such: ‘The agreement does certainly 
not hold the status of an irrevocable contract, but is always subject to renegotiation, 
to reinterpretation, and is as fluid as the ongoing relationship is indeterminate.
Elements/Components typical of a Benchmark Agreement from the South 
African Constitution (1996)
Teuteberg (2015:140) writes that ‘while in itself a Benchmark Agreement does not 
necessarily take the form of written agreement, certain elements contained within a 
written agreement may allude to the existence of such an agreement’. Phrasing used 
within the written constitution may point to the intention to ‘address past injustices, 
the superiority of a larger goal in the minds of some authors, as well as the overall 
status of the document being of a permanent or transitory nature.’
There is clear evidence in the 1996 constitution that righting past injustices was on 
the agenda, as well as ensuring that these types of injustices do not happen again. 
Wording from the 1996 Constitution (emphasis added) indicates an allusion to this 
type of thinking:
  Preamble ‘Recognise the injustices of our past… Heal the divisions of the past and 
establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental 
human rights…’
  In Section 25: Property: (7) A person or community dispossessed of property 
after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is 
MODERN STATE DEVELOPMENT
78
entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to restitution of 
that property or to equitable redress.
  Section 195: Basic values and principles governing public administration (1) 
(i) Public administration must be broadly representative of the South African 
people, with employment and personnel management practices based on 
ability, objectivity, fairness, and the need to redress the imbalances of the past to 
achieve broad representation.
Two Negotiators: Mac Maharaj & Thabo Mbeki
Mac Maharaj
Mac Maharaj, who formed part of ANC lead negotiator Cyril Ramaphosa’s team 
during the negotiations, and later negotiated directly with Fanie van der Merwe of 
the NP can be associated with the benchmark view. A series of interviews by Patti 
Waldmeir and Padraig O’Malley provide the basis for the assessment of Maharaj’s 
beliefs and opinions, with a follow up, in-depth interview by the author, originally 
cited in Teuteberg (2015).
Maharaj explains the act of negotiating: ‘Compromises and concessions are very 
interesting for selling a package… Good line, good persuasion, useful negotiating 
tactic.’ (1993). To Maharaj, negotiations between conflicting parties by nature 
‘mean a give and take and a compromise’ (Maharaj, 2000A). In 2014, Maharaj 
stated that ‘we started as opponents, and in the process we became partners in a 
process that took SA to democracy based on one-person-one-vote enshrined in the 
final Constitution adopted [by] the two houses of parliament sitting together as a 
Constitutional Assembly’ (Maharaj, 2014). He was very clear that the relationship 
between the parties involved was ‘not static’ (Maharaj, 2014).
Maharaj refers to the Record of Understanding as ‘a reflection of the changed 
balance of forces internally and externally’ (Maharaj, 1997). He goes on to say 
that this reflected the reality that the NP was no longer a legitimate government 
and represented a minority. In 1994, Maharaj admitted that while he had realised 
that negotiations were inevitable, the ANC approach would have to be to ‘pursue a 
strategy that doesn’t say we are heading for negotiations. Build your strength so you 
can wage the struggle for any eventuality’ (Maharaj, 1994B). Teuteberg (2015:174) 
finds that Maharaj was not entirely committed to the negotiations, showing that ‘he 
would like the ANC to maintain another source of power, perhaps in order to create 
leverage.’ 
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In 1993, Maharaj claimed that the ANC used the argument of certain deals being hard 
to sell to their grassroots supporters as enhancing ‘the moral high ground’ (Maharaj, 
1993). On the unilateral suspension of the armed struggle before the August 1990 
negotiations which lead to the signing of the Pretoria Minute, Maharaj says that the 
ANC asked itself what it could do to gain the moral high ground in order to force the 
NP to ‘respond in kind’ (Maharaj, 2000B). This continued referral to the moral high 
ground as a bargaining chip is congruent with a Benchmark Agreement.
In an interview with Patti Waldmeir in 1995, Maharaj admits that he was ‘very 
disgusted with FW [de Klerk] as a person’ (Maharaj, 1995A:1). Maharaj continued 
to note his negative feelings on De Klerk, likening his experience to that of Nelson 
Mandela’s losing confidence in De Klerk. According to Maharaj, De Klerk ‘likes 
to behave like he knows, he is going to tell us how to run government’ (Maharaj, 
1995A:2). Maharaj found he couldn’t relate to De Klerk, and referred to De Klerk as 
‘pretty racist’ (1995A:2). Maharaj found Meyer to be a ‘difficult guy’, referring to him, 
as well as ‘their culture’, as ‘very officious’ (Maharaj, 1995A:14).
Regarding the issue of trust, Maharaj is ambivalent. He notes that he ‘never 
approached FW [de Klerk] from the point of view do I trust him or don’t I. I accepted 
that he will try and slip something past us’ (Maharaj, 1999). He continues by saying 
that (Maharaj, 1999):
…trust is not the issue for me. What is important is that you recognise 
that you are rivals sitting at a table, that you are seeking an outcome 
which will give you as a particular political force greater space to gain 
advantage from it but that you conduct yourself in such a way that no 
matter how much heat is generated at the moment you are constantly 
keeping your eye on the ball, that you are not engaged in negotiations 
simply to bring it to an end so that you can revert to the earlier status quo.
On the Interim Constitution, Maharaj found that the ‘other side’ (the NP) held 
‘third power in hoping to co-opt us… we must understand the sunset clauses and 
the negotiating process’ (1995A:4). Maharaj was hoping to manipulate the power 
relationship so that the ANC ‘will be in the position to say now we have created the 
condition where we can co-opt them for our needs’ (Maharaj, 1995A:4). He said that 
‘we [the ANC] only carry out that negotiation with that perspective with the view 
that once April takes place there’ll be a changed relationship where our objective 
would be to co-opt them because we now sit in that framework’ (Maharaj, 1995B). 
This shows an inclination toward thinking about the negotiations process as a more 
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fluid and changeable agreement in the form of a Benchmark Agreement. Maharaj 
was hoping to change the power relationship in such a way that the ANC held the 
stronger position and could impose its will unilaterally. 
On the issue of the Sunset Clauses and creating a vice presidential post for FW de 
Klerk, Maharaj said that the ANC waited to deliver this idea until they knew that 
both the ANC and De Klerk’s personal interests could be accommodated (Maharaj, 
1995A:13). By April 1995, Maharaj found that the ‘transition was moving smoothly’ 
and that they had ‘it on track’ (1995B). Maharaj considered the right wing to be under 
control, and on the issue of the economy, he noted that the ANC was ready to commit 
to an agreement ‘that all of us can agree with’ (Maharaj, 1995B). 
While recognising that the NP would continue to push for permanent power-sharing, 
Maharaj was certain that an elected Constituent Assembly would not permanently 
entrench power-sharing (1993). In the period of five years in which the Government 
of National Unity would rule, ‘the arrangements must be such that there cannot be a 
denial of majority rule. They must be such that they lead the country towards majority 
rule, an acceptance of majority rule’ (Maharaj, 1993). However, in 2014, Maharaj said 
that he ‘would assert that both in the period of the GNU and up to the present, it is 
seldom that cabinet decisions are arrived at through a formal vote’ (Maharaj, 2014). 
Maharaj is adamant that while the ANC was elected ‘by overwhelming majority’, 
they continued to seek a ‘spirit of consensus’ (Maharaj, 2014). 
On the settlement itself, Maharaj believes that it ‘favoured all parties in the sense 
that it created the conditions where all parties could take advantage of it and benefit 
from it’ (1997). He stated that the NP failed to make use of this opportunity by 
continually trying to weaken the ANC, while Mandela negotiated to become ‘better 
and stronger’ (1997). 
Maharaj felt that throughout the negotiations, the NP had tried to ‘co-opt’ the ANC, 
but that the ANC had anticipated this strategy and had avoided it. Maharaj was very 
clear that by 1999, the constitution would not include ‘enforced coalition’ (1995B). 
Maharaj also says that ‘views are not immutable, the Constitution is not mechanical. 
It will change. That’s the nature of the convention of ideas’ (2014). Maharaj 
continues to mention the changing power relationship and the ability of co-opting 
one’s opponent once that relationship
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Thabo Mbeki
Thabo Mbeki, who would later become president of South Africa, played a vital role 
in the secret meetings leading up to the substantial negotiations in the early 1990s. 
Mbeki was present at the Groote Schuur Minute, and started out as leader of the 
ANC’s negotiating team. He was later replaced by Cyril Ramaphosa. At Codesa I 
and Codesa II, Mbeki lead the ANC’s team in Working Group 3, and he was part of 
Ramaphosa’s team at the MPNP. The assessment of Mbeki’s views relies primarily 
on two interviews conducted by Patti Waldmeir (1995A; 1995B) as well as a book of 
his speeches (Corrigan, 1999).
Mbeki specifically mentions what the NP has ‘lost’ and what they have ‘gained’. 
According to him, the NP has not lost ‘whatever prosperity they had, they haven’t 
lost language and a whole manner of things’, nor has the transition had a ‘negative 
material impact on them’ (Mbeki, 1995A:3). What the NP has gained, according to 
Mbeki, is ‘a rediscovery of South Africaness – they are proud to be South African’ 
(Mbeki, 1995A:3). He also finds the new political arrangements to be beneficial to 
the NP, adding that having a deputy president and several cabinet ministers meant 
that the NP was ‘very much part of the process of governing the country… So I think 
in reality in terms of the trappings of power they think they have got a fair share and 
they probably have’ (Mbeki, 1995A:3). Mbeki does not believe that anyone on the 
side of the NP could have ‘produced a result that was any different’ (Mbeki, 1995A:8). 
In a book of speeches and quotes by Thabo Mbeki, Mbeki: His Time Has Come, 
compiled by Corrigan (1999), some insight into Mbeki’s opinion on the 1993 and 
1996 constitutions can be identified. More specifically, at a business conference in 
London in September 1990, Mbeki defined what the ANC meant by majority: ‘When 
we speak of a majority, we refer to a political majority and not one that is defined 
in racial or ethnic terms. At no stage have we ever spoken of black majority rule’ 
(Mbeki, 1990, in Corrigan, 1999:23).
In 1995, Mbeki assured the media that the ANC was not drafting an ‘ANC constitution’, 
but rather a constitution that could be supported by all South Africans (Mbeki, 
1995, in Corrigan, 1999:23). That same year in a speech made in Vienna, Mbeki 
stated that ‘nobody would lose and everybody would gain from sharing a common 
nationhood’ (Mbeki, 1995, in Corrigan, 1999:33). At the same conference, Mbeki 
spoke of the development of a national consensus on ‘the basic constitutional and 
political requirements which would assure everybody that they are assured of equal 
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and inalienable rights in a free and prosperous society’ (Mbeki, 1990, in Corrigan, 
1999:23).
Mbeki is of the opinion that over the years that it took from negotiations to the 
elections, ‘some kind of consensus about some things’ was forming among the 
participants (Mbeki, 1995B). Mbeki believed that all the parties involved had one 
purpose: ‘to get rid of apartheid and the consequences of apartheid’ (Mbeki, 1995B). 
Because of this, Mbeki held that a ‘more classical opposition’ party would only 
emerge in time. 
Mbeki is convinced that all parties had to make compromises to achieve the outcome, 
and the no party will be ‘happy with all its provisions’ (Hansard, 1996:91). He 
mentions specifically the Property Clause as a provision that the ANC was unhappy 
with, but had complied with in the spirit of ‘give-and-take’ (Hansard, 1996:91). In 
the same speech in the Constitutional Assembly in 1996, Mbeki identified the final 
Constitution as ‘another peg in the negotiated transition process begun in 1990, but 
we have not yet completed that process’ (Hansard, 1996:90). This type of argument 
is usually found in negotiators congruent with a Benchmark Agreement.
In 1998, Mbeki stated that the ANC-run government believed that ‘any changes to the 
constitution must reflect a broad consensus. It must also involve not only the other 
parties in Parliament, but also the citizens of the country, who have already played 
such an important role in drawing up the constitution’ (Mbeki, 1998, in Corrigan, 
1998:24). However, Mbeki is later quoted as saying that ‘the negotiations for an 
interim constitution were “contrived elements of a transition” necessary to end white 
domination. At no time did the ANC consider them “as elements of permanence”’ 
(Giliomee, 2012:361). Mbeki felt that the constitution ‘is meant to overhaul and 
redress socio-economic distortions and imbalances which are so deeply embedded 
in the fabric of society… the task of maintaining and defending the unity and the 
integrity of the state should be done with appreciation and sensitivity to the rich 
diversity of our demography, ethnicity, language, culture and environment’ (Mbeki, 
1995, in Corrigan, 1999:23). This type of thinking is usually exhibited when seeking 
an agreement akin to a Benchmark Agreement. 
Conclusion
Mac Maharaj represents the Benchmark Agreement, with a clear preference towards 
a constantly changing agreement, a contract that evolves as society and the power 
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relationships change. Thabo Mbeki shows signs of differing types of thinking, and his 
views are reconcilable with more than one type of negotiator.
Du Toit’s question whether South Africa represents a process based on good faith 
or on goodwill may be answered in that negotiators have divergent opinions on this, 
as evidenced in Teuteberg (2015), and that certain negotiators may be associated 
with the concept of goodwill. Identifying those views congruent with the Benchmark 
Agreement proved difficult. It was found that the nature of a Benchmark Agreement 
as such may not be solely identifiable within the opinions or views expressed by 
the negotiators, specifically at the time leading up to the agreement. A Benchmark 
Agreement may be more easily identifiable after the outcome has been implemented 
(thus after 1996). The nature of the Benchmark Agreement in itself makes it difficult 
to identify during the initial negotiating period as often negotiators seek to conceal 
this view. Negotiators that have a Benchmark Agreement in mind tend toward 
Constitutional Contract-like agreements which are then altered by the dominant 
party once the power relationship has shifted decisively in their favour.
While both Thabo Mbeki and Mac Maharaj’s opinions can effectively be placed within 
this category, it ‘proved difficult to definitely place either negotiator as deliberately 
agreeing to the outcome in order to change it in the long run, once the power has 
shifted in their favour.’ Both Du Toit (2001) and Teuteberg (2015) note that a study 
of political culture later, after 1996, may produce a more conclusive result, as well as 
a study of ANC policy documents, ‘Strategy and Tactics’ (1997; 2002; 2007; 2012). 
Negotiators seeking a Benchmark Agreement may make use of promises of more 
permanent agreements in order to advance the agreement.
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THE RULE OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA:  
CONTENDING INTERPRETATIONS OF CORE CONCEPTS 
Charl Swart 
This contribution formed part of a doctoral study under the supervision of Pierre du Toit, Department of 
Political Science, Stellenbosch University 
Abstract 
This chapter investigates the contribution Professor du Toit made to exploring what the 
rule of law and democracy means in post-apartheid South Africa. The chapter presents 
a conceptual typology of democracy co-developed by Professor du Toit which describes 
two contending views of democracy: liberal and liberationist. This conceptual distinction 
has subsequently been verified both empirically and conceptually. Drawing on his work, 
I present a conceptual typology of the rule of law that describes two conceptions of 
thereof: liberal rule of law and social rule of law. The liberal rule of law shares many of the 
fundamental precepts of Professor du Toit’s liberal democracy, whilst the social rule of law 
is closely aligned to the liberationist strand of democracy. Discord amongst South Africans 
on the key concepts of democracy and the rule of law may hold important implications 
for creating a unified citizenry and ensuring a durable and stable constitutional order. 
The chapter concludes by presenting possible pathways for consensus between these 
fundamentally divergent views of democracy and the rule of law. Nearly 20 years after 
the adoption of the Constitution of 1996, it may be time for South Africans to seek 
consensus on what type of society the constitution envisions. 
Introduction
This volume illustrates the wide scope of Professor Pierre du Toit’s research interests 
and scholarly contributions in the field of Political Science. My personal relationship 
with Professor du Toit started when I enrolled for a masters’ study in the Political 
Science Department at Stellenbosch University. My interests at the time was merely 
to complete my degree, and I had no suspicion that survey data on land reform and 
the rule law Professor du Toit had available would eventually lead to the completion 
of a PhD. The ability to mentor and guide students, which is often times neglected 
in the publishing-focused modern academia is one of Professor du Toit’s greatest 
attributes. It was his passion for Political Science and broad scope of knowledge that 
cultivated a deep interest in South African politics within me. 
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One of his interests lies in transitional and post-conflict societies and specifically the 
case of South Africa’s post-apartheid democratic society. In that sense, this volume 
comes at an opportune time, nearly 20 years after the adoption of the Constitution 
of 1996. It is opportune considering that according to Elkins, Ginsberg and Melton 
(2009) the median period of duration (or life-span) of constitutions is 19 years. After 
19 years, half of the constitutions they studied ceased to be in operation. Considering 
such a finding, it can be argued that the South African constitution, and therefore the 
democratic society established after apartheid, is at a critical juncture.
Professor du Toit has argued that, since its inception, the very nature of our democracy 
has been contested and is therefore in danger of faltering if the fundamental 
differences are not addressed. Writing with Gagiano in 1996, they argued that there 
is no consensus on what democracy means in the South African context and, if there 
is no consensus about what democracy is, then there can be no consensus on how 
to consolidate our fledgling democratic regime. At the epicentre of such a thesis 
lies a simple question: what does democracy mean? On the face of it, the question 
appears painfully simple. However, as is the case with many challenging research 
questions that appear simple, the possible solutions and explanations they present 
are anything but straight forward. This is in part due to the fact that if democracy is a 
contested term, then the accompanying ideals subsumed under modern democracy 
are also contested. This includes, but is not limited to, notions of justice, equity, the 
common good and the rule of law. 
Fortunately, the scope of my contribution is dedicated to highlighting the how 
Professor du Toit has added to understanding democracy and the rule of law in 
South Africa, and not in exploring all the conceptual challenges posed by the above-
mentioned question. Following in the footsteps of Professor du Toit, or as he would put 
it “standing on the shoulders of others”, my humble contribution lies in attempting to 
gain a deeper understanding of an equally straight forward question: what does the 
rule of law mean? This is a question I inadvertently stumbled upon during my masters’ 
study, and it was with the assistance of Professor’s du Toit’s surgical analytical ability 
that I was able to further explore the question in my PhD study. 
The chapter will commence by highlighting that as early as 1996 Prof du Toit helped 
put forward a thesis that is now nearly common knowledge in the field of Political 
Science in South Africa, namely that there are distinct and identifiable views of what 
constitutes democracy in South Africa. The argument put forward by Gagiano and 
du Toit in 1996 was subsequently verified by public opinion surveys conducted by 
some of the most renowned scholars in the quantitative field as well as authors who 
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employed similar dichotomous conceptions in analysing politics in South Africa, 
thusly validating such a theoretical argument. Thereafter the focus shifts to the rule 
of law, relying on the work of distinguished scholars as well as my MA work wherein 
it was shown that public opinion on the rule of law differs substantially between 
racial groups in South Africa. Before concluding, I briefly put forward my typology 
of the rule of law in South Africa emphasising that my work is wholly situated in 
that of Professor du Toit’s contribution to theories of democracy within the South 
African context. 
Democracy in South Africa: Liberal and liberationist perspectives 
As early as 1996, the year of the adoption of South Africa’s constitution and the 
question of what democracy means in the South African context was tackled by Prof 
du Toit. Gagiano and u Toit (1996) explored the meaning of democracy within the 
South African context and argued that there are two distinctly identifiable views of 
democracy and labelled them as the liberal and liberationist perspectives. The work 
by Gagiano and du Toit (1996) was a one of the earliest pieces dealing with a central 
question confronting the new South Africa and other transitional societies namely, 
what does democracy mean? 
The difference between the liberal and liberationist perspectives of democracy 
can be illustrated by highlighting how they differ on the concepts of inequality 
and transformation. The liberal view, which is primarily focused on maximizing 
individual freedom, holds that inequality in the distribution of economic, political 
and social power hampers the freedom and autonomy of individuals (Gagiano and 
du Toit, 1996:50-59). The liberal view postulates that inequality can be mitigated 
by ensuring a clear separation of the political, social and economic spheres. This 
would ensure that a single power bloc does not have simultaneous influence in all 
three spheres. Such an arrangement will, according to the liberal view, ensure that 
individuals can enjoy the greatest sphere of autonomy. Furthermore, the individual is 
the primary focus in relation to transformation within the liberal framework. For the 
subscribers of this view, transformation “…entails the transformation of members 
of society into individuals” (Gagiano and du Toit, 1996:54). Successfully addressing 
the challenges of transformation and inequality in this strand of democracy requires 
a strong, independent state and the principle of rule of law – all individuals must be 
treated equally before and under the law. This notion of liberal democracy therefore 
subscribes to many of the normative precepts associated with the standard liberal 
democratic theory. In essence, for those subscribing to this view, “[d]emocracy … is 
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about the rules that secure the boundaries of state, civil society and economy” (du 
Toit, 2006:3). 
In contrast, the liberationists have a diametrically opposed views to addressing the 
challenges posed by inequality and transformation (Gagiano and du Toit, 1996:59-64). 
The liberationist strand draws support from the previously disadvantaged majority in 
South Africa and holds that democracy is more than a means of safeguarding rights 
and upholding the legal order. For them, democracy has a distinct emancipatory 
goal and is viewed as the next site of the liberation struggle. The liberationist strand 
is grounded firmly in the Marxist thesis that capitalist societies are fundamentally 
unequal. In order to rectify such inequalities, the state must actively distribute and 
allocate resources. The state can therefore not act as custodian or neutral referee 
that maintains the separation of the political, social and economic spheres of society. 
“What the liberals see as the remedy, the liberationists interpret as the problem” 
(Gagiano and du Toit, 1996:61).
Accordingly, the liberationists view of transformation is also fundamentally different 
than that of the liberal strand. According to the liberationists, transformation refers 
to the emancipation of the previously oppressed community. Specifically, all those 
that were disadvantaged under the apartheid regime require the necessary social, 
political and economic resources in order to gain freedom. For the liberationists, 
transformation is not about individuals, but about groups, and specifically the groups 
that suffered under the apartheid regime. The liberals and liberationists therefore 
have completely contrasting views of the role of the state, individual autonomy, 
transformation and (in)equality. Published in 1996, the work by Gagiano and du 
Toit was one of the earliest attempts to describe the different views of democracy 
present within the South African context. Subsequent authors have developed similar 
dichotomous descriptions of democracy employed as analytic frameworks, although 
not all of them reach the same conclusions (Johnson, 2003; Zuern, 2009). 
In a similar vein, other authors, such Pretorius (2006), have investigated how the 
ruling party conceptualises notions of democracy, the role of the state and the role of 
the individual in society. By analysing various policy and party documents of the ANC, 
Pretorius (1996) found that the party holds to very specific views of what constitutes 
of democracy and associated concepts. Importantly, this includes very particular 
conceptions of the demos, what the public good is, what the goal of democracy is 
and how these goals need to be achieved. Importantly, the view subscribed to by 
the ANC is somewhat exclusionary, with a focus on a particular group of people, 
i.e. those who were previously disadvantaged under apartheid. The role envisioned 
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for the state is also far more active than a mere referee-state. Rather, within ANC 
vernacular, the state is the vehicle that must be used to actively ensure that certain 
societal goals are met, including transformation, the redistribution of public goods 
and addressing inequality.
The findings of Pretorius (2006) place the ANC’s view of democracy in line with the 
liberationist perspective of democracy put forward by Gagiano and du Toit (1996). 
Other studies’ findings focusing on how the ANC views transformation (Hudson, 
2000) and equality (Stacey, 2003) also show high levels of congruence with the 
liberationist perspective on democracy. Suffice to say, since the publication of 
Gagiano and du Toit’s 1996 work, numerous authors investigating wat democracy 
and associated concepts mean to powerful elites and the ruling party in South 
Africa, have produced findings that show a high level of congruence between these 
stakeholders and the liberationist perspective on democracy. The idea that certain 
groups of people in South Africa hold to identifiable and varying notions of what 
democracy means has also subsequently verified through studies relying on public 
opinion data. 
Bratton and Mattes (2001), relying on extensive public opinion survey data, found 
that support for democracy in South Africa can be described as either intrinsic or 
instrumental. Intrinsic support is a commitment to democracy that does not depend 
on economic, social or political conditions. It is the support of democracy as an end 
in itself, therefore intrinsic. Contrastingly, instrumental support for democracy relies 
on the government’s ability to provide substantive goods, such as jobs, basic services 
and housing. The authors found that there is a disparity amongst the racial groups in 
South Africa in their type of support for democracy. Bratton and Mattes (2001:455) 
found that “…while many South Africans of all races say they accept the necessity 
of redistributing jobs, houses and incomes, blacks seem to focus more on ‘equality 
of results’ while whites stress ‘equality of opportunity’”. This is an understandable, 
and socially justifiable view, if one takes into account the degree to which non-whites 
experienced discrimination and ‘second-class’ citizenship in South Africa prior to the 
democratic order. 
However, this also illustrates that there is no consensus amongst South Africans 
about the type of society we are building. Different groups have contrasting, and any 
many cases mutually exclusive, views of what constitutes a democratic society. This 
contention over what our society should be, is not limited to only democracy, but 
stretches to one of the building blocks of democracy: the rule of law. 
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Public opinion on the rule of law in South Africa 
There are also studies that specifically investigate public opinion on the rule of 
law in South Africa. Once such study by Gibson and Gouws (1997) employed four 
survey items to gauge public opinion on the rule of law. The items employed to gauge 
respondents’ opinions on the rule of law were: Sometimes it might be better to ignore 
the law and solve problems immediately rather than wait for a legal solution; It’s all right 
to get around the law as long as you don’t actually break it; In times of emergency, the 
government ought to be able to suspend law in order to solve pressing social problems; 
and It is not necessary to obey the laws of government that I did not vote for (Gibson 
and Gouws, 1997:179).  The authors found that, based on responses to the survey 
items, many citizens feel that if the law does not produce specific outcomes, it can 
be manipulated, ignored or bypassed (Gibson and Gouws, 1997:188). The attitudes 
expressed also showed a marked difference between the racial groups in South 
Africa. Suport for universalism and the rule of law showed higher levels of support 
amongst white respondents than black respondents (Gibson and Gouws, 1997:188).
Twelve years later, investigating support for redistributive land policies in South 
Africa, Gibson (2009a), employed some of the same items as the Gibson and Gouws 
(1997) study, and also concluded that support for rule of law and legal universalism 
in South Africa is limited. Gibson (2009:158) also found large differences between 
racial groups with black South Africans supporting fewer of the rule of law statements, 
followed by coloured and Asian South Africans, with white South Africans showing 
the highest level of support (Gibson, 2009a:158). Again, the different opinions of held 
by varying racial groups is understandable considering the history of apartheid South 
Africa. The point here is not investigate causal mechanisms or to seek explanatory 
variables, but merely to show that there are different views of the rule of law present 
amongst different groups of South Africans. The race-based classification is the 
unfortunate legacy of our discriminatory history.
It is within this sub-field of Political Science that my path crossed with that of Prof du 
Toit as he had survey data available on public opinion on land reform that could be 
used for a MA study. The dataset in question was from surveys carried out by Ipsos-
Markinor in 2004 and 2007 amongst the general population. The samples and items, 
although not large in scale, offered the opportunity to further explore what South 
African thought about land reform and its relationship to the rule of law. The surveys 
included four items, of which three are of relevance here. The items were framed as 
statements to which respondents were required to list their level of agreement on a 
five point Likert scale. The relevant items were: landowners who dispute land claims 
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by going to court are racist; landowners who dispute land claims by going to court are 
blocking transformation; and landowners who dispute land claims by going to court are 
fairly using the rights awarded them by the constitution. Support for the rule of law was 
indicated by disagreement with the first two statements, and agreement to the last. 
The responses were similar to those of the studies cited above showing a difference 
in responses between racial groups, with white respondents showing a higher level 
of support for the rule of law than the other racial groups, and black respondents 
showing lowest level of support (Swart, 2010). Interestingly, all respondents, 
regardless of race, showed support for the last statement. This level of support for 
the rule of law was found by both Gibson (2009a) and Swart (2010), who noted that 
all racial groups in the country do have a level of support for the rule of law. In my 
masters’ study all racial groups supported the notion that disputing land claims in 
court is a constitutional right, and Gibson (2009:149) found that “…South Africans of 
every race believe it quite important that land policy should be based strictly on the 
law.” Taken together with the work by Gibson (2009a) showing that South Africans 
wish land reform to follow the law, as well as the works by Carter (2011), Du Toit 
and Kotzé (2011) and Gibson (2009b) which demonstrate that South Africans have 
faith in the intuitions associated with the rule of law, an argument can be made that 
even though South Africans believe in the rule of law, they may attach fundamentally 
divergent values and beliefs to the ideal. This is based on the notion that all South 
Africans show a level of support for the rule of law, even when it is juxtaposed to a 
substantive and emotive issue, that of land reform. The challenge then becomes to 
make sense of such a finding. How is that racial groups can have polarising views on 
the rule of law, yet still believe in it? What then, does the rule of law mean in South 
Africa? 
Contending interpretations of the rule of law in South Africa
Before one can explore possible typologies for categorising and analysing different 
views of the rule of law it is necessary to explore what the concept means in a 
normative sense. One of the more concise definitions of the concept was put forward 
by Hayek (1944:75-76) who argued that: “Stripped of all technicalities this means 
that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand 
– rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will 
use its coercive powers in given circumstances, and to plan one’s individual affairs on 
the basis of this knowledge.” However succinct as this definition may be, it does not 
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address the relationship between democracy and the rule of law, nor does it address 
the values that may or may not be attached to the ideal. 
The relationship between democracy and the rule of law is an interesting one. In 
a sense, the two concepts have become indistinct in modern notions of liberal 
democracy. This can, in part, be attributed to the notion that for a democracy to 
thrive and become consolidated, it requires the rule of law. Diamond and Morlino 
(2004:23) note that the “…rule of law is the base upon which every other dimension 
of democratic quality rests”. Other authors writing in the field of democratic 
consolidation also note the necessity of rule of law in order for a regime to be 
considered democratic and for democratic consolidation to take place (Linz and 
Stephan, 1996; Bratton and Chang, 2006). The prominence of the rule of law within 
democratic regimes is also observable in the spread of the concept throughout the 
post-communist Eastern European states (Esquith, 1999) and a host of countries 
and regimes ranging from Russia, Indonesia, Mexico, China, Zimbabwe, and even 
the Taliban (Tamanaha, 2004:2). Carothers (1998:95) remarked that the “…concept 
is suddenly everywhere...” with a range of regimes claiming to be, in some way or 
another, involved in rule of law reform initiatives. 
What makes the rule of law so peculiar is that it has gained a level of global 
endorsement that no “…other single political ideal has ever achieved” (Tamanaha, 
2004:3). Furthermore, despite such global endorsement by a range of regimes, there 
is no “…agreement upon precisely what it means” (Tamanaha, 2004:4). The rule 
law is therefore peculiar in the sense that most people, regardless of their political 
orientations and views of democracy and associated ideas, believe in the ideal without 
there being any form of consensus of what it is they believe in. The variance found 
within definitions and conceptions of the rule of law has thankfully been explored 
by other scholars. One such a typology of conceptions is put forward by Tamanaha 
(2004) and is presented below in figure 1. The literature on the rule of law suggests 
that one of the main distinctions that can be drawn between different definitions of 
the term is that of formal and substantive versions.
The difference between formal and substantive versions of the rule of law is 
explained by Craig (1997:467) as follows: “Formal conceptions of the rule of law 
do not however seek to pass judgement upon the actual content of the law itself. 
They are not concerned with whether the law was in that sense good law or bad law, 
provided that the formal precepts of the rule of law were themselves met. Those 
who espouse substantive conceptions of the rule of law seek to go beyond this. They 
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accept that the rule of law has the formal attributes mentioned above, but they wish 
to take the doctrine further.” 




law as instrument of 
government action
2. Formal Legality
general, prospective, clear, 
certain
3.  Democracy + 
Legality




4.  Individual Rights
property, contract, privacy, 
autonomy
5.  Right of Dignity 
and/or Justice
6. Social Welfare
substantive equality, welfare, 
preservation of the community
Figure 1 Varying rule of law formulations (Source: Tamanaha, 2004:91)
Formal conceptions of the rule of law are therefore not concerned with the content 
or outcomes of the law, but rather with the process whilst their substantive notions 
place greater emphasis on the nature of the laws and what is to be achieved 
therewith. Within the South African context, this has a particular relevance due to the 
discriminatory nature of the legal system under apartheid. Dyzenhaus (2007:735) 
has noted that the “…apartheid legal order implemented a racist ideology through 
law but was formally no less committed than the new order to both the supremacy 
of the constitution and the rule of law. If one ignored the ideology and focused on the 
formal features of the apartheid legal order, it replicated the constitutional structure 
of the British legal order”. Due to the historic role of the rule of law, the nature of our 
constitution and the spirit of democratic society, the conception of the rule of law 
present in democratic South Africa will not be a strictly formal and legally orientated 
version of the ideal. However, this does not mean that there is clarity or consensus on 
what the rule of law means in democratic South Africa. In a way, the question about 
what democracy means in South Africa is mirrored in the rule of law. The conceptual 
typology of democracy as put forward by Gagiano and du Toit (1996) and the public 
opinion surveys of democracy and the rule of law illustrate South Africans hold to 
varying opinions of both these concepts. The challenge lies in creating a conceptual 
typology with which to classify and describe such varying views.
In order to achieve this, I drew heavily on the work of Gagiano and du Toit (1996) 
highlighting the congruence between liberal and liberationist democracy, and liberal 
and social rule of law respectively. The interpretive framework is presented in 
table 1. The development of the conceptual typology of the rule of law was verified 
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empirically by applying it to a specific case, the AfriForum v Malema hate speech 
case. Social and liberal rule law can be differentiated on the grounds of three main 
elements (Swart, 2013:89-90): 
  whether the rule of law serves the interests of all individuals in society or 
that of specific communities or collectivities. All individuals are either treated 
equally, or some individuals, collectivities, groups or communities are given 
preferential treatment based on their group affiliation, i.e. whether the 
individual or the group is afforded more status in society;
  whether the rule of law promotes a specific conception of the public good 
and if such a conception is one that affords primacy to a group or collectively, 
or whether the conception of the good is one that promotes creating a rule 
based society that affords every individual the opportunity to pursue their own 
conception of the good; i.e. whether the public good allows moral pluralism or 
whether it is collectively determined (by the state or government);
  whether the rule of law is implemented in order to entrench legal, social, 
political and economic norms for ensuring a stable society for tomorrow, or as 
a tool for righting past legal, social, political and economic injustices; i.e. is the 
rule of law orientated towards rewriting historic injustices (backward-looking) 
or creating a predictable rule based society of the future (forward-looking).
Table 1 Interpretive framework of democracy and the rule of law
Liberal Rule of Law Social Rule of Law
Democracy • Liberal: focus on individual freedom and 
autonomy 
• Autonomous state with separation of spheres of 
government
• Goals of democracy are: 
1. Create a rule-based society
2. Transform society to ensure individual 
autonomy
3. Create framework for future society based on 
individual rights
• Liberationist: focus on group welfare
• State seen as vehicle for emancipation, 
amalgamation of spheres of government to 
concentrate power 
• Goals of democracy are: 
1. Create a material outcomes-based 
society
2. Transform society to ensure welfare of 
specific group(s)
3. Create institutions to correct past 
wrongs and further group needs
Rule of law • Individual of utmost importance
• Negative liberty 
• Formal equality
• Goal of rule of law is to create and maintain a 
rule-based society
• Emphasis on future – focus on creating society 
for future with little importance placed in 
historical context
• Allows for multiple conceptions of the good, 
moral pluralism
• Community of utmost importance
• Positive liberty
• Substantive equality
• Goal of rule of law is to confer power, 
wealth and preference onto specific group 
• Emphasis on past – focus on rectifying 
injustices of the past and the importance of 
historical context
• Subscribes to specific conception of the 
good, the ‘public good’
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What should the rule of law mean in South Africa?
Even though the conceptual framework presented above is verified on both empirical 
grounds and within other studies that rely on similar conceptual distinction, it still 
does not address the problem of what the rule of law in post-apartheid South Africa 
‘ought’ to mean. The problem is neatly captured by Dazenhaus (2007:739) who 
warns that “…a commitment to the substantive conception of the rule of law cannot 
settle contention about the rule of law, since the content of that commitment remains 
controversial”. The danger of a conception of the rule of law that relies too heavily on 
the social rule of law that is too closely entwined with notions of social justice is that 
it can “…become a hapless victim to the fierce moral and ideological conflicts of our 
time” (Mathews, 1986: 13). 
There are aspects of both the liberal and social rule of law that need to be retained 
and discarded. The liberal rule of law’s focus on individual freedom and autonomy 
needs to be strengthened in the South African context. Importantly though, this can 
and should not be done to the detriment of the most vulnerable groups of society. 
The state must ensure the continued expansion and delivery of basic services such as 
health care, education and housing to the millions of South Africans who did not enjoy 
access to such services under the apartheid regime. However, all minority groups in 
South Africa need to be ensured that their rights are not infringed upon in the name 
of the ‘public good’ or in the guise of ‘building democracy’. Individual freedom and 
autonomy must be respected and the state must allow for moral pluralism. Moral 
pluralism is a central tenant of modern liberal democracy and must be respected in 
order to facilitate the consolidation of democracy.
Crucial to any conception of the rule of law is the notion of compliance to the law by 
all, from the president to the pauper. Within the South African context, the role and 
powers of the public protector need to be clearly defined and adhered to in all cases. 
The independence of the courts remains paramount in order to ensure democratic 
stability. Courts are the custodians of constitutional regimes. Thankfully the sanctity 
of the courts continues to remain a sacrosanct within the South African democracy. 
In line with the independence of the courts, is the composition of the judiciary. 
Currently, the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) is responsible for making 
recommendations on appointments to the President, who selects judges from 
those proposed by the JSC. The composition of the JSC is however highly politicized 
with the majority of the body being of political nature, and more specifically ANC 
representatives. This ensures that the ruling party has an undue level of influence 
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in the selection of judges and the composition of the judiciary. The JSC must retain 
space in its ranks for more legal representatives, and particularly for women from the 
legal fraternity as well as groups representing minority interests. 
Finally, all South Africans need to have an open and frank discussion about our 
history. Those who subscribe to the liberal rule of law cannot continue to ignore 
past injustices that manifest as contemporary inequalities. The unrest on university 
campuses across South Africa in late 2015 is a symptom of the frustration felt by 
millions of young South Africans. However, those who subscribe to the social rule 
of law also need to be honest about the role of history, and importantly be honest 
about our recent history – namely the 20 years of democracy. Can those who claim 
that apartheid is responsible for all the injustices in society, honestly say that the 
ANC led government has done everything in their power to educate, care for, uplift 
and provide freedom for millions of disadvantaged South Africans? Public protests 
in the guise of “service delivery protests” would provide sufficient evidence that this 
may not be the case. The same can be said for chronic corruption and abuse of state 
power for personal gain. Are the people being put first in democratic South Afirca? 
Conclusion
This chapter presented a typology for the classification of the rule of law that is 
grounded in a typology of democracy co-developed by Professor du Toit. It is my 
hope that the distinction between social and liberal rule of law can be employed as 
an analytical construct by other authors interested in the complexities of democracy 
and the rule of law in South Africa. The work by Professor du Toit on the meaning, 
nature and future prospects of the post-apartheid South Africa has left a footprint in 
the landscape of Political Science in South Africa. The conceptual typology presented 
here was influenced and guided by his knowledge and insight into the field Political 
Science in South Africa and other transitional regimes. 
I cannot hope to pay adequate tribute to the contributions made to the field of Political 
Science by Professor du Toit other than re-stating that his work on conceptions of 
democracy was one of the earliest attempts to make sense of what democracy means 
in South Africa. I can only add, in my personal capacity, that Professor du Toit has 
shaped and influenced me as a scholar and academic in a manner that will forever 
influence how I think about political and social problems. The lessons of academic 
and analytic rigour imparted onto me are invaluable and I hope that my future work 
can live up to the standard he has set.  
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PERCEPTIONS OF EVIL AND THE EROSION OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN 
SOUTH AFRICA
Cindy Steenekamp and Reinet Loubser
Introduction
There are a plethora of empirical studies that highlight the importance of social 
capital to a wide range of socio-economic phenomena. Social capital is important for 
the efficient functioning of modern economies and stable liberal democracy. It also 
provides a base for co-operation across sector and power differences as well as being 
an important product of such co-operation (Brown and Ashman, 1996; Fukuyama, 
2001). Social capital is also charged with a range of potential beneficial effects 
including: facilitation of higher levels of, and growth in, gross domestic product; 
facilitation of more efficient functioning of labour markets; lower levels of crime; and 
improvements in the effectiveness of institutions of government (Aldridge et al, 2002; 
Halpern, 2001; Kawachi et al, 1999; Putnam, 1993). Social capital is an important 
variable in educational attainment (Aldridge et al, 2002; Israel et al, 2001), public 
health and wellbeing (Steenekamp, 2011: 48-50), and community governance. The 
practical implications of social capital are thus broad and profound and inherently 
beneficial for those individuals and communities that possess it. It is hardly surprising 
then, that forging a unified society with strong social ties across communities – social 
cohesion – has been a significant developmental goal in democratic South Africa. 
While the generation of social capital can be seen to support social norms, such as 
trust and tolerance, as well as co-operation between groups and communities and 
generally pro-social values and behaviour, the belief in evil and evil forces have a 
direct adverse effect on interpersonal relations and co-operation (Gersham, 2016: 
183). The belief in evil, magic and witchcraft is a cultural phenomenon that features 
in the daily lives of many South Africans. Sensationalist stories of evil, witchcraft, 
demons and the like frequently appear in South Africa’s tabloid newspapers like the 
Daily Sun. The belief in witchcraft and the fear and practice thereof plays a significant 
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role in various instances of violence, including witch killings, muthi murders1 and the 
use of magic for protection by criminals and protesters such as the striking miners at 
Marikana in 2012 (Labuschagne, 2004:195; van der Vlies, 2013:511). There are also 
numerous examples in South Africa of allegedly bewitched school pupils blaming 
poor academic performance and illness on witchcraft and university students 
reporting their fear of being harmed through sorcery by jealous relatives, friends and 
neighbours (Leistner, 2014:10). 
The existence of such contradictory value systems – prosocial versus antisocial 
norms and behaviour – are highly problematic in deeply divided and developmental 
societies, such as South Africa. While the dimensions of social capital and the values 
that underpin them advance liberal democratic values, the belief in evil and evil forces 
serve to undermine them. This chapter utilises data from the last two waves of the 
World Values Survey (WVS) in order to investigate the extent to which perceptions 
of evil erode social capital in South Africa, if at all.  
The concept of social capital
Central to social capital theory is that social networks have value and that social 
contacts affect the productivity of individuals and groups (Putnam, 2000:18-19). 
More specifically, Putnam (2000:19) defines social capital as the “connections 
among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness 
that arise from them”. The definition of social capital is a compound of two different 
terms: “social” indicates that it has something to do with relationships amongst 
individuals and “capital” that it constitutes some kind of asset for the people who 
possess it. 
Societies work best where citizens trust their fellow citizens, work co-operatively 
with them for common goals, and thus share a civic culture (Rotberg, 1999:339). 
A civic community is marked, in Putnam’s words (1993:170), “by an active, public-
spirited citizenry, by egalitarian political relations, [and] by a social fabric of trust and 
cooperation”. Vibrant networks and norms of civic engagement are essential for such 
a community. In societies where distrust is prevalent and horizontal ties of mutual 
involvement are replaced by hierarchical politics, social capital is absent, and little 
civic engagement exists (Rotberg, 1999:339). Indeed, the dilemmas of collective 
1 Traditional health practitioners and alleged witches make use of muthi (Zulu for medicine) to help 
their clients. Muthi can be made from animal, plant or even human material. When it is made from 
human body parts, it has usually been obtained by attacking live victims. When such attacks lead to 
the deaths of the victims, it is known as “muthi murder” (Labuschagne, 2004: 192-193).
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action at almost any level can best be solved through networks of reciprocal trust, a 
key component of social capital and an essential ingredient of democracy (Putnam, 
1993:172). For political stability and government effectiveness, Putnam (1993:183) 
argues that “social capital may be even more important than physical or human 
capital.”
The accumulation of reciprocal trust, as demonstrated by a variety and combination 
of voluntary efforts for the creation of common goods, helps to build social capital 
and contributes to effective government (Putnam, 1993:172). Societies with high 
levels of social capital function with greater, rather than lesser, participation of 
citizens and as such, social capital contributes to the making of civil society. In other 
words, a civic culture exists because citizens have accumulated large amounts of 
social capital. Although political culture is the term that describes how a society 
and a collection of leaders and citizens choose, and has long chosen, to approach 
national political decisions, high levels of social capital contribute to the creation 
of a political culture that is open, pluralistic, deliberative, tolerant, and democratic 
(Putnam, 1993:33-38). These are some of the propositions advanced to explain 
why countries or regions within countries display high levels of civic engagement 
and democratic performance over years and decades, and why other countries and 
regions do not. Conversely, these propositions imply that without healthy levels of 
volunteerism, civic engagement, reciprocal trust, and citizen involvement in politics, 
civil society will not flourish, nor will plural democracy (Rotberg, 2000:340). 
Even if there are variations in the content and components of social capital, most 
will agree that the concept basically refers to social connections that facilitate co-
ordination and co-operation amongst people. So what is social capital composed of? 
Most forms can be seen to have three basic dimensions: social trust, social tolerance 
and social networks.
Social trust is the most frequent dimension in different approaches to social capital. 
Broadly understood, trust is about the expectations of the behaviour of others. Earle 
and Cvetkovich (1995:38) suggest that trust represents “a simplifying strategy that 
enables individuals to adapt to complex social environments, and thereby benefit 
from increased opportunities”. Whilst Newton (2004:17) posits that trust is the 
“belief that others will not deliberately or knowingly do us harm, if they can avoid it, 
and will look after our interests, if this is possible”. For Putnam (1993: 168), trust is 
the most important dimension of social capital, the one that facilitates citizens’ co-
operation. He also draws a distinction between generalised and the particularised 
trust. Particularised trust stems from our personal relationships with certain people 
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i.e. “trust embedded in personal relations that are strong, frequent, and nested in 
wider networks is sometimes called thick trust” (Putnam, 2000:136). Opposite of 
this would be trusting the members of our own community whom we do not know, 
which Putnam (2000:136) calls generalised or thin or social trust, is an integral part 
of social capital as it enables us to extend the scope of trust beyond the circle of 
people we know personally.
Tolerance can be defined as “putting up with something that one does not like” (Vogt, 
1997:1). Tolerance thus involves “support for the rights and liberties of others; others 
of whom one dislikes, disapproves of, disagrees with, finds threatening, or toward 
whom one has some other negative attitude” (Vogt, 1997:xxiv). In addition, tolerance 
can also vary according to the object of tolerance. Vogt (1997:17-20) identifies three 
overlapping but distinct categories of tolerance defined by its objects: political, 
social and moral. Political tolerance refers to tolerance of “acts in the public sphere”, 
such as giving a speech, demonstrating, distributing leaflets etc, as is fundamental 
because it is important for winning and maintaining tolerance of other kinds. Moral 
tolerance refers to the tolerance of “acts in the private sphere”. Most typically, and 
controversially, in recent decades this has concerned sexual conduct, such as “living 
in sin”, pornography, homosexuality and abortion. Social tolerance, on the other 
hand, is tolerance of “people’s state of being”. That is, of characteristics people have 
at birth, such as skin colour, or as the result of early socialisation, such as language. 
For the purposes of this chapter, tolerance is defined by moral and social objects; i.e. 
all of those acts which take place in the private sphere and those concerned with an 
individual’s state of being. 
Voluntary associations are defined as “organisations that have a high degree of 
autonomy and whose members are relatively free to join or leave the organisation” 
(Fennema, 2004:431). Putnam (2000:65-78) argues that participation in voluntary 
associations generates social capital by supporting norms of reciprocity and civic 
engagement, building social trust, and providing networks of social relations that 
can be mobilized for civic action. Wang and Grady (2008) posit that there are four 
types of social networks: bridging social networks, informal social networks, civic 
engagement, and organised group activism. Social networks generally include 
bonding and bridging networks (Putnam, 2000). The former refers to networks 
among homogenous groups of people, while the latter refers to networks among 
heterogeneous groups. Bridging social networks represent the extent and diversity of 
social relations in which people engage. Individuals who have friends from different 
social backgrounds are expected to be more open and respectful of others. The 
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second type, informal social networks, refers to interactions among family, friends, 
and others. These types of interaction foster a sense of reciprocity and caring among 
people, which are deemed to be virtues that lead to philanthropy (Martin 1994). 
The third type, civic engagement, refers to formal group involvement. Through group 
involvement, individuals build a sense of connection with another or categorising 
another as a member of one’s own group (Jackson et al, 1995:74). The final type, 
organised group activism, refers to the extent of civic participation. Being a member 
of an organisation is different from actually attending local community events, club 
meetings, and public meetings. If being a member shows the breadth of an individual’s 
social network, actual participation in organized group activities indicates the depth 
of the network. 
The concept of evil
In the secular imagination the word “evil,” when it is used at all, describes a particularly 
bad or exceptionally wrongful act. It refers to an act that is worse, more unreasonable 
or more prohibited than regular wrongdoing. The act is not necessarily perpetrated 
on a large scale, but is borne out of a lack of mercy and conscience (or the deliberate 
silencing of the conscience) (Garrard, 1998:44-60). Indeed, psychologist Simon 
Baron-Cohen (2011) argues that a lack of empathy due to restricted brain functioning 
lies at the root of some people’s extremely inconsiderate and harmful behaviour.
Regardless of the science behind excessive wrongdoing, most secular societies 
– including most established liberal democracies – view wrongdoers as simply 
misguided or ignorant rather than inherently malicious or sinful (Glenna, 2002:207). 
People are believed to be fundamentally good and their harmful acts are seen as 
mistakes which can be corrected through education. Criminals are therefore 
rehabilitated rather than punished. The secular conception of evil is devoid of 
the supernatural, the religious and the spiritual. In fact, the latter is often seen as 
superstition. Although this view of evil – a person lacking in empathy or conscience 
– can still be disturbing, it nevertheless identifies the root of evil as human and 
therefore in our power to correct (Loubser, 2015:41). 
Unlike most established liberal democracies, South Africa remains a very religious 
country. 
The secular conception of evil is therefore of limited value in a multicultural country 
which – despite its predominant Protestant Christianity – is in practice home to 
diverse religious and spiritual beliefs and practices. Thus in addition to the secular 
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notion, two further conceptions of evil can be identified: the traditional Christian 
conceptualisation and the traditional African one (Loubser, 2015:31-41).
In Christianity, as in the other Abrahamic faiths, the world is traditionally viewed 
as a battlefield between good and evil, personified by two spiritual beings: God and 
the Devil. God is considered omnipresent and omnipotent and his prescriptions 
are to be adhered to. Satan, on the other hand, is God’s malevolent challenger who 
attempts to undermine him by tempting his followers away from his prescriptions. 
Evil – in whatever form it manifests – is the result of the machinations of Satan and 
his followers (du Toit and Kotzé, 2011:60-63).
In addition to the over 11.1 million South Africans who worship at mainline Protestant 
churches, more than 14.5 million attend the African Independent Churches (AICs) 
– Christian Churches that also preserve traditional African customs (Rule, 2007:419-
421). Like other parts of the developing world, South Africa has also experienced 
a growth in Pentecostal and Charismatic sects (South African Institute of Race 
Relations [SAIRR], 2012: 81-83; 2014: 68). 
The Pentecostal churches have over 6.8 million members and are characterised by 
the belief that God intervenes directly in human affairs and provides direct spiritual 
guidance to help people in their spiritual warfare against evil forces (Rule, 2007: 419-
421; Jenkins, 2002: 63). Evil can take the form of outright and obvious cruelty, but it 
can also manifest in small, subtle ways. Thus everything from a murder to mundane 
bureaucratic corruption and failed government policy can be perceived as the work 
of the devil, which must be confronted with the help of divine intervention (Loubser, 
2015: 34).
A similar, literal conception of evil also exists in traditional African spiritual beliefs. 
The African spiritual world traditionally consists of benevolent and malevolent 
actors, both human and spiritual (Ashforth, 2010: 100). The power of the spirit world 
is harnessed by those who can communicate with them and used for either good 
or ill. Similar to Pentecostal belief, humans and spirits who are evil can perpetrate 
any kind of harm, be it poverty and disease, seemingly random car accidents or an 
individual’s decision to commit suicide (Niehaus, 2012:36-37). 
In traditional African belief, good fortune (or luck) is a finite resource of which 
everyone receives an equal share. A person who appears to be exceptionally 
successful is thus often suspected of foul play as one can only be so fortunate if one 
has somehow appropriated more than one’s fair share of luck (Labuschagne, 2004: 
193). A very successful person must have used supernatural means to steal from 
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the good fortune of others, thus harming innocent people and upsetting the natural 
order. Someone who feels themselves to be on the receiving end of undue ill fortune, 
may therefore suspect deliberate evil rather than random suffering. The end result 
is a general fear of those who are thought capable of harnessing spiritual means to 
cause suffering (commonly referred to as witches) as well as the fear of becoming 
too successful, thus provoking jealousy, suspicion and allegations of witchcraft 
(Leistner, 2014:5-18).
When the natural order of life has been upset, it is necessary to engage with the spirit 
world. It is believed possible to manage one’s relations with spiritual entities correctly 
and successfully. All that is needed is a powerful traditional healer2 or sangoma to help 
one battle the evil forces causing illness or misfortune. The sangoma communicates 
with the ancestors to find the source of one’s troubles. The source of the evil is often 
identified as a person: a witch and his/her clients. When the evildoer(s) has been 
identified, violence sometimes follows (Loubser, 2015:36-38).
Traditional African beliefs and some Christian beliefs – particularly those endorsed 
by Pentecostalism – and even Western science are quite compatible in the South 
African context. Whereas science might explain how something happens, people 
often turn to religion to explain how and why it happens (Ashforth, 2005a:216). To 
find answers, South Africans can turn to a traditional healer (or several) or a number 
of religious leaders who claim to be communicating with God. Since there is no 
consensus from the various religious and spiritual authorities discussed above on 
what to do in the face of spiritual challenges, South Africans often avail themselves 
of a number of options. Indeed, it is quite common for fearful people to turn to several 
traditional healers (trying to find the most powerful one) as well as religious leaders 
(Loubser, 2015:41).
Data set
The focus of this chapter is on the measurement of the various dimensions of social 
capital and the perceptions of evil which (could) erode the formation of those 
dimensions in South Africa. One of the most successful and economical methods 
of tapping individual attitudes is by means of secondary data analysis, based on 
survey research.  
2 South Africa has an estimated 350 000 traditional healers (Ashforth, 2005b:8), consulted by up to 
85% of (black) African households (Cohan, 2011:828).
MODERN STATE DEVELOPMENT
106
The descriptive analysis relies on data from the last two waves of the WVS conducted 
in South Africa in 2006 and 2013. The WVS provides a valuable tool with which to 
analyse the values, beliefs and motivations of ordinary citizens at the mass level over 
time. The increasingly prominent worldwide values research convincingly shows 
that changing value patterns have a strong impact on political, economic and social 
developments within a country. 
The WVS is conducted by means of face-to-face interviews in the language of 
preference of respondents. Probability samples are drawn, with all adult citizens 
having an equal chance of being selected. The samples are also stratified into 
homogenous sub-groups defined by various demographic attributes. Since the 
samples are weighted to the full population and within a statistical margin of error of 
less than two per cent at the 95 percent confidence level, they are representative of 
the adult population of South Africa. 
Empirical analysis
Despite socio-economic improvements since democratisation, South Africa still 
experiences very high levels of poverty, unemployment and income inequality that 
disproportionately affect South Africans by race (Lipton, 2014: 12). The demand to 
provide housing for the poor has grown much faster than supply, while the provision 
of basic services such as water, electricity, sanitation services and access to high 
quality education also remains highly skewed (Burger et al, 2015: 38). South Africans’ 
frustration with poverty and inequality is evident in the country’s increasingly 
frequent and violent social protest action. The protests are largely related to 
service delivery and labour rights, although many also include xenophobic violence 
(SAIRR, 2014:728). South Africa also has an excessively high crime rate. Not only is 
inequality linked to crime, but crime is linked to low productivity as well as high levels 
of stress, illness, fear and distrust in unequal and divided societies (SAIRR, 2014:707; 
Hamilton, 2011:359). 
It is clear that South Africa lacks the benefits of equitable economic development 
and cultural unity. South Africans do not share the same resources, access to 
opportunities and social concerns. South Africans’ diverging interests and concerns 
do not necessarily endanger its democracy, but it may impede the growth of liberal 
values as groups feel frustrated at their exclusion from social, political and economic 
resources. The same values are nevertheless needed as a vital source of stability and 
cohesion. Parallel to these values conducive for social cohesion is the belief of South 
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Africans in the concept of evil forces, the power these forces have to do harm and the 
role that such beliefs may play in outbreaks of public violence.
The empirical analysis thus tracks the various dimensions of social capital in South 
Africa in order to determine the extent to which communities share common values 
that extend beyond their close ties; values that are essential for social cohesion 
and co-operation, especially in deeply divided societies. The analysis also tracks 
perceptions of evil and evil forces, which have the potential to disrupt and erode 
levels of social capital within South Africa.  
Dimensions of social capital
Social trust is the belief that people are generally trustworthy and that most people 
share the same basic norms and values as one self. The values that form the basis of 
social trust, however, are not universal, but rather can vary among cultures, between 
contexts, and across time. Uslaner (2000, 2001, 2002) suggests that individual 
trust is shaped through processes of socialisation and learning. Since generalised 
trust, in the socialisation perspective, is shaped through interaction processes with 
one’s social context, the expectation is that social context will be crucial for the 
possibility of social change. If “most people” in a social context are trustworthy then 
most interactions with them will result in positive outcomes. 
In order to gauge levels of social trust in South Africa, respondents of the last two 
waves of the WVS were asked the following question: “Generally speaking, would 
you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be careful in dealing with 
people?” Responses were recoded into the following categories: no trust, low trust, 
moderate trust, and high trust. The levels of social trust in South Africa in 2006 and 
2013 are tabulated below (see Table 1). 
Table 1 Levels of social trust in South Africa, 2006 and 2013 (percentages)
Indicator of social trust 2006 2013
No trust 29.0 10.4
Low trust 42.8 48.5
Moderate trust 23.9 30.2
High trust 4.3 10.9
Overall, levels of social trust in South Africa are low. In both surveys, the majority 
of respondents indicated that they have no or low trust. A total of 71.8% of South 
Africans had little trust in others in 2006, including 29.0% who indicated that they 
have no trust at all. Although the percentage of respondents that have moderate 
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to high trust increased from 28.3 to 41.1 between 2006 and 2013, 58.9% of South 
Africans indicated that they have little or no social trust. Despite the overwhelmingly 
low levels of social trust in South Africa, it is important to note that the number 
of respondents with no social trust at all decreased from almost three in ten South 
Africans to one in ten South Africans between the two surveys. 
The second dimension of social capital – social tolerance – is related to perceptions 
of threat. High among the imperatives and values of democratic societies, especially 
ones as socially and culturally diverse as South Africa, is social tolerance for people 
and groups that are perceived as different. Complete social tolerance would entail 
“full recognition and acceptance of the identity and uniqueness of differences that 
are seen as not reducible to invisibility by their bearers” (Persell et al, 2001:208). In 
societies where such acceptance is absent, a lesser level of tolerance would include 
the willingness to grant equal political and legal rights to someone seen as different 
as well as an unwillingness to express intolerant attitudes openly (Persell et al, 
2001:208). 
In order to measure levels of social tolerance in South Africa, a composite variable 
was created by adding the tolerance of six groups of people together, including: 
drug addicts, heavy drinkers, people of a different race, people who have HIV/aids, 
immigrants and foreign workers, and homosexuals. The new variable indicates the 
level of tolerance as follows: no tolerance, low tolerance, moderate tolerance, and 
high tolerance. Table 2 provides an overview of the levels of social tolerance in South 
Africa in 2006 and 2013. 
Table 2 Levels of social tolerance in South Africa, 2006 and 2013 (percentages)
Indicator of social tolerance 2006 2013
No tolerance 0.2 3.1
Low tolerance 14.2 22.1
Moderate tolerance 69.8 53.2
High tolerance 15.8 21.6
From the data above, we can conclude that, unlike social trust, levels of social 
tolerance in South Africa are high. In both surveys, the vast majority of South Africans 
reported moderate to high levels of social tolerance, despite a decline from 85.6% in 
2006 to 74.8% in 2013. There are, however, also some interesting and contradictory 
findings relating to social tolerance. For example, the percentage of respondents with 
no or low tolerance increased from 14.4 to 25.2 in 2013, while the percentage of 
respondents with high tolerance also increased (by 5.8 %) during the same period. 
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The majority of South Africans are moderately tolerant; however, this category of 
respondents decreased by 16.6% between 2006 and 2013. 
The third dimension of social capital is that of social networks. Voluntary associations 
or social networks create civic community in that they create among their members’ 
networks of horizontal and vertical relations. Active members of a social network 
form a ‘distance-two’ network if each pair of members X and Y know each other 
personally or have at least one acquaintance in common (Fennema, 2004:433). 
Thus, the quality of civil society depends not only on the number of active members 
and the level of membership, but also on the number of associations. Numerous 
and overlapping voluntary organisations also create cross-cutting ties that serve to 
bind society together by its own internal divisions and produce pluralist competition 
between different interests (Foley and Edwards, 1996). 
As with social tolerance, a composite variable summed the membership of nine 
voluntary associations together, including: church or religious organisation, sport 
or recreational organisation, art, music or educational organisation, labour union, 
political party, environmental organisation, professional association, humanitarian 
or charitable organisation, and “other” organisation. The new variable indicates the 
number of social networks to which respondents are active members. The level of 
social network activity in South Africa in 2006 and 2013 is presented in Table 3 below. 
Table 3 Level of social network activity in South Africa, 2006 and 2013 (percentages)
Indicator of social network activity 2006 2013
No activity (belong to no social networks) 10.9 34.4
Low activity (belong to 1-2 social networks) 55.5 49.1
Moderate activity (belong to 3-4 social networks) 15.4 10.9
High activity (belong to 5 or more social networks) 18.3 5.6
Overall, social network activity is on the decline in South Africa. Approximately half 
of South Africans (55.5 % in 2006 and 49.1  % in 2013) are active members in at least 
1-2 social networks. It is highly likely that the bulk of activity in this category would 
be related to church or other religious organisations and sport or recreational clubs 
(such as gyms). High and moderate activity in social networks declined by 12.7 % 
and 4.5% respectively, while South Africans are three times less likely to actively 




While social capital has been likened to the “glue” that holds society together, 
perceptions of evil are thought to erode the social fabric of society. Evil as a belief 
is conceptualised in two ways: the belief in a literal evil is defined as the belief in 
real (if unseen), malignant spiritual forces that can cause real and direct harm in the 
lives of individuals, while secular evil is conceptualised as an entirely non-spiritual 
phenomenon characterised by wrongdoing on the part of flawed human beings 
(Loubser, 2015:57). 
In order to measure perceptions towards evil (the independent variable), 
respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they strongly agree, agree, 
disagree, strongly disagree or neither agree nor disagree with three questions: evil 
is everywhere; evil can take possession of some people; and the community must 
get rid of people possessed by evil even if it means that they have to be killed. A 
composite variable was created by adding the three measures together. The new 
variable indicates the extent to which South Africans have no, low/weak, moderate 
or high/strong beliefs in evil (see Table 4). 
Table 4 Attitudes towards evil in South Africa, 2006 and 2013 (percentages)
Indictor of attitudes towards evil 2006 2013
No belief in evil 0.4 0.7
Low/weak belief in evil 4.1 3.9
Moderate belief in evil 48.9 32.7
High/strong belief in evil 46.6 62.7
From the data above, it is evident that perceptions of evil are salient in South Africa. 
Almost all (95.5% and 95.4%) respondents indicated that they hold moderate or 
strong beliefs in evil in 2006 and 2013 respectively. Moreover, these beliefs appear 
to be strengthening over time as strong belief increased from 46.6% to 62.7% 
between the periods under investigation; marking a 16.1% increase. Less than 5% of 
respondents in both waves do not believe in evil or have a weak belief in evil forces. 
Do perceptions of evil erode social capital in South Africa?
An assessment of the levels or stocks of social capital in South Africa present some 
interesting and mixed results. Perhaps the most positive finding is that levels of 
social trust have increased, albeit from a very low level in 2006. Despite this positive 
movement, the majority of South Africans hold little or no trust in others in both 
periods under investigation. Levels of social tolerance and social network activity, 
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on the other hand, are both on the decline. It is true that levels of social tolerance 
are particularly high in South Africa, with three quarters indicating that they have 
moderate to high levels of tolerance of outsiders – cultural, lifestyle and permissive. 
However, continued decline in tolerance could pose a threat to social cohesion and 
result in increased conflict between these different groups of South Africans. Similarly, 
more than a third of South Africans do not participate in any type of social network, 
compared to only 10.9% in 2006. This decline is significant because the face-to-
face interaction that takes places in formally organised voluntary organisations and 
social networks is vital for generating democratic norms among citizens as they 
teach citizens the civic virtues of reciprocity, trust, compromise, and moderation 
(Newton, 1997). Overall, it appears that good stocks of social capital in South Africa 
are under threat. 
At the same time, perceptions of or belief in evil are strong and increasing amongst 
South Africans. From our data, it is evident that belief in evil and evil forces is a 
cultural phenomenon that is a salient feature in the lives of many South Africans, 
the vast majority of whom also identify as being religious and attending church 
frequently (du Toit and Kotze, 2011:133-138; Loubser, 2015:85-86). This creates an 
imbalance in the underlying values structure of society between the positive role of 
social capital in facilitating and supporting co-operation and prosocial behaviour on 
the one hand and antisocial norms, attitudes and behaviour associated with belief in 
evil on the other.
Further statistical analysis – Pearson’s r – was conducted in order to determine the 
degree of linear dependence between the various dimensions of social capital and 
perceptions/beliefs in evil. The analysis from the 2013 data confirmed that there is 
indeed a negative correlation between social capital and perceptions of evil. More 
specifically, the analysis shows that the stronger the perceptions of evil, the lower 
the levels of social trust, social tolerance and social network activity in South Africa. 
Although the correlations are fairly weak, they are all statistically significant at the 
.05 level.
Discussion
According to secularisation theorists, religious or spiritual values (such as beliefs 
in evil) are bound to be more important in insecure societies. Where the state is 
generally powerful enough to protect people from harm and secure their wellbeing, 
there is little need to turn to religion for psychological assurance or explanations for 
life’s troubles. However, in those societies where people experience high levels of 
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existential insecurity, spiritual comfort is needed to relieve stress and help people 
cope with the challenges of daily life (Norris and Inglehart, 2004:13-19). 
In South Africa, several causes of insecurity can be identified, namely poverty, 
inequality and crime. These problems adversely affect social capital. They also 
stimulate a need for spiritual comfort which may result in either positive social capital 
(community or church projects) or negative outcomes (scapegoating or vigilantism).
Despite socio-economic improvements since the end of apartheid, South Africa 
continues to struggle with endemic poverty and inequality. The Gini coefficient 
remains high at levels of between 0.65 and 0.69 (Statistics South Africa, 2014) and 
indeed, income inequality has increased among and within race groups (Du Toit and 
Kotzé, 2011:77-79). Although access to services has been extended, unemployment, 
poverty and high inflation leave millions unable to pay for these necessities (Bond 
and Mottiar, 2013:284-285).
Crime and violence pose yet a further threat to South Africans’ physical security. 
It also undermines the social capital needed to address other socio-economic ills. 
South Africa – widely reputed as one of the most dangerous countries in the world 
– currently experiences approximately 49 murders and 48 attempted murders 
per day, amounting to 33 murders and 32 attempted murders per 100 000 people 
(South African Police Service, 2015). This figure is more than five times higher than 
the global average (6.2 murders per 100 000 people) (Newham et al., 2015). South 
Africa also has one of the highest rates of violence against women and children in the 
world, including rape and domestic abuse (Snodgrass and Bodisch, 2015:68).
Although crime does not always affect all South Africans equally, the fear of crime 
leaves no one untouched. A climate of fear leads to a change in behaviour – for 
example, limiting social activities or freedom of movement and fortifying homes – as 
people attempt to ensure their own safety. This serves to normalise crime and fear 
and can have a negative effect on social relations and social cohesion (Loubser, 2015: 
106-109). Moreover, in countries or regions where, for whatever reason, citizens 
volunteer less and less, help each other less and less, and disengage from civic life 
more and more, plural democracy will suffer (Rotberg, 2000:340). Under these 
circumstances, a political culture that is plurally democratic will lose some of its key 
attributes of participation and cohesion.
A climate of extreme violence is also likely to stimulate the belief that some people 
are “evil” and that extreme measures are needed to remove them from society. 
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South Africans’ continued support for capital punishment may be one example of 
the negative impact of crime and fear of crime (Loubser, 2015:82-83). 
In sum, South Africa remains deeply racialised, in cultural and social terms, as well 
as deeply unequal, in terms of the distribution of income and opportunities. As 
common in many deeply divided societies, South Africa is characterised by polarised 
and separated communities, which are both socially insulated and spatially isolated. 
This reality has adversely impacted the levels and growth of good stocks of social 
capital in South Africa, while also being conducive for the rise of beliefs in evil and 
evil forces.
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SOUTH AFRICA’S HIV AND AIDS RESPONSE:  
TWO SCENARIOS TOWARDS 2019
Pieter Fourie and Charl Swart 
Abstract
In May 2016 the South African Minister of Health announced a major policy shift in 
the country’s response to the AIDS epidemic: from September all people who are HIV-
positive will receive anti-retroviral treatment, regardless of their CD4 count. This shift to 
a universal test-and-treat strategy will have far-reaching consequences for the country’s 
health system. Universal test-and-treatment assumes the availability of adequate 
financial, human, and management resources in the health system. By employing future 
scenarios methodology, this chapter states and problematises a spectrum of elite opinion 
about South Africa’s current and future response to the epidemic. We identify critical 
decision points which need to be considered by policy makers to ensure the success of the 
national response. We apply an inductive scenario methodology to generate scenarios 
regarding the short-term future of South Africa’s response to the epidemic. Policy 
demands, tensions and outcomes will be determined by how effectively the country 
responds to the particular challenges of human resources management, financing, and 
general health systems strengthening. Policy makers need to take particular cognisance 
of the inequities within South African society in general, and of the capacity deficits in the 
health system in particular.
Background
On 10 May 2016 the South African Minister of Health, Dr Aaron Motsoaledi, 
announced that 
In September this year, we will remove CD4 count as an eligibility 
criterion for ARV treatment; [i]t means we shall move to test and treat in 
line with the new guidelines released by the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) in December last year. […. This] will cost us an additional R1 
billion in this year’s budget… (Motsoaledi, 2016).
Such a radical policy shift could have far-reaching implications for the national health 
system, considering that the country has the largest AIDS epidemic in the world, with 
6.4 million people who are HIV-positive in a population of just more than 50 million 
(Whiteside and Strauss, 2014). The shift towards adopting a universal test and treat 
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(UTT) regime is based on a WHO recommendation that earlier treatment initiation 
reduces HIV incidence (WHO, 2015). The South African policy shift is premised on 
the assumption that the national health system can (1) afford and (2) effectively 
deliver treatment to nearly seven million (and counting) HIV-positive South Africans. 
The purpose of this debate piece is to problematise this assumption: is such a 
biomedical response sustainable in a middle-income country with the largest AIDS 
epidemic in the world? 
What makes this shift to UTT remarkable, further complicating the challenge to the 
health system, is the idiosyncratic South African policy response to HIV and AIDS. 
The apartheid and Mandela governments largely ignored the growing epidemic, 
whilst the government of Thabo Mbeki (1999-2008) denied either the existence 
of HIV or its link to AIDS, refusing to make available at public health facilities the 
anti-retroviral drugs (ARVs) that could save the lives of millions. A study at Harvard 
University (Chigwedere et al, 2008) stated that Mbeki’s foot-dragging to provide 
ARVs to South Africans living with the virus in the years between 2000 and 2005 
cost more than 330,000 lives, with 35,000 babies born HIV-positive because of 
delays in the provision of these drugs to pregnant women. Max Essex, a virologist 
who has led Harvard’s AIDS research programme since the early days of the global 
pandemic, called South Africa’s response to AIDS under Thabo Mbeki ‘a case of bad, 
or even evil, public health’ (Dugger, 2008).
The country has move beyond those dark days and now has the largest AIDS treatment 
programme in the world. Of the 6.4 million HIV-positive South Africans, 2.2 million 
now receive ARVs at public health facilities, and 200,000 receive ARVs through their 
private health insurance (Du Toit et al, 2015; Interview 6). As a result, South Africans 
now live longer and healthier lives: life expectancy in 2003, the year prior to ARV 
roll-out in the public sector, was estimated at 49.2; by 2011, life expectancy had risen 
to 60.5 years (Bor, Newell and Bärnighausen, 2013). The South African HIV epidemic 
began later than the HIV epidemics in most other African countries, but it rapidly 
grew to be the largest HIV epidemic in the world. 
The Thembisa model estimates that HIV incidence rates in adults (ages 15-49) 
peaked at 2.3% per annum in 1998 and has been slowly declining since then, 
reaching 1.5% by the start of 2012 (Johnson, 2014). These declines in incidence have 
been largely attributable to increases in condom use over time, particularly following 
the large HIV communication programmes initiated in the late 1990s and early 
2000s (Johnson et al, 2012). However, in recent years there has been limited growth 
in condom use; some evidence even suggests that condom use may have declined 
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(Shisana et al, 2014). Although HIV incidence in South Africa is projected to continue 
to decline in future, these future declines are likely to be driven mainly by increases in 
uptake of antiretroviral treatment (ART) rather than behaviour change.
Annual numbers of AIDS deaths in South Africa peaked at over 300,000 in 2005, 
but since that time there has been a dramatic decline in levels of AIDS mortality, 
largely due to the success of the ART programme in the public sector (Johnson, 
2014). It is expected that levels of AIDS mortality will continue to decline in future, 
as ART initiation criteria change to recommend earlier ART initiation, and as fewer 
individuals remain untreated in the advanced stages of HIV disease. Although there 
is concern that rising levels of drug resistance may compromise the ART programme, 
detailed mathematical modelling suggests that levels of mortality in ART patients 
are likely to continue to decline even in the absence of specific interventions to limit 
drug resistance. 
But how sustainable is the good news? Are we alert to the pitfalls that could 
undermine the way forward? Have we identified and are we prepared for the tensions, 
difficult decisions and mutually exclusive choices that the country will have to face? 
For instance, the New York Times on 25 August 2014 noted that South Africa would 
stop receiving American funding towards its ARV programme in 2017, stating that 
‘the South African government must find hundreds of millions of dollars, even as its 
national caseload grows rapidly’ (McNeil, 2014). How will the already fragile health 
system cope with the additional demands of UTT?
Methodology
In order to answer these questions, we employed a future scenarios methodology. 
The assumption underpinning the methodology of future scenarios is that key 
elements or determinants of the future are present in the current reality, and that 
there is a scientific method – a methodology – that can access and expose them (Van 
der Heijden, 1996). These drivers of the future can then be extrapolated upon and, 
applying both qualitative and quantitative methods, it then becomes possible to talk 
intelligently about what may happen in a more informed manner. Scenarios are about 
exposing and comparing different sets of assumptions about the present, which are 
then extrapolated into the future (Van der Heijden et al, 2002). In this way scenario 
methodology is as much about the here and now as they are about any future; in fact, 
scenarios are simply a way to use the future as a vantage point from which to view 
the present.  
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The different storylines or scenario narratives are best read as a single set. The mistake 
is often made to isolate one scenario and to note how ‘good’ or ‘bad’ its findings 
are. However, the real value lies in comparing the insights and lessons of different 
scenario storylines with one another. It is important to remember that scenarios are 
about what may happen in the future, rather than what one wants to happen in the 
future (Wack, 1985a and 1985b). A scenario set should contain coherent, credible 
and challenging story elements that are neither simply derivative and predictable nor 
so radical that they alienate the reader. Such a scenario set can then assist decision 
makers in reviewing the appropriateness of their own assumptions, in highlighting 
hidden mental maps, and in drafting future policies.
The scenarios reported here were derived from an inductive methodology. The 
scenario set results from the inference of an overall structure to begin with – prior 
to this, the authors had done some research and key informant interviews to come 
up with a pair of key variables that may influence the future. We interviewed 15 top 
opinion makers, government officials and medical experts who work at the forefront 
of the South African AIDS response. All of the interviews were conducted between 
December 2013 and April 2014, and in order to enable reflections that are free of 
institutional and other constraints, we have anonymized these key respondents’ 
answers. Our interview schedule was informed by variations on the ‘seven questions’ 
often used in scenario planning (De Geus, 1985; Van der Heijden, 1996; Schwartz, 
1996; Ringland, 2002; Chermack, 2011), to enable reflection on the status quo, but 
with a view to the future governance of the South African epidemic. 
The reflections of the current and future realities of AIDS in South Africa that emerged 
from the interviews can be clustered into three broad themes: AIDS science, AIDS 
management, and the social determinants of AIDS. The interviews demonstrate that 
since 2008 the policy response to the epidemic has been thoroughly biomedicalised. 
Despite improvements in anti-retroviral drug rollout and life expectancy at the 
aggregate national level, considerable challenges and uncertainties in the response 
remain. These include a dangerously weak national health system, which may buckle 
under the strain of demands of an ever- and rapidly expanding ARV programme. 
The key decision point for the future governance of AIDS in South Africa will be 
the rising demand for an effective response on the one hand, and the reality of the 
uncertain and unequal availability of human, infrastructural and financial resources 
on the other. 
These variables are then plotted on 2x2 axes and different scenarios are extrapolated 
from the resultant matrix. Quantitative data is then fitted into the framework. The key 
South Africa’s HIV and Aids response: Two scenarios towards 2019 
121
strength of future scenarios is that they reveal to us what may happen, rather than 
what we want the future to be; they help us to move beyond our own mental maps, 
to think the unthinkable, and to plan accordingly. We developed these findings by 
employing the above-mentioned inductive future scenario methodology to generate 
story spaces and make explicit the policy implications of what may happen in the 
near future, rather than normative aspirations about which future may be desirable. 
This exercise provides us with insights regarding the complexities of policy choices 
that need to be considered in order to ensure an effective response to the AIDS 
epidemic in South Africa. 
Our analysis proceeds as follows: first, we discuss the elite interviews, identifying 
the key themes to emerge; then, we confirm the research problem, time horizon, and 
key driving forces, along with the socio-political context of the scenarios. We then 




The interview responses can be clustered into three themes: the science of AIDS, the 
management of AIDS, and the social determinants of AIDS. 
The interviews reflect remarkable consensus on the reality and challenges posed by 
AIDS in South Africa – virologically, epidemiologically and politically. There are few 
marked differences of opinion regarding the ‘science’ of AIDS, and the concomitant 
clinical and government interventions required to combat it. We were struck by the 
broad and unquestioned embrace of a biomedical perspective on the epidemic. This 
is a major departure from the Mbeki era: during that time a narrative about poverty 
and the social determinants of health dominated policy considerations related to 
the epidemic. However, in our recent interviews even when respondents chose to 
mention or focus on behavioural and social factors regarding the epidemic, they still 
placed far greater emphasis on biomedical responses rather than on the need for 
behaviour change. 
Respondents emphasize four specific medical interventions as primary responses to 
the epidemic: ART, the prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT), medical 
male circumcision (MMC), and male condoms. There is wide agreement that ART 
is the greatest success story in South Africa’s recent response to AIDS. Mother-to-
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child transmission of the virus has dropped dramatically across the country as ARVs 
became available at public antenatal health facilities (Grimwood et al, 2012). 
Although ART scale-up is universally embraced, more than six million South Africans 
are HIV-positive, and there is some concern that the sustaining and expanding the 
ARV programme will pose significant challenges to the health system of South Africa, 
both in terms of capacity and affordability. Despite such challenges, respondents 
agree that the test-and-treat strategy has been successful. However, one respondent 
warned that ‘people who think treatment is the be-all-and-end-all of the problem 
[…] are in for a bad shock one day’ (Interview 14). The principle of treatment-as-
prevention is not supported across the board, with some respondents cautioning 
that what seems like an ARV-driven drop in incidence (the year-on-year increase in 
new infections) may rather be attributable to a naturally occurring epidemiological 
cycle (Interview 6). 
Other issues that complicate ART as a success story include concerns about ARV 
drug resistance, viral mutation, treatment adherence, retention in care, and general 
virological monitoring and knowledge. Much is made of the changing demographics 
of the South African epidemic, specifically in light of the increase in aggregate 
longevity (Bor et al, 2013). Respondents are concerned that, as greater numbers of 
HIV-positive people remain alive due to the success of ART, an ageing HIV-positive 
cohort represents a significant clinical unknown, and may also demand resources 
that will not readily be available in future. This issue is further complicated by 
considerations regarding non-communicable diseases and other co-morbidities 
such as tuberculosis (TB), at scale and over time. 
The other medical interventions are explicitly gendered. Many respondents 
mentioned the importance of MMC as a fairly recent programmatic intervention. 
However, there is not consensus about the wisdom of giving MMC such prominence 
as an effective tool for reducing the risk of HIV transmission, especially in the absence 
of concerted behaviour-change information campaigns. The concern is raised that 
MMC is presented as a preventive measure that lowers the risk of viral transmission 
significantly for the circumcized male, but leaves their sexual partners unprotected: 
‘[p]eople have this idea that if you are circumcized you are okay; women think that 
if a man is circumcized, she is okay. […] And this is really, really bad’ (Interview 
9). Such muted enthusiasm is also reflected in perspectives on (male) condoms: 
although there is agreement amongst respondents about the efficacy of condoms, 
there is some concern regarding the somewhat unknown trajectory of condom use 
amongst South Africans (Interview 7).
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In addition to these medical interventions, respondents expressed concern about 
our ability to correctly measure, interpret and address incidence. These concerns 
are expressed as variations of disagreement amongst respondents, who differed on 
the causal relationship between lower AIDS mortality and higher HIV prevalence 
levels on the one hand, and incidence levels on the other. There was also a lack of 
consensus about the inferred direct causal link between ARV rollout and declining 
incidence levels. Such variations of opinion about basic epidemiological data-
gathering reflects an unease regarding the availability and validity of data generally, 
and incidence data specifically. Although measuring models are viewed to be 
improving, with more nuanced and mathematically sophisticated models being 
developed, respondents emphasize the continued need for population-specific data, 
meaningfully disaggregated. For instance, some of the respondents noted the need 
for population studies amongst sentinel cohorts (e.g. gay men in Cape Town, young 
women in KwaZulu-Natal province, and the rural poor in the Eastern Cape province) 
to gain a more accurate and meaningful understanding of variations in incidence. 
Some of the respondents suggested that the development and wide use of a single 
patient identifier would be a helpful statistical and information-gathering tool to 
address such concerns about data. That said, these respondents acknowledged 
that the South African health system may not be ready for the implementation of 
a single patient identifier, as it would require many resources (human, financial and 
infrastructural) to implement and sustain its use across the country. When pushed 
to suggest a wish list of further measures to combat AIDS, respondents express the 
hope that AIDS cure-science could one day produce a miracle, such as an effective 
antibody. However, respondents believe that developments towards a vaccine or 
a vaginal microbicide may be a more realistic aspiration in the more immediate 
future. That said, two medical innovations were mentioned that may become game-
changers in the next three to five years: (1) a microchip to monitor a patient’s viral 
load, suggesting automatically updated treatment regimens, and (2) a long-acting 
ARV injectable administered four times a year, which would enable simpler treatment 
protocols, which in turn could ensure greater treatment adherence.
In terms of AIDS management, respondents overwhelmingly agree that the post-
Mbeki minister of health, Dr Aaron Motsoaledi’s arrival in South Africa’s national 
health governance was a positive game-changing development. To illustrate the 
respondents’ sentiment towards the minister, the only ‘negative’ comment about 
his personality, management style, and abilities is that his very energy, competence 
and innovation may make him such a standout in the government of president Jacob 
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Zuma that his appointment may become unsustainable. Supporting this sense of 
optimism about the minister, one respondent notes that the Motsoaledi’s political 
and managerial agenda is so ambitious that the minister may be side-tracked by 
wanting to do too much, too soon. In the main, however, the overall sense is positive, 
namely that South Africa has a national minister of health who is the opposite of 
his predecessors in the Mbeki administrations: we have a minister who is serious 
about addressing not only HIV, but who wants to transform the country’s entire 
health system.
Such complimentary reflections are not, however, applicable to the South African 
health system more generally. One respondent noted that ‘the more we can protect 
people from the health care system the better’ (Interview 6). Respondents are 
scathing in their criticism of the lack of coordination within the national department 
of health, and between different levels of government, across various institutions with 
direct import in AIDS governance, including the South African National AIDS Council 
(SANAC) and its coordination with non-government organizations (NGOs) and the 
larger health community. The South African health system is seen as dysfunctional, 
specifically at the provincial level. Although there is variability amongst the provincial 
departments of health, respondents are deeply concerned about poor management 
skills and a lack of concerted management across national, provincial, district and 
local spheres of public health facilities, including hospitals and clinics.
Respondents decry the absence of medical professionals (particularly medical 
doctors) at top management levels. There is a sense that management expertise 
is lacking, in particular in hospitals and clinics, and that managers with medical 
backgrounds have a more appropriate skill set than other ‘professional managers’. 
Other respondents are satisfied with non-medical managers, provided that they 
are competent, adequately trained, and receive ongoing skills development. One 
respondent noted that ‘management is not rocket science, management is reasonably 
straight forward, and this country has enough resources to provide good services’ 
(Interview 3).
In the South African context the disjuncture between rural and urban health care 
facilities is of particular concern. In health system terms the challenge is to adapt 
the appropriate delivery mechanism(s) for all health and related services, including 
equitable access to health personnel, the delivery of medical consumables, 
diagnostics and outpatient care. The role of mobile voluntary counselling and testing 
clinics, home-based care facilities and the National Health Laboratory Services is 
emphasized, and respondents recommend that the public and private sectors 
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cooperate more closely to improve health outcomes. Interestingly, the private sector 
is only mentioned in the context of public-private partnerships, and then almost 
incidentally, as part of discussions about the development of a National Health 
Insurance (NHI) system. 
Respondents express significant scepticism about the NHI, and emphasize the lack 
of specificity of what the scheme would essentially seek to achieve: ‘I think the fuzzy 
political leadership around the NHI is a big negative’ (Interview 6). There seems 
to be a general sense that the NHI will fail to get started, that it will bankrupt the 
country, and fail to deliver anything meaningful. Respondents are overwhelmingly 
in favour of profound reform of the national health system, but the NHI is not seen 
as any kind of panacea. One positive development in terms of AIDS management in 
general, however, is the move away from GPs as the primary point of care for AIDS 
patients; nurses are becoming the primary point of care. At the same time there is 
recognition that nurses already bear a heavy burden of care in the health system in 
general, and this has been compounded by AIDS. Respondents note that community-
focused interventions are a way to alleviate pressures on health care workers, and 
recommend further innovation in bottom-up rather than top-down care initiatives. 
Central to all reflections regarding the national health system is the reality of 
increasing demands in the management of the rapidly expanding national ARV 
programme: ‘we are going to need to put about six million people on treatment. 
There is no way South Africa can put six million people on treatment in the current 
strategy [….] it would completely collapse the health care system’ (Interview 14). 
The concomitant burden on the health system is difficult to overstate, and the 
respondents highlight the following as particular challenges: drug stock-outs, supply 
chain management, challenges around dispensing, logistics, and the management of 
tender processes and drug pricing mechanisms. As mentioned earlier, many of the 
respondents suggest the introduction of a single patient identifier as one significant 
way to ease this burden. 
The issue of funding is closely linked to concerns about the NHI as well as South 
Africa’s health system restructuring and the proposed expansion of the ARV 
programme. Several respondents mention the end of President’s Emergency Plan 
for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) funding in 2017 as a predictable development that will 
require serious fiscal planning. Although the national treasury is seen as a centre of 
excellence within government, the consequences of the departure of PEPFAR money 
will be significant. South Africa funds 80 percent of its national AIDS response 
(including ARV rollout), but in the absence of PEPFAR the national department of 
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health and the treasury will need to think innovatively about plugging the funding 
deficit. Compounding such pressures is the lethargic growth outlook for the South 
African economy, and the implications that this could have for the total national 
health budget.
The third theme around which interview responses converged was the social 
determinants of AIDS. In July 2013, during a plenary session of the 2nd International 
Conference for the Social Sciences and Humanities in HIV in Paris, a high-ranking 
UNAIDS official stated that ‘interventions or programmes to prevent AIDS and which 
focus on behaviour change are dead’. The shift away from behaviour change-led 
interventions towards a mostly biomedical intervention model has prevailed since 
2008, and this new norm is echoed amongst all those interviewed for this project. 
A small minority of the respondents mentioned the continuing need for behaviour 
change programmes for preventing HIV transmission – particularly as part of an 
emphasis on societal values and nuclear families – but the vast majority of those 
interviewed do not at all mention behaviour change as a major factor in the current 
South African AIDS epidemic. When asked about this, one respondent suggests 
that South Africans might be in denial about the AIDS denialism of the Mbeki era (a 
so-called ‘second generation of AIDS denialism’) (Interview 1), as a way of moving 
beyond the infighting and dysfunction of a decade ago. This sense of historical 
revisionism regarding Mbeki’s tenure, specifically his treatment of HIV, is something 
other commentators have also mentioned (Steinberg, 2014).  
Despite the scepticism and silence regarding behaviour change as a viable option 
for mitigating the epidemic, respondents were invited to comment on the social 
determinants of AIDS. They acknowledge a general lack of meaningful social 
messaging regarding the epidemic. However, issues around gender are acknowledged 
as a key driver of AIDS. A cocktail of socio-cultural behaviour is seen as fanning 
incidence: early sexual debut, intergenerational sex (young women with older 
men), alcohol abuse, and, most importantly, gender-based violence. Black men and 
black young women and girls are mentioned as the main vulnerable populations 
in the epidemic. (Interestingly, in the interviews men who have sex with men and 
intravenous drug users are not generally included as vulnerable populations). 
In turn, factors that may influence individual vulnerability include low income 
(poverty), low levels of education, general levels of material inequality, and rural-
urban differences (as well as regular movement between rural areas and urban 
centres). None of the respondents specifically mentioned poor nutrition, general 
unemployment, or cultural values as key determinants of AIDS. Having said that, 
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ageing cohorts of HIV-positive people and higher numbers of people with non-
communicable diseases are viewed as significant new ‘consumers’ of health services. 
The scenarios
The aim of the scenarios is to expose the policy implications associated with two 
interrelated questions: 
Is a biomedical response (specifically UTT) sustainable in a middle-income country with 
the largest AIDS epidemic in the world? How will the twin demands of an effective response 
and the availability of resources be accommodated in South Africa’s AIDS governance 
towards 2019?
It is evident that the scenarios cover a short period of time, namely the years 2016 
to 2019. The end year (2019) was selected as it refers to the end of the current 
government administration and electoral cycle. As is the case with any scenario 
study, there are elements in the near future that one can predict with great certainty. 
These certainties result from the current reality and contribute towards determining 
the policy- and decision-making frameworks or ‘branching points’ which may 
differentiate one scenario from another.
For example, political certainties in South Africa include the provincial elections of 
2016, the African National Congress’ national conference to be held in December 
2017, and the national elections of 2019. We also know that South Africa will lose 
significant PEPFAR support for funding its fiscal HIV response in 2017; this will 
create a considerable deficit in South Africa’s HIV budget. In addition, GDP growth 
will remain weak for the entire scenario period, but at the same time government is 
committed to expanding South Africa’s ARV rollout programme, which is already the 
largest in the world. 
There are also elements of the AIDS epidemic that we can predict with a high degree 
of certainty. As AIDS mortality is declining more rapidly than HIV incidence, the 
annual numbers of new infections still exceeds the annual numbers of AIDS deaths. 
This implies that the total number of HIV infections in South Africa is still increasing, 
and will probably continue to increase for the next few years. However, the age 
distribution of the HIV-positive population is changing substantially, with fewer 
HIV-positive youth but rapidly-increasing numbers of HIV-positive adults at older 
ages. Some analysts (Hontelez et al, 2012) project that the number of HIV-positive 
South Africans aged 15-49 will decline slightly over the 2011-2025 period, while the 
number aged 50 and older will increase by 57%. This ageing HIV-positive cohort 
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will, in turn, be characterised by comorbidities such as non-communicable diseases 
and TB. Lastly, new medical technologies such as quarterly-administered injectable 
ARVs and more sophisticated virological monitoring techniques may come online 
within the next five years; these innovations could be game-changers in the daily 
management of AIDS.
In addition to these certainties there are key driving forces, which include actors, 
institutions and narrative elements that will be critical in any scenario of AIDS 
governance in South Africa over the next four years. These driving forces can be 
clustered into five issue areas: 
1. Elements regarding treatment, including adherence, universal test-
and-treatment, treatment-as-prevention, biomedical responses.
2. The health system, including delivery mechanisms, health facilities, 
supply chain management, the proposed National Health Insurance 
scheme, urban-rural differences.
3. Social determinants, including poverty, alcohol abuse, unemployment, 
gender, education.
4. Behavioural elements, including culture, gender-based violence, 
condom use, sexual behaviour.
5. Significant actors, including the Treasury, the minister of health, the 
health ministry, different tiers of government, medical health personnel, 
civil society, the private sector, vulnerable populations
The scenario dynamics

















Figure 1   Story spaces
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This figure captures the particular challenge within the South African health system, 
and refers to tensions between, firstly, an effective AIDS response plotted against, 
secondly, the (non-)availability of resources (i.e. financial, human, infrastructural 
inequalities and inequities). This key tension reflects the two major themes that 
emerge from the scenario exercise: AIDS Science and AIDS Governance. 
Story space I
In this future the response to AIDS is relatively effective. However, this effectiveness 
is differentiated by the availability of resources. In story space 1 (top-left, called 
‘Mama Africa’) this describes a mostly rural reality, whereas story space 2 (top-
right, called ‘Systems response’) describes a mostly urban setting. Spaces I.1 and 
I.2 should be viewed as a continuum, rather than as strictly separate realities. The 
improvements in these story spaces start in the next five years, with the benefits 
accruing in years to come. 
In ‘Mama Africa’ (I.1), poor, mostly rural South Africans are able to cope despite the 
relative lack of financial, infrastructural and human resources. People are financially 
dependent on social grants, and rely on social and community networks. Over the 
next four years, women continue to carry the greatest burden of care. However, 
partnering with church and community-based organisations they are able to catalyze 
a more effective, bottom-up response. Community-based ARV programmes 
are a central feature at the frontline of the epidemic, enabling a sustainable ARV 
supply accompanied by life skills training. Having to make do with fewer resources, 
government and elements of the private sector target specific micro-financing 
schemes and initiatives to facilitate this response. This future does not, however, see 
any significant change in either gender roles, or any improvement of the rural health 
system. Alcohol abuse and diseases of poverty remain scourges to be managed daily. 
In ‘Systems response’ (I.2), a more effective response is driven by an improved 
health system enabled by the greater availability of human and financial resources, 
as well as infrastructural development. Despite economic lethargy, government 
and the private sector prioritise fundamentals of the health system, building public 
and private health facilities, and focusing on improving management skills and the 
training of health workers. Working together, the public and private sectors work with 
civil society to establish a sustainable financing mechanism for health. This scenario 
reflects solid progress towards the establishment of a health system that is able to 
absorb the challenges of HIV in a general health systems response. The improved 
management of the health system is a key feature of this story, with much improved 
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coordination and integration across tiers of government, specifically in the health 
sector. Provincial healthcare receives special attention at all levels, and is populated 
with competent managers. 
Story space II
In this future the response to AIDS is relatively ineffective. However, this ineffectiveness 
is differentiated by the availability of resources. In story space 3 (bottom-left, called 
‘Things fall apart’) this describes a mostly rural reality, whereas story space 4 
(bottom-right, called ‘Pills Pills Pills’) describes a mostly urban setting. Spaces II.3 
and II.4 should be viewed as a continuum, rather than as strictly separate realities. 
In ‘Things fall apart’ (II.3) the economic slowdown and the lack of any meaningful 
progress towards the establishment of a health systems financing mechanism over 
the next four years has a crippling effect on health budgets. In terms of subsistence, 
unemployment increases, with an even greater burden of care on women. 
Government fails to plan adequately for the end of PEPFAR funding in 2017; this 
exacerbates the already acrimonious relationship between government and business. 
Instead of investing in health systems interventions, government prioritises social 
grants, ignoring warnings that the social grants scheme would no longer be able to 
accommodate more grant recipients. Health system improvement is viewed as an 
unaffordable luxury, and so the health system gradually erodes. Over the next four 
years, more of South Africa comes to approximate the current health crises in the 
rural Eastern Cape province and the Free State province. Health workers flock to urban 
centres, or follow the demand curve overseas. Service delivery protests becomes the 
norm, are ignored by an increasingly defensive government, with populist pressures 
mounting from the ideological left, especially in the run-up to the 2019 elections. The 
existing gap between the health-haves and have-nots is increased, and the country’s 
aggregate health indicators reflect a reversal of progress made in the years following 
Thabo Mbeki’s departure. 
‘Pills Pills Pills’ (II.4) is a scenario that closely resembles the current reality, in 
particular the biomedicalisation of the epidemic, the focus on the scale-up of the ARV 
programme and treatment-as-prevention. Concurrently, in this story scant attention 
is paid to any effort at behavioural change to combat HIV. There is a drive to place as 
many HIV-positive people as possible on ARVs, with a rapid uptake of ART from the 
current level of 2.2 million HIV-positive people to all HIV-positive individuals. In the 
first half of the story, such rapid uptake is absorbed by the health system. However, 
this is not sustainable, and a critical point is reached when the health system is no 
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longer able to cope with the uptake of millions of additional patients. The system 
buckles, stock-outs occur, and this aggregate burden over time incrementally renders 
the public health system ineffective. In this scenario the investment in medicalisation 
and ARV provision outpaces the ability of health systems managers and infrastructure 
to accommodate the demand. 
Conclusions
There are four primary insights that emerge from the scenario set:
1. No conversation or strategy about AIDS in South Africa is meaningful 
unless it places the consideration and governance of the health system 
at its very core.
2. AIDS workers should not be seduced into a specious notion of impact 
effectiveness as a result of the impressive gains made possible by 
biomedicalisation during the last decade. Although the demands and 
pressures of the epidemic are significant and decisive action is required, 
policy-makers need to remain aware of the fact that an appropriate 
response to AIDS is a long-term process. 
3. The rural-urban divide in responses to AIDS is significant, both in terms 
of the burden(s) of care and in terms of policy, systems and investment 
realities. This differential bespeaks the entrenchment of a more 
profound health apartheid.
4. Gender disparities remain at the core of this epidemic. Biomedical 
responses to AIDS in South Africa have had many good consequences, 
but unless systemic issues related to culture, sex and gender are 
addressed, women will continue to bear the brunt.
In sum, these four insights point to an important reality that will inform all decision 
and policy making regarding the future of AIDS governance in South Africa: an 
appropriate response to AIDS in this country demands fundamental national 
introspection regarding and a long-term vision to address systemic inequalities. 
AIDS in South Africa exposes a long list of national and societal inequalities and 
inequities: gender, material, demographic, racial, geographical, technological, socio-
cultural, economic, governmental, managerial and health systemic.
The main policy implication of these insights is that the current policy response to 
AIDS, namely an embrace of biomedicalisation (focusing on the scale-up of ART 
without paying sufficient attention to the social determinants of health as well as to 
MODERN STATE DEVELOPMENT
132
health systems strengthening) is insufficient and unsustainable. In the first half of 
the scenario period – up to 2017 – the current response can remain effective, but the 
combination of stressors introduced after that period (economic stasis, less donor 
support, political uncertainty) can collapse the already weak health system. As 
the biomedical response has not had a sufficient impact on HIV incidence in South 
Africa, behaviour change messaging and AIDS education should be reprioritised. 
An appropriate response to AIDS in South Africa does not imply a zero-sum policy 
strategy between biomedical interventions and socio-behaviour change. 
Taking the scenarios spaces as a whole, both an effective and an ineffective response 
to the epidemic in South Africa are intimately related to the governance of the 
health system. In the case of ineffective responses, the neglect of health systems 
strengthening lies at the root of the failure to respond effectively to the epidemic. 
Conversely, responses to AIDS in South Africa can only be effective if adequate 
investments are made in the health system. The epidemic requires significant 
and sustained investment in human resources broadly, health managerial skills 
specifically, infrastructural development (public health facilities in particular), and 
in information systems. 
For the national minister of health, this implies a diversification of attention away 
from the ostensible vertical ‘success story’ of AIDS in South Africa after 2008, 
towards greater clarity regarding what the NHI actually means, as well as urgently 
strengthening the health system. This would include greater coordination across 
government departments and tiers; particular attention should be paid to poor-
performing provincial departments of health. SANAC is well-placed to facilitate much 
needed coordination across various actors and sectors, but is over-bureaucratised 
and lacks the agency to make such a role meaningful. Meaningful coordination would 
eliminate duplication and waste, and streamline the response to the epidemic. 
The private sector in particular needs to contribute to an effective response to the 
epidemic. Government and business need to cultivate constructive engagement on 
AIDS specifically and health more broadly, in order to alleviate the pressure on the 
public health system. Considering that the private health sector accounts for over 
50% of all health expenditure in South Africa (WHO, n.d.), they are a key actor 
in finding innovative and sustainable financing mechanisms for restructuring the 
health system. 
Finally, the scenarios emphasise the importance of rural/provincial health systems 
in particular. An integrated response to the epidemic demands the improved 
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management of provincial public health in general, with adequate and appropriate 
attention to female and rural end-users of health services. A bottom-up response in 
rural settings implies greater consultation with poor women in particular. Specifically, 
this may include innovation around micro-financing schemes for poor women in 
rural areas. 
AIDS is a long-wave event that exposes many of the fault lines in our society. If we 
fail to place the reduction of inequality and inequity at the centre of our response to 
HIV and AIDS, we shall simply and tragically neglect the most important lesson of 
this epidemic.
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STELLENBOSCH UNIVERSITY’S ‘BORN-FREES’: RESPONSIBLY ENGAGED
Nicola de Jager and Ubanesia Adams-Jack1
Introduction
The second quarter of 2015 saw the advancing of student protests across the 
campuses of South Africa’s universities. The impetus was the ever-increasing student 
fees,2 making higher education a costly burden. Stellenbosch University (SU) was no 
exception to these student protests, which became embodied in the #FeesMustFall 
movement. The upward spiralling of student fees was largely due to government 
subsidies to universities declining in real terms in relation to student numbers, 
which have grown considerably. Student numbers, under government pressure, have 
increased from approximately 500 000 in 1994 to over 1 million in 2014, without the 
subsidies to support such growth (Bozzoli, 2014). See figure 1 for SU’s increasing 
student enrolments between 1910 and 2014. South Africa’s government expenditure 
on Higher Education is comparatively low, accounting for 12 % of expenditure on 
education, whereas for the rest of Africa it is 20 % and the rest of the world is 19.8 % 
(Bozzoli, 2014). Between 2000 and 2013 government’s contribution to university 
budgets declined from 49 % to 40 %, subsequently student fees increased from 24 % 
to 33 % (Rudin, 2015). This meant student fee contributions more than doubled from 
a total of R7.8-billion to R17.83-billion (Rudin, 2015). Of interest, where the norm was 
for government subsidies to contribute towards 40 % of the universities’ budgets, for 
SU only 24 % of its income was from government (Stellenbosch University, 2016). 
Even so, SU’s students fees for 2015 were not amongst the highest; for 2015 fees for a 
Bachelor of Arts at the University of Cape Town ranged between R43 500–R59 000, 
compared to SU’s R32 534 (‘Top SA Universities’, 2015).
1 This chapter has been written to honour Prof. Pierre du Toit. Pierre, your contribution has not just 
been in the measurable academic-outputs, but in the immeasurable inputs you have made in the 
lives of your students and colleagues. Thank you for your example of excellence and integrity, your 
mentorship and your friendship.
2 Although there is a genuine grievance in terms of high fees, there is growing concern that this 
grievance is being mobilised for political ends. In his open letter the Rector of WITS University, 
Professor Adam Habib recognised that there is a ‘political project of some actors to delegitimise 





Figure 1 Number of Stellenbosch University students for the years 1910 to 2015
Source: Data adapted from Stellenbosch University’s Statistical Profile, see:  
http://www.sun.ac.za/english/Pages/statistical_profile.aspx
Notes: The SU student number for 1981 is estimated.
The nature of the protests on the campus of Stellenbosch tended to differ to that 
of many of the other universities. Besides the illegal occupation of administrative 
buildings, some incidences of property being damaged and a few occurrences of 
intimidation, the Stellenbosch protests were largely characterised by being peaceful. 
In anecdotal conversations with Stellenbosch students and conversations overheard 
during the protests, protestors from other campuses accused the SU students of 
being too ‘bourgeois’. We were interested to find out if this meant SU’s ‘born-frees’ 
were politically apathetic.
In light of the developments on the SU campus we were particularly interested in 
how SU’s ‘born-frees’ (those born during South Africa’s democratic dispensation) 
perceived political engagement in a democratic dispensation and how they engaged 
in the political realm. The survey revealed that SU’s student cohort, far from being 
politically apathetic: understand their role of being citizens in a democracy; largely 
base their vote on the performance of a political party; and are willing to engage in 
protests but not of a violent nature. 
Methodology
Surveys provide windows into the minds of the respondents, hence our intention with 
this survey was to gain a better understanding of the political culture and behaviour 
of SU’s born-frees as they form part of the emerging future decision-makers and 
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aspiring middle class of South Africa. The SU survey forms part of a broader 
nationwide project, The Political Attitudes of South Africa’s first Democratic Generation: 
A Survey of the first democratic generation’s University Students, spearheaded by Prof. 
Joleen Steyn Kotze from Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU). This 
is an important project as those participating in the surveys represent the first 
generation of post-apartheid voters, the so-called ‘born-free’ generation. The project 
thus seeks to generate data on electoral trends, political behaviour and political 
attitudes of a generation that has grown up exclusively within the democratic 
dispensation (since 1994). Noting that only 12.1 % of the South African population 
holds a tertiary qualification (StatsSA, 2012), the project is primarily concerned with 
the evolving political culture of the educated as an elite group. It is expected that this 
group will form a core cohort of future leaders and influencers in South Africa, hence 
the importance of understanding them better.
The SU survey was conducted in the first quarter of 2015, with the participants 
broadly reflective of the university’s demographic profile. The sample of students 
was selected to be representative (in terms of gender and race) of the university’s 
undergraduate student body across all academic disciplines, though our key sampling 
criterion were age and nationality, namely South African ‘born frees’.3 Over-sampling 
was utilized to attain as representative a sample as possible. Students from nine 
of the ten faculties,4 namely AgriSciences, Arts & Social Sciences, Economic and 
Management Sciences, Education, Engineering, Law, Medicine, and Health Sciences, 
Science and Theology participated. The survey largely comprised a battery of closed 
questions, but there were also open-ended questions to enable the students to 
expand on their answers. 
Understanding political participation and political culture in a 
democratic setting 
Democracy in its most basic understanding is premised on citizens playing an active 
role in governing their communal affairs. A core value of a liberal democracy is freedom 
(du Toit and Kotzé 2011:1), in particular the freedom to participate in the democratic 
process. Dalton (2000:927) explains the connection between democracy and political 
participation when he notes that ‘democracy expects an active citizenry because it 
is through discussion, popular interest and involvement in politics that societal goals 
should be defined and carried out’. Furthermore, he points out that if the public are not 
3 Sample size was 310 students of an undergraduate population of 18138 using 2014 figures.
4 Military Science was not included because its students were from an older age group.
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involved in a democracy then the democracy ‘lacks both its legitimacy and its guiding 
force’ (Dalton, 2000:927). It therefore remains important to ascertain whether the 
citizenry in a democracy are interested in participation and their attitudes toward 
political participation. Almond and Verba (1965) studied the cultural attributes of a 
successful democracy in their seminal cross-national study, the “Five Nation Study”. 
Their findings were reported in their book, Civic Culture, where they challenged the 
rational-activist model, which held that a successful democracy needed a well-
informed citizenry that took an active interest and role in public affairs. The logic held 
that this active citizenry would hold governing elites in check. Instead, Almond and 
Verba found that the majority of the citizenry in successful democracies were neither 
politically active nor well informed. They rather put forward the civic culture model, 
arguing for balance in having both an active and an inactive citizenry, thus allowing 
government the discretion needed to govern, whilst also being held to account. 
Mayer, Burnett and Ogden (1996:76) refer to this necessary tension in a democratic 
government as that between the ‘imperatives of …responsiveness… on the one hand 
and stability on the other’. Similarly, Hague and Harrop (2004:90) explain Almond 
and Verba’s civic culture as a blending of subject, parochial and participant cultures5 
to create a balance between ‘popular control and effective governance: [allowing 
for] citizen influence while retaining flexibility for the governing elite’. Furthermore, 
the freedom to participate in a democracy is not unrestrained, and we argue that 
political participation in a democratic setting requires responsible freedom. The form 
of the political participation, either conventional or unconventional, is illustrative of 
whether that freedom is being used responsibly or not.
Political participation can take various forms. Scholars have used various 
categorisations to make sense of the variety of ways in which political participation 
occurs. Sabucedo and Arce (1991:94) note that the common classification category is 
to distinguish between conventional and unconventional political participation. They 
note that alternative distinctions such as legal and illegal and institutional and non-
institutional methods of political participation have also been used. Verba and Nie 
(1972 in Janowski and Strate, 1995: 90) refer to conventional political participation 
as comprising ‘campaigning, voting, communal action, and personalised contacting’. 
According to Sabucedo and Arce (1991:94) scholars such as Kaase et al. (1979) 
5 People with a subject political culture see themselves not as participants but as subjects of the 
government and thus largely remain passive. Those with a parochial political culture are either 
remotely or completely unaware of the existence of a central government. In a participant political 
culture citizens believe that they can contribute to the political system and that they are affected by 
it. They thus tend to be more active in politics.
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view ‘legal demonstrations, boycotts, illegal strikes damage to property and personal 
violence’ as non-conventional methods of political participation. When Kotzé (2001: 
137) unpacks South Africans’ attitudes to protest using the World Values Surveys, 
he too refers to ‘protest and direct action’ as ‘unconventional’ forms of political 
participation. 
The specific categorisation of forms of political participation as either conventional 
or unconventional requires critical reflection for two reasons. The first reason is 
the source of these categorisations. Sabucedo and Arce (1991:94) argue that the 
nature of the categorisations stem from the status quo and anything other than the 
status quo or traditional activities, were viewed in a negative way. The second reason 
why this categorisation must be critically considered is because the distinction 
between conventional and unconventional political participation may differ by 
context. For example what constitutes conventional and unconventional in the South 
African democratic context does not necessarily align with the aforementioned 
categorisations. If we take the effect of the struggle for freedom into consideration 
then protest as a form of political participation in the South African political culture 
has become normalised. This observation raises a question regarding whether any 
normalised mode of political participation within a particular context should be 
considered conventional. Even so, a concern with this approach relates to the regime 
context. The struggle for freedom was under apartheid, an authoritarian regime, 
where conventional participation, in particular voting, was inaccessible to the majority 
of South Africans. On the other hand, the post-1994 dispensation is a democratic 
regime, which recognises and protects the rights of all citizens to participate in the 
conventional methods of participation. Kotzé’s (2001:151) observations support the 
notion that protest should be considered a conventional form of political participation 
for a sizeable proportion of South Africans when he notes that ‘the persistently higher 
level of protest among black South Africans indicates that the political exclusion of 
this group over decades did in fact establish a culture of protest unmatched among 
other groups’ in South Africa. He further asserts that protests seem to be more part 
of the black South African’s political culture than other groupings (Kotzé, 2001: 
151). If one takes into account South Africa’s racial demography, then black South 
Africans comprise the overwhelming majority of the population, then protest could 
be considered a ‘conventional’ political activity in the South African context. 
There is other evidence that notions around what constitutes conventional and 
unconventional political participation in a democracy need reformulation. Sabucedo 
and Arce (1991:94) refer to research done on the 1970s and early 1980s which 
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they say implied that there are ‘people who try to use more direct methods of 
influencing political life, without losing their interest in, as well as their ability to 
practice, traditional modes of political participation.’ They therefore noted that social 
scientists need to ‘recognize these new forms of action’ in relation to the concept of 
political participation and that there is a need ‘to create new and distinct categories 
in order to provide a greater understanding of these emerging phenomena.’ Dalton 
(2000) also provides such evidence in his review of the scholarship on political 
participation when he indicates that the literature suggests that citizens in older and 
newer democracies are looking for other ways to engage politically beyond merely 
voting. Dalton (2000: 929) notes that citizens are engaging more in direct action 
and these methods of participation are employed to gain more influence. What his 
observations suggest is that some people’s political participation has become more 
strategic. What Dalton is highlighting is that it would seem that people want more 
value from their political participation. If this is indeed the case, then we have to 
examine how we classify modes of participation and we have to consider whether 
some of the activities previously classified as unconventional forms of political 
participation have actually become normalised modes of political participation in 
various contexts. 
The question about how we interpret the normalised political participation practices 
is very relevant in the South African context. Apart from protest as a tool of 
political participation during apartheid, protest is also a chosen method of political 
participation in post-apartheid South Africa. This is not to the exclusion of voting. 
However, de Jager (2015: 161) notes that a key trend in political participation has been 
a declining voter turn-out, where ‘South Africa’s biggest voting block is those who do 
not vote’; in the 2014 national elections more (41 % of the voting age population) did 
not vote than those that voted for the ruling party (36 % of the voting age population 
voted for the African National Congress). In other words 41 % of those eligible to 
vote (voting age population) decided to rather opt out of the formal electoral system. 
Concomitant with the decline in voter participation has been an increase in so-called 
‘non-conventional’ forms of political participation. These methods of participation, 
often referred to as service delivery protests, have increased significantly, especially 
between the period 2009 and 2014. However, Municipal IQ’s Municipal Hotspots 
Monitor shows that since 2004, 70 % of these protests have been violent and 
destructive in nature. 
In light of the question about how different modes of political participation are 
categorised, the South African political context offers an input that focuses on the 
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relabelling of protest as part of what would constitute conventional political activity. 
The word conventional signifies that this practice is considered unproblematic and 
is deemed broadly acceptable within a democratic setting. The right to peacefully 
assemble and demonstrate is endorsed in section 17 of the Bill of Rights, which states: 
‘Everyone has the right, peacefully and unarmed, to assemble, to demonstrate, to 
picket and to present petitions’ (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). 
In light of this constitutional provision, even if violence is popularised it remains 
an unconventional form of political protest, incompatible with democratic political 
participation. Violence is recognised as the anti-thesis of democratic behaviour (du 
Toit and Kotzé, 2011:4). Instead, within a liberal democracy virtues of ‘forbearance, 
compromise, accommodation, and fair-mindedness’ emanating from the recognition 
of the ‘essential equality of humans’ (du Toit and Kotzé, 2011:16) should guide 
political behaviour. Violence also contravenes Almond and Verba’s aforementioned 
democratic political culture as required for a successful democracy. Violent protest 
tilts the needed balance in a democracy between participation and stability, rendering 
government and institutions unstable. 
We, therefore argue, for the use of law (in South Africa’s case the 1996 Constitution) 
as the basis of reassessing the categorisation of conventional versus unconventional 
participation. In other words the dividing line is between legal and illegal participation, 
where peaceful protests are legal and therefore conventional, and the use of violence 














Figure 2  Re-Categorising Political Participation
We now explore the responses of SU born-frees to questions about their intended 
and actual political participation as well as their attitudes towards conventional 
and unconventional forms of participation by examining the responses to questions 
about support for different types of protests (peaceful and violent protest). 
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An empirical overview of the political participation of SU’s born-frees 
Using the SU born-frees survey we sought to understand how SU’s students viewed 
political participation in a democracy, in particular, voting. Moving from this, we 
sought to understand which political party these students either voted for or 
would vote for, and on what basis they determined their support. Finally we sought 
to understand how they viewed protest, both peaceful and violent, as forms of 
political participation.
SU’s born-frees support the tools of democracy and they are interested in politics 
For a democracy to survive, people need to believe in it and participate in its 
processes. To determine the SU born-frees’ political attitudes towards voting as a 
democratic process, the survey presented the following statements- ‘my vote makes 
a difference’; ‘it is the duty of all citizens to vote’; ‘voting can be a valuable exercise as 
we elect politicians we can trust and have the best interest of the citizenry at heart’- 
to which the students could respond strongly agree, agree, neither/nor, disagree or 
strongly disagree.
Table 1 Stellenbosch University’s born-frees’ views of voting, 2015
Agreed with 
statement
My vote makes a difference  74 %
It is the duty of all citizens to vote 84 %
Voting can be a valuable exercise as we elect politicians we can 
trust and have the best interest of the citizenry at heart 62 %
Our survey findings indicate that SU born-frees believe in participating in political 
activities such as voting and they are generally quite positive toward voting. Voting 
is an important element of democracy because it allows people to choose who they 
want to govern them. The survey indicates that a majority of the students recognise 
the value of elections as a means to recruit people to govern on their behalf. We 
found that most SU born-frees believe that voting is something that citizens should 
do. More than 80 % agreed with the statement that it is the duty of all citizens to vote. 
Over 70 % agreed that voting makes a difference, and 62 % agreed that voting can be 
a valuable exercise. If we were to use their commitment to voting and their positive 
orientation toward political participation as signs of a commitment to democracy 
then the SU ‘born frees’ show a strong sense of being responsible democratic citizens.
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SU’s born-frees vote on the basis of performance 
South Africa’s elections since 1994 have been described as a “racial census”, where 
race has been a principle predictor of voting behaviour. Of interest to us was whether 
race was a key determinant of political party support for SU’s students or not. To 
answer this we determined to know which political party (asking the respondents 
to pretend that they were all eligible to vote) they voted for in the 2014 national 
elections. Then to properly understand the basis of this support we used cross-
tabulations to analyse the responses, on the basis of race, to the statement of ‘race 
plays a role in my voting preference’. To further understand their preference for a 
political party, open-ended questions were included, asking them to specify why they 
preferred the party they selected.
Table 2 SU’s born-frees political party support, 2014 national elections










ACDP ANC DA COPE EFF FF+ Other Did not
answer
Table 2 shows an overwhelming support (80 %) for the Democratic Alliance, with 
the ANC receiving 9.7 % of the support, followed by the African Christian Democratic 
Party (ACDP) with 1.6 % and the Economic Freedom Fighters with 1.3 %.
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Table 3 Race as a basis for voting preference






In response to the statement ‘Race plays a role in my voting preference’ 59 % 
of the respondents either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement. 
When accounting for race, 47 % of the black respondents, 60 % of the coloured 
respondents and 62 % of the white respondents disagreed with the statement. SU’s 
born-frees thus appear to be breaking away from this pattern of race-based voting. 
Instead, they are considering how a political party performed when they vote. More 
than 80 % of SU’s born-frees indicated they did or would vote for the DA, citing 
past performance as the key reason for this. Examples of their statements from the 
open-ended question include: “Proven track record of service delivery, as shown by 
the running of the Western Cape”; “The DA seems more capable to bring order and 
makes wiser choices”; “The DA runs the Western Cape and statistically the Western 
Cape is the best run province” and “The DA makes a significant difference in my local 
community and therefore can do the same nationally”. Taking the responses to the 
open-ended question for only those that answered that they had voted for the DA, a 
word cloud was derived from the frequency of word usage in the text where higher 
frequencies displays larger block. It provides an interesting visual illustration of the 
key reasons for supporting the DA.
Figure 3 Reasons given for preference for the DA
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SU born-frees support peaceful protest action, but not violent protest action
Following from our theoretical discussions concerning the categorisation of political 
participation in terms of conventional and unconventional participation, we sought to 
understand how SU’s born-frees perceived political participation in terms of protest, 
and then in terms of violent versus peaceful protest. 
Table 4 SU’s born-frees’ support of mass action
Agree Disagree
Non-violent mass action is an acceptable way for 
people to express their views in a democracy 73 % 12 %
Violent mass action is an acceptable way for people 
to express their views in a democracy 5 % 89 %
73 % of the respondents agreed with the statement that ‘non-violent mass action 
is an acceptable way for people to express their views in a democracy’, with 12 % 
disagreeing and the rest remaining neutral. On the other hand, only 5 % of the 
respondents agreed that violent mass action is acceptable with an overwhelming 
majority (89 %) disagreeing with violent mass action and remainder were neutral. 
Thus the SU born-frees, consider non-violent protest as an acceptable and thus 
conventional form of political participation. The largely peaceful nature of the 
protests on SU’s campus in 2015 is therefore unsurprising in light of 89 % of the 
respondents being unsupportive of violent mass action.
Conclusion
The recent #FeesMustFall campaign demonstrates that a sizeable proportion of 
South Africa’s university students view protest as a legitimate means of political 
participation. The nature of the protests differed across university campuses. While 
Stellenbosch University protests were mainly peaceful, many campuses experienced 
violent protests. If one argues along the lines of Dalton’s observation then we see 
here evidence of citizens who want to engage politically, but they want to engage in 
ways that bring about more influence. When these protests are compared in terms 
of impact it may be argued that the student protests had more influence than service 
delivery protests because there was a significant policy response from government. 
The South African president, with little broader consultation, responded within days 
and announced that there would be no fee increases in 2016 and the government 
undertook to help universities carry the cost of not increasing their fees. This ‘victory’ 
could potentially deepen the normalisation of peaceful protest as an accepted means 
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of political participation amongst the more privileged in a society, meaning those 
who have access to higher education and who could be future leaders. But, the 
‘victory’ was also won based on a campaign that included violent protests on many 
other campuses in South Africa. While SU students may continue to support and 
engage in peaceful protests, one has to be cognisant of the fact that government’s 
swift response may also be interpreted as violent protests ‘work’. It may therefore 
inculcate the value that violence is effective. The long-term implications of this 
unconventional and unconstitutional behaviour for the stability of South Africa’s 
democracy should not be taken lightly. 
Nevertheless, the encouraging message from the SU born-free survey remains, 
which is that these born-frees hold the kind of political attitudes to participation that 
support a democratic government system. As Stellenbosch University is but one of 
a number of higher education institutions in South Africa, it is essential to examine, 
through comparative research, whether similar or divergent attitudes persist 
elsewhere and what the findings suggest in terms of our future leaders’ support for 
a democratic system. 
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SOUTH AFRICAN STUDENT PROTESTS AS NEW IMAGINED 
COMMUNITIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE
Barend Lutz 
Background and Introduction
In 2014 Professor Pierre du Toit and I co-authored a book on digital media and 
democracy titled: Defining Democracy in a Digital Age: Political Support on Social Media. 
In addition to exploring the development of democracy and the impact of emerging 
technologies on this development, we constructed a methodology for measuring 
public expressions on political issues from social media platforms. In the book we 
focussed specifically on global public expressions on democracy from the popular 
social media platform Twitter. Without spoiling the findings of the book, or 
overextending the scope of this chapter, it will suffice to say that we found that a 
significant proportion of Twitter users were negative about the prospects of 
democracy. The book was an introductory study testing the methodology and the 
aim was to open up the field for future research in the measurement of public 
expressions on social media. We were particularly interested in the notion of social 
media conversations as a form of Habermasian public sphere (Habermas, 1989) 
where influential opinions and cohesive imagined communities are formed that can 
influence real world change. As part of the study, we proposed a number of avenues 
for future research to take to further this work. This chapter of this Festschrift 
honouring the achievements of Professor du Toit will examine a case study 
implementing multiple avenues for future research that was proposed in our book. 
The tweet above hints at the theme of the case study that this chapter will focus on, 
namely the 2015 student movements that were the largest student protests seen 
A popular Tweet from a Johannesburg-based 
woman that was shared on 22 October 2015, 
the day that the #FeesMustFall protest was 
most active on Twitter, and the day that 
students marched to the ANC’s Luthuli House in 
Johannesburg and the magistrate’s court in Cape 
Town. The tweet also refers to the Rhodes Statue 




in the country since the epoch-defining Soweto uprising in 1976. One of the key 
differences between the uprisings in 1976 and the ongoing student movement is the 
impact of digital media in not only the mobilisation of protests, but more importantly 
the formation of what can be called ‘imagined communities’. These communities 
form ‘societies’ which are connected by social engagement, and share social capital 
that bond and bridge individuals into a cohesive grouping. In our book we propose 
that social media forms a critical communication network with a stable source of 
content, that is open to contextualisation, self-reflection and aggregation, and 
provides symbolic content visually to its consumers (Lutz & du Toit, 2014).
The first section of this chapter will examine the avenues for future research 
proposed in Defining Democracy in a Digital Age: Political Support on Social Media. 
The following section will look briefly at the dynamics of modern democracies, the 
impact that social media have on these, and further expand on the ideas of the public 
sphere and imagined communities. The final section of this chapter is a case study 
on the #FeesMustFall student movement that emerged in October 2015, but has 
ramifications that are continuing to impact the South African political sphere. This 
student movement will be examined from the perspective of an imagined community 
that has real-world impact, and some of the methods proposed for future research 
will be used in analysing the movement.
Proposals for future research in Defining Democracy in a Digital Age:  
Political Support on Social Media
Given that Defining Democracy in a Digital Age: Political Support on Social Media was 
an introductory study to develop and test the methodology of measuring public 
expressions on democracy from Twitter, it was impossible to look at all the potential 
uses of measuring public expressions from social media sites. In chapter 4 of the 
book we examined further potential analyses using variations of the study that might 
be of benefit to future studies. 
Firstly, we stated that although the original study focused on the topic of democracy, 
it could be replicated with any topic of a researcher’s choosing. If people discuss a 
topic on the Internet the same methodology should function. As such this chapter will 
look at student protests in South Africa rather than democracy. More specifically, the 
study will focus on one specific popular hashtag that is used by student protesters, 
namely #FeesMustFall.
Secondly, one could use other online social media networks for this study, however 
as tweets are relatively freely available, and were the most popular tool for 
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communication during the #FeesMustFall movement, it was decided to remain with 
tweet data only.
Thirdly, the initial study looked only at the content of the tweets and examined the 
sentiment of this content. Tweets contain additional data such as information about 
the person tweeting – specifically location data. In this chapter location data will be 
used to identify only tweets from users in South Africa. 
Fourthly, we proposed that there are a number of ways in which a future researcher 
can get more profound understanding of collected data. In this study word 
counts will be used to identify the most popular topics that co-occurred with the 
#FeesMustFall tweets. 
Next, more mature sentiment and natural language processing was used in analysing 
the data and determining sentiment scores. However, given that the hashtag that 
was followed is about protests – which by its nature should evoke negative sentiment 
– it is debatable how useful the sentiment analysis section of this study will be.
Finally, a more granular analysis of tweets over time will be conducted in order to see 
how the #FeesMustFall movement started, developed and evolved. This section will 
form the basis for exploring how this Twitter-based public sphere works and how an 
imagined community on a social network is formed and evolves.
Democracy, Social Media, the Public Sphere and Imagined Communities
In our book, Defining Democracy in a Digital Age: Political Support on Social Media 
(2014), Professor du Toit and myself looked at the evolving dynamics of modern 
democracies. Throughout history democracies have been continuously shaped 
by technological and institutional innovations, the values and beliefs found in the 
political culture of societies, and by the factor of size. The Age of Modernity which 
took off in Europe by the late fifteenth century, was said to have led this process 
with three technological innovations (all of which originated elsewhere): gunpowder, 
oceanic navigation and the printing press. The major institutional innovation that 
emerged from the Middle Ages was that of representative assemblies. Modern 
democracies benefited directly from one of these innovations – the technology of 
the printing press – invented in Europe in 1454 (and much earlier in China), which 
allowed ever larger populations of citizens to be drawn into political society. The 
political cultures that developed in the durable democracies of the twentieth century 
built on notions about, inter alia, the identity of the political society (shaped primarily 
by the ideology of nationalism); the institutional framework of the nation(al)-state; 
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and the civic and political virtues captured in the evolving liberal-democratic human 
rights doctrines. Since the invention of the printing press technologies such as radio, 
television, the internet (all of which can impact societal development), have been 
advancing at a rapid rate.
In our book we focussed specifically on one such new technology – social media. 
We argue that the ever increasing group of social media platforms, such as Twitter, 
Facebook, WhatsApp, YouTube, Instagram, Sina Weibo, Renren, QZone, VKontakte 
and Odnoklassniki, can be seen as new types of Habermasian public spheres.
Although these opinion-rich sources come from an increasing variety of users and 
although this group of users do not (yet) represent the fullness of society, it can at 
least give one a glimpse of a specific influential sector of society. At present, this 
section of society consists largely of the young, and they are, arguably, one of the 
most influential sectors society with the potential to bring (or at least instigate and 
promote) revolutionary change to the larger population. It is precisely these ‘netizens’ 
who have been instrumental in recent large political upheavals, such as the so-called 
Arab Spring; the 2013-14 Ukrainian civil unrest; and the ongoing socio-economically 
driven political unrest in Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Thailand and many other 
countries across the globe. 
In the next section the impact of this sector of society on the South African political 
spectrum will be explored. These social media netizens use Facebook, Twitter, blogs 
and the thousands of other digital channels available to them, to express their opinions 
on everything from the latest fashion trends, to foreign policy and expressions on 
democracy. Their thoughts, beliefs and expressions are publicly available, and free to 
be interpreted and analysed by researchers.
In our book, we focussed specifically on one of the most popular social network tools, 
the microblogging site, Twitter. We used the broad theoretical perspectives of the 
German sociologist and philosopher Jürgen Habermas, and treated expressions on 
Twitter as a form of discourse within a Habermasian public sphere. Scholars such as 
Habermas and Hannah Arendt (1963) have discussed the public sphere and how it is 
constantly changing. Habermas  has looked specifically at the influence of the media 
on political opinion in the public sphere (Habermas, 1989).
Public Sphere
The public sphere refers to a place, be it physical or virtual, where citizens gather 
and exchange views on public affairs. These spheres are ‘places’ where citizens can 
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meet and discuss, debate and deliberate on current affairs which eventually leads 
to the formation of public opinion (Castells, 2008). The contemporary view of the 
public sphere is mainly based on the works of Habermas (1989). He defines the 
public sphere as a “network for communicating information and points of view … 
filtered and synthesised in such a way that they coalesce into bundles of topically 
specified public opinions” (Habermas, 1996).. Such a public sphere will subsequently 
be illustrated with a South African case.
Throughout the development of democracy there have been many versions of public 
spheres promoting political accountability. Some examples are the agora of Greek 
City States, where citizens gathered and discussed public affairs. Another form would 
be the tribal gatherings and certain church congregations throughout history. In 
European monarchies the royal court was also a public sphere, but it was dominated 
by the monarchy. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, salons (France), 
coffeehouses (England) and table societies (Germany) were public spheres that were 
limited to the aristocracy. As technology developed and mass newspapers became 
distributed, the discussions from these coffeehouses and salons became truly public 
(Habermas, 1996; CommGAP, 2012).
Today, with the rapid development of technology, there are those who argue that 
new forms of public spheres are developing with the help of information and 
communication technologies. This means people no longer have to physically gather 
somewhere to discuss public affairs. 
Using the ideas from Habermas (1989), a number of scholars such as Papacharissi 
(2009) have examined social media sites and the Internet as new types of public 
spheres where public opinion is being generated and discussed. The creator of Twitter, 
Jack Dorsey, stated at the 2012 Digital Life Design Conference in Munich that Twitter 
is a public medium that hosts public conversation in a way simple enough for anyone 
to use (VentureBeat, 2012). If this statement is an accurate representation of Twitter, 
the discussions on Twitter might be comparable to a type of Habermasian public 
sphere and the opinions generated here can be of the utmost value in gauging public 
opinion. The expressions on democracy from this sphere could then be indicative of 
the legitimacy of democracy as a whole (Habermas, 1976; CommGAP, 2012). 
Downey and Fenton (2003) have stated that public discussion on new media 
sites might lead to the creation of counter-public spheres, which could challenge 
the opinions of the current public sphere. This idea of counter-public spheres was 
developed by Habermas (1996) when he recognised that alternative public spheres 
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might challenge the current dominant sphere. This might also be the case for Twitter, 
but we are of the opinion that expressions on Twitter would rather form part of the 
dominant public sphere. This, however, remains to be tested in future studies.
In her book, A Private Sphere: Democracy in a Digital Age, Papacharissi (2010) has 
argued that new technologies have, in fact, eroded the boundaries between the 
private and the public sphere. She believes that the public sphere is no longer the 
centre of democratic debate and that private citizens now broadcast gestures of a 
social, civic, political, cultural and economic nature from the mobile enclosures of 
the private sphere, to mass global audiences. She also believes that these spheres 
are not fully public as there is an unfair distribution of access to information, a lack 
of reciprocity in communication, and an overarching commercialisation that inhibits 
open discussion. Papacharissi, therefore, would rather explain expressions on new 
media as falling within the private sphere.
As yet, there is no definitive answer to whether Twitter can be seen as a Habermasian 
public sphere in which public opinion can be created. In our book we accepted that 
Twitter does indeed meet the criteria of a public sphere. The expressions measured in 
this study would, therefore, form part of the discussion that influences the formation 
of public opinion. The South African case study below will attempt to further this 
research by illustrating how influential Twitter is in opinion forming and in influencing 
political action in the country.
What we do point out already is that views expressed on Twitter do not necessarily 
“coalesce into bundles of topically specified public opinions” (Habermas, 1989) as 
required by Habermas’ definition of the public sphere. For this process of coalescence 
to emerge, new methodologies of aggregation of data are needed. Such a process will 
be discussed in the case study below.
Imagined Communities
According to Lutz and du Toit (2014) within the public sphere, the process of 
shaping the social base of democracy can also be seen as the role of innovation 
in communications technology. An inclusive national identity can emerge in the 
civic culture of mature democracies through a process of both formal and informal 
political socialisation that proceeds from one generation to the next. Or, if context 
and circumstance requires the more speedy establishment of a cohesive citizenry, a 
deliberate use of symbols, symbolic events and leaders can be used to ‘create’ such 
a collective identity. For Benedict Anderson (2006), the social construction of such 
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a community in the form of a nation is that of the establishment of an “imagined 
community”. 
In this view, the nation (or group) is imagined as an inherently sovereign and limited 
social entity. It is imagined in the sense that nations, even very small ones, consist 
of thousands of members – the vast majority of whom will never meet one another, 
but each one, in their mind’s eye, is aware of the others and has a sense of him/
herself in sharing this particular identity. The nation is sovereign – is not being ruled 
by foreigners, nor is it limited with defined (albeit malleable) boundaries with other 
nations, similarly defined. It is, importantly, a community, understood as membership 
with “deep horizontal comradeship” (Anderson, 2006). As the printing press 
helped with the formation of these imagined communities, so today digital media, 
specifically social media, assists in this role.
This cohesive well-knit citizenry can now enter democratic politics through efficient 
institutions for demand generation. The key processes of presenting interests and 
preferences to policy makers are through that of interest articulation (mostly through 
organised interest groups) and interest aggregation (mostly political parties), who 
provide the institutional conveyor belt for taking citizens into electoral politics, and 
from there, into representative assemblies where public policy is made. Making 
decisions about public policy, inter alia, on the basis of demands made by citizens, is 
the first crucial step in achieving system capacity. Effectively implementation of such 
policy decisions, when all the while maintaining the constitutional rules that define 
the regime and its policy-making processes is the second crucial step; one that 
delivers legitimacy to the democratic process, which in turn, is expressed in further 
public support for the regime. According to Almond and Verba (1963), effective 
system capacity generated and maintained in this way, contributes to maintaining 
the belief at the very core of civic culture – namely, the myth of citizen competence 
by providing a partial empirical base for this belief.
A question that was examined in Defining Democracy in a Digital Age: Political Support 
on Social Media (Lutz & du Toit, 2014) was: 
“Can digital media, including the social media, contribute to creating new 
and durable imagined communities favourable to the reconstruction of the 
social base of democracies?” 
In the next section an examination of an imagined community – bound by the 
artefacts of popular Twitter hashtags – participation in an online public sphere in 
South Africa will be examined in order to attempt to further answer this question. 
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Case Study: South Africa’s 2015/16 Student Protests – the #FeesMustFall 
Movement as an Imagined Community
In April 2015 South Africa began celebrating the third decade of democracy, following 
the end of apartheid in 1994. According to an April 2015 article on the government’s 
website: “South Africa has come a long way in addressing the economic, social 
and cultural challenges created under apartheid” (ZA Government, 2015). During 
the celebrations of Freedom Month much of the media in the country focussed on 
the so called “Born Frees” or “New Youth” – those born under the new post-1994 
regime. However, even though the country might have come a long way since 1994 
as the government suggests, a key theme that was emerging under the Born Frees 
was “continuing inequality and injustice, particularly economic” (Coleman, 2015). 
This case study will examine the radical student-led movements that emerged out of 
this sentiment in 2015. These movements challenge the status quo at universities in 
South Africa and express frustrations at the lack of a more diverse and representative 
educational system. Communications on Twitter will be examined and viewed as an 
imagined community participating in a form of public sphere with real-world impact. 
The Statue that Fell
In addition to marking the third decade of democracy in the new South Africa, April 
2015 was also the month that the University of Cape Town’s (UCT) council voted to 
remove the statue of Cecil John Rhodes following a protest campaign.
Although the removal of the statue was one of the movement’s goals, the 
#RhodesMustFall movement began on 9 March 2015 and described itself as “a 
collective movement of students and staff members mobilising for direct action 
against the reality of institutional racism at UCT” (Rhodes Must Fall, 2016).  Thus, 
the removal of the statute and Rhodes’ place in history was but one of its main issues 
to be redressed (Kamanzi, 2015; Hlophe, 2015). 
Whilst the removal of the Rhodes statue was an initial aim, the movement also 
protested against perceived white privilege on university campuses across the 
country, with historically-white universities bearing the brunt of the protests. The fall 
of the statue can be seen as a symbolic victory, an example of interest aggregation 
and binding artefact for the imagined community that was developing in the national 
consciousness, media and social media alike. The #RhodesMustFall campaign 
attracted much national and international attention and could be seen as the catalyst 
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for an ongoing allied student movements at other universities, both within South 
Africa and elsewhere in the world. 
Between April and October 2015 there were multiple smaller, related student 
led movements across the country – such as the protests over language issues 
that started at Stellenbosch University in July 2015 and later also surfaced at the 
University of Pretoria. One social media artefact and driving force behind protesters 
at Stellenbosch University was a documentary shared on YouTube entitled Luister 
(Youtube, 2015). The documentary received thousands of views and told the stories 
the lives of students of colour who attend Stellenbosch University. In a series of 
interviews, students recount instances of racial prejudice that they continue to 
experience in the town of Stellenbosch and the challenges that they face due to the 
use of Afrikaans as a language of teaching at the university. However, it was not until 
October 2015 that the full force of this newly-developed imagined community would 
be seen in the form of the #FeesMustFall protests.
In the next section the #FeesMustFall movement will be examined as an imagined 
community that used Twitter1 as a public sphere and impacted real-world change. 
The movement gave rise to the largest student protests since 1976 (Masola, 2015). 
From tweets collected from Twitter, one can examine the development, impact and 
growth of this movement down to the second.
This is What: Telling the Story of #FeesMustFall with Tweets
In addition to being one of the largest student protest movements that the country 
experienced, the #FeesMustFall movement was also one of the largest social media 
events in the country (Pedroncelli, 2015). This researcher has compiled a collection 
of tweets published publically on Twitter between 10 October 2015 and 29 February 
2016, from the hashtag #FeesMustFall. The tweets are from users who are self-
reported to be located in South Africa.2 The collection consist of 912,790 tweets 
from 98,354 unique Twitter accounts and includes all public Twitter mentions of the 
hashtag #FeesMustFall for the collection period. From this collection one can follow 
1 Other digital media sources, such as Facebook, were also pivotal in this movement and can be 
examined in future research.
2 It should be noted that the methodology of only using users who are self-reported to be located in 
South Africa could exclude certain influential South Africans, such as Trevor Noah, who is in the United 
States, however the goal here is to get a picture of events on the ground, as such the methodology 
should be sound. It would not be difficult to extend the search to all tweets, however this will include 
international media sources which might not be formative in this imagined community. The volume 




events closely and examine how this imagined community developed and changed 
on Twitter.
The Birth of a Hashtag
Aside from the ongoing student unrest in the country, a catalyst for the 
#FeesMustFall movement was the announcement in October 2015 by the University 
of Witwatersrand (Wits) management that student tuition fees will be increased 
by 10.5 % in 2016 (Nkosi, 2015). From 8 October students from Wits used the 
hashtag #WitsFeesMustFall when talking about the proposed fee increase. However 
on 13 October a new broader hashtag emerged as a call to action. At 13:46 on 13 
October the Twitter account of Wits Student Representative Council (SRC) tweeted: 
“#FEESMUSTFALL #JOINTHEMOVEMENT #OCT14” with a picture with more 
information, seen below. This was the first use of the hashtag #FeesMustFall on 
Twitter.
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For this study this tweet can be seen as the first interaction in this emerging imagined 
community on the Twitter public sphere. It was the birth of a hashtag and a protest 
movement that started off as a simmer of discontent and soon became a veritable 
national movement (Allison, 2015).
Figure 1 below illustrates the first few days after the formation of the hashtag. 
Although it garnered some interactions, the use of the hashtag was still limited 
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#FeesMustFall: 12-18 October 
Figure 1 Tweet data for #FeesMustFall between 12-18 October 2015.
One of the most significant tweets from this initial period was from the author Khaya 
Dlanga (tweet below) who stated on 15 October: “People who say that race has nothing 
to do with #FeesMustFall haven’t applied their minds to the history that haunts the present”. 
This tweet can be seen as an initial indicator of the racial narrative that was forming 
in this imagined community. Another key theme from this period was that students 
from other universities in the country were also embracing the hashtag, with some of 
the most popular tweets mentioning the universities of Fort Hare, Stellenbosch and 





On Sunday 18 October 2015 the hashtag #FeesMustFall stood on 330 mentions for 
the day. The tweet above, with a picture co-opted from the 2013 Gezi Park protests 
in Turkey, was shared late that Sunday evening and can be seen as foreshadowing 
for what was to come in the next week. On Monday 19 October the hashtag be-
gan to spread like wildfire and the imagined community was truly born. As seen 
in Figure 2 below, between Monday and Friday (19-23 October 2015) there were 
754 917 tweets mentioning #FeesMustFall. On 19 October the protests had spread 
to UCT and Rhodes University in Grahamstown. In Cape Town road blocks at uni-
versity entrances were set up by students. In Grahamstown students occupied 
university administration buildings and 25 were arrested (Van der Merwe, 2015). 
 Other key hashtags on the day were #UCTShutdown, which received 2 698 tweets, 
#witsfeeswillfall (1 219 tweets) and #RhodesMIPmustFall (1 125 tweets). 
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#FeesMustFall: 12-30 October 
Figure 2 Tweet data for #FeesMustFall between 10-31 October 2015.
On 20, 21 and 22 October 2015 related protests also occurred at Cape Peninsula 
University of Technology (CPUT), Fort Hare University, Stellenbosch University 
and Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU). Other key hashtags on 
these days were #NationalShutdown (12 049 tweets), #UWCShutdown (2 192 
tweets) and #FeesMustFallForAll 
(1 202 tweets). On 21 October 
an estimated 5 000 students 
marched on the South African 
Parliament in Cape Town. The 
march coincided with the meeting 
of the national assembly where 
both President Jacob Zuma and 
Higher Education Minister, Blade 
Nzimande, were present. 
This was the most popular tweet 
mentioning both #FeesMustFall 
and the parliament protests.
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As mentioned previously, sentiment analysis was most useful in the book, Defining 
Democracy in a Digital Age. However, it is not as beneficial for understanding student 
protests that by their very nature elicit negative sentiment. Figure 3 below shows 
negative neutral and positive for tweets mentioning #FeesMustFall between 19 
and 23 October 2015. It is interesting to note that the day with the most tweets, 22 
October, was not the day with the most negative sentiment – however, one would 
have to examine the data more closely to see why this is the case. This examination 
falls outside the scope of this study. 
The following table represents the key words that were used between 19 and 23 
October 2015. The word count can give one an indication of which topics were 
most important in those days. The key themes that emerge from this list are links to 
students, violence and police, and the government.
2015/10/19 2015/10/20 2015/10/21 2015/10/22 2015/10/23
#FeesMustFall Sentiment: 19-23 October   
Negative Neutral Positive
Figure 3 Sentiment data for #FeesMustFall Tweets between 19-23 October 2015. 
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Friday, 23 October 2015 was a 
pivotal day for the movement. 
That morning saw a 10 000 strong 
crowd of students gathered at the 
Union Buildings in Pretoria calling 
on President Zuma to come out 
and answer to the crowd – which 
he eventually did not do, sparking 
more violence to erupt, as seen in 
the following tweet: 
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Although President Zuma did not address the crowd, he did announce via the media 
plans to scrap the proposed tuition fee hike (Allison, 2015). With the announcement 
the core demand of the movement was met, however this would not be the end of 
the student movement. This imagined community that consisted mostly of students 
continues to develop, as will be illustrated below.
The Hashtag Loses Momentum as the Imagined Community Evolves
In the first tweet in the intro-
duction of this chapter, Samina 
Anwary hinted that the #Fees-
MustFall movement developed 
out of the #RhodesMustFall 
movement. In Figure 4 below 
one notes that the #FeesMust-
Fall movement lost most of its popularity following the October 2015 events. Al-
though a small spike in mentions occurred in January 2016, the imagined community 
that congregated around this social artefact has now largely moved on. As with the 
#RhodesMustFall protests, the underlying issues – such as inequality and injustice, 
racial tensions, language issues and various concerns with governance – remain. Al-
though it falls outside of the scope of this study to examine the full development of 
the movement since October 2015, some of the key hashtags used in recent months 
have arguably evolved out of this imagined community. Some of these are: #Afri-
kaansMustFall, #ZumaMustFall, #OutsourcingMustFall, #Shackville, #ZuptaMust-
Fall and #AskBlade.








2015/10/13 2015/11/13 2015/12/13 2016/01/13 2016/02/13
#FeesMustFall Tweets:  October to February  
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Conclusion
The goal of this chapter was to expand on the study of public expressions using 
social media tools that were presented in the book Defining Democracy in a Digital 
Age: Political Support on Social Media. By focusing on a South African case study and 
implementing the avenues proposed for future research from the book is possible to 
see how public expressions on Twitter can generate somewhat cohesive social media 
communities.
The social media community formed around the #FeesMustFall hashtag adhered 
to the core principles of an imagined community set out in Defining Democracy in a 
Digital Age: Political Support on Social Media (2014:99-100). The movement effectively 
used Twitter as a critical communication network and effected real-world change. It 
provided a stable source of content, inspiring the imaginations of individual group 
members as seen in the thousands of tweets. These tweets and the various hashtags 
used by the movement provided contextualisation to members as it illustrated real-
world issues that inspire them. This form of contextualisation then lead to interest 
aggregation, as was seen with the key demand of the students, namely that fees 
must fall. The visual nature of Twitter and other social media platforms is also key in 
establishing an effective imagined community and forms symbolic representations 
of artefacts that can be shared by the community. 
This chapter therefore argues that digital media, including social media, can contribute 
to creating new and durable imagined communities. Within the bigger political 
sphere these imagined communities could be favourable to the reconstruction of the 
social base of democracies, as was discussed in Defining Democracy in a Digital Age: 
Political Support on Social Media. What is indeed clear however, is that they can affect 
real world change.
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In 1985, as a second-year undergraduate student in Political Science, at the end of the 
class, two fellow students and I were asked to remain behind. The lecturer, Pierre du 
Toit, announced that “a select few” (uitverkorenes in Afrikaans) should remain behind 
to receive their essays from him in person. He then went on to speak to each one 
of us individually and told us why our essays were good and what we should do to 
develop and grow in the discipline. I was over the moon, because Pierre was the one 
lecturer who inspired me and whom I wanted to impress. On that day, I knew that I 
wanted and could become a scholar in Political Science; he inspired that confidence 
in me. It was the beginning of some 30 years of mentorship and collegiality, not just 
academically, but also personally. A period which, if we have to put an end to it, 
reached its fulfillment just the other day when Pierre presented me with a copy of 
his ninth book. Just like all the other books, it was on a topic of immediate concern 
and relevance, namely, the need to revisit and rethink the meaning of South Africa’s 
Constitution in the midst of a time of crisis.
I think that the highest compliment I could bestow on Pierre is this: he not only inspired 
me to choose the career of a professional academic, but he was instrumental in how I 
developed and grew into that role, and also in how I view the pursuit of knowledge. In 
that sense, I firmly believe that a scientific study of politics, or in my own formulation, 
political economy, is not only possible but also essential. He also taught me that one 
should read widely, way beyond the confines of your own discipline. When visiting his 
office, I would scan his desk and note the titles and authors on a variety of topics. Not 
too long ago, as I embarked on a new research project, far removed from the study 
of political economy issues, Pierre pointed me in the right direction. He stressed, as 
he always did, that one should not overlook the giants in any field. For Pierre, quality 
always took precedence over quantity – this notwithstanding the fact that, during 
his career, he published steadily and productively. Quality remained the measure of 
excellence. It is because of this that a compliment coming from him, as on that day 
in his second-year undergraduate class, always continued to inspire and encourage.
Pierre is someone who chooses his words and reflects on them, before speaking. His 
classes, seminars and the many conversations we had were characterised by the 
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dictum of using time wisely, not abusing it or artificially inflating it. I once asked him 
how many sources one should cite in a journal article. His reply was “as many as it 
takes to do the job.” His advice was the same for my doctoral dissertation. I think he 
managed to instill in me a sense of being economical with words, although here, I 
must admit, he probably thinks that I am still a work in progress!
Over the years, he also gave me wise advice on a personal level that always stuck 
with me, or at the very least warranted reflection. During the years which were 
characterised by the states of emergency and intensification of the struggle in South 
Africa, I once had a vehement argument with my former father-in-law who was, 
at the time, an enlightened National Party supporter. I recounted the argument to 
Pierre and told him, with some intensity, exactly what I thought of my father-in-law. 
I used a word which does not need repeating here, but suffice to say that it was not 
complimentary. There was a pregnant pause, after which Pierre said that I should 
not talk about him in that manner, because he was family and that one, at any rate, 
always engaged with the argument and never attacked the person. I was brought 
up short, and rightly so. This fundamental rule in academic debate is one which 
resonates beyond academics and is a crucial value to uphold in our interpersonal 
relationships. We cannot live out our values in a compartmentalised, ad hoc manner. 
Pierre’s professional life is also his personal life. The words integrity and consistency 
best describe the person whom I am privileged to know and from whom I learned so 
many things over the past three decades.
I share Pierre’s love of the mountains, the peace they bring, the challenges they 
pose, and the self-reflection which results from being surrounded by their imposing 
presence when you enter alone. It is that discipline of the mind which is, perhaps, his 
lasting gift to me, his student and colleague. 
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